Aeschylus: Playwright Educator

by

Robert H. Beck

MARTINUS NIJHOFF — THE HAGUE

AESCHYLUS : PLAYWRIGHT EDUCATOR

AESCHYLUS: PLAYWRIGHT EDUCATOR

by

ROBERT HOLMES BECK

MARTINUS NIJHOFF - THE HAGUE - 1975

in memoriam

M. Carl Beck and Richard M. Elliott

© *1975 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands.*
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1975
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.

ISBN-13: 978-94-011-8175-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-011-8818-0
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-8818-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations vii

Periodicals viii

Acknowledgments ix

Prologue xi

PART ONE
LIFE, BACKGROUND AND VIEWS

I. The Symbol and the Man 3
II. Moral Lessons in Aeschylean Drama 14
III. *Timê* and Time 42

PART TWO
THE ORESTEIA

IV. *Agamemnon* 63
V. Crime, Punishment and Judgment 85

PART THREE
THE RHYTHM OF MORALITY

VI. *Prometheus Bound* 111
VII. The Danaid Trilogy 132
VIII. Plays with odd endings: *Persians* and *Seven Against Thebes* 168

References 193

ABBREVIATIONS

Aga.	*Agamemnon*
Apoll. Rhod.	Apollonius Rhodius
Diod.	Diodorus Siculus
Eum.	*Eumenides*
fn.	footnote
Il.	*Iliad*
LB.	*Libation Bearers* (*Choephori*)
M	*Mediceus Laurentianus*, codex 32, 9
Od.	*Odyssey*
PB. (*PV.*)	*Prometheus Bound* (*Prometheus Vinctus*)
Pers.	*Persians* (*Persae*)
Oxyp.	*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*
RE	*Real-Encyclopädie*
Semon. Amorg.	Semonides of Amorgos
Seven.	*Seven Against Thebes* (*Septem.*)
Suppl.	*Suppliants* (*Supplices*)
Theog.	Theognis
Vita	*Vita Aeschyli* (in the Codex Mediceus)

PERIODICALS

AJPh	*American Journal of Philology*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*
C & M	*Classica et Mediaevalia*
CF	*Classical Folia*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*The Classical Review*
CW	*The Classical World*
G & R	*Greece and Rome*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
HSPh	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
Phoenix	*Phoenix*
PCPhS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum*
Symb Osl	*Symbolae Osloenses*
TAPhA	*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*
WS	*Wiener Studien*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many persons whose help has made this study possible. The staff of the Wilson Library Reference Services Department offered assistance unstintingly. The College of Education and the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota underwrote much of the cost occasioned by the preparation of this manuscript. Miss Josephine Zimmar, Supervisor of the Faculty Secretarial Office, College of Education, released the secretarial time.

The aid of several research assistants is gratefully acknowledged; I have pleasant memories of the help given me by research assistants Raymond Larson, Penelope Lawrence, Cornelia Ooms, Tyra Orren, and Shirley Stewart.

The rather long trail taken in this study began with conversations initiated by William A. McDonald, the University of Minnesota Classics Department. McDonald has maintained his interest from that beginning. All along the way Donald C. Swanson, also of the Classics Department, has been a willing consultant on technical points in Greek language.

Special thanks are owed to the three men who offered to read the manuscript and whose suggestions have proved invaluable. One of these men, Michael Molitor, Department of Classics, University of Calgary, not only was a meticulous and most helpful reader, but loaned me his comprehensive manuscript study on the life of Aeschylus. Equally helpful were the two readers at the University of Minnesota: Arthur H. Ballet, Department of Speech and Theater Arts, and Robert P. Sonkowsky, Chairman and Professor of Classics. The faults remaining in the manuscript are not there for want of strenuous efforts made by these readers.

My wife, Maeve, has been a willing listener over the years as I took too many hours trying out notions on how some one of the characters or aspects of Aeschylus' dramas was intended. But Maeve's help went further. Her knowledge of literature and her common sense saved me from many blind alleys.

This manuscript required painstaking and tireless preparation. For their care I am very conscious of the help of Katherine Fisher, Anne Marie Nelson and Deborah Vigness—assisted by Trinidad Montero and Donald Olson.

Finally I wish to thank the following publishers who kindly have granted permission to quote: Cornell University Press; Doubleday & Company, Inc.; Robert Graves and A. P. Watt & Son; Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, LTD.; Richmond Lattimore and The University of Chicago Press; Manchester University Press; Penguin Books, LTD.

PROLOGUE

> "... We have schoolmasters for little boys; we have poets for grown men. Let our concern be only with what is good."[1]

The purpose of this book is to offer students of the history of Western education a comprehensive and consistent statement of Aeschylus' moral philosophy as given us in his extant plays. While the primary audiences for which the book has been written are classicists and those concerned with the history of Western educational thought, other audiences have been kept in mind. Aeschylus frequently used a form of debate, the *agôn logôn* to which subsequent pages so often refer. Perhaps the earliest record of debate that professors and students of speech can review are those to be found in the tragedies of Aeschylus. It goes without saying that historians of theater are a natural audience for anyone who reflects on Aeschylus. While all this seems true enough, what really needs to be admitted is that Aeschylus has been neglected as an important figure in the history of education. That his lessons were not taught in a classroom, but could be learned out of the living theater, does not make Aeschylus less of an educator. Not all ideas of prime importance in education can be found in writing about education. Aeschylus was an educator and ought to be taken seriously as one of the first of those who made a known contribution to defining the purpose of education as engraining what the Greeks agreed to be right and, *pari passu*, persuading men and women to refrain from what was agreed to be evil. If more needs to be said, I think it is enough to recognize that with Aeschylus the history of ancient Western education heard a final poetic version of a reconstructed Homeric lesson with special emphasis on individual responsibility for moral decision. Sophocles and Euripides changed the lessons and with Plato one has shifted to philosophy rather than poetry.

[1] Aristophanes. *The Frogs*. Translated by Dudley Fitts. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955, p. 107, lines 1053-1055.

I began with labeling Aeschylus as a moralist. I might have added that Aeschylus stressed individual moral responsibility. Doubtless, professional students of ethics will have a good deal to say about Aeschylus' moral philosophy—with full appreciation for its conservative quality. In any case I would welcome their cooperation in the study of ancient Greek education. Those philosophers who have liberal positions in ethics should be fascinated with the thoughts of a man who was uncompromising in upholding a stern individualism in his ideas about moral responsibility. There is another group whose joint effort with historians of education is most desirable. I am thinking of the classicists. Classicists have contributed the greatest share of what has been written about Aeschylus. Those in the classics are the natural leaders in the cooperative effort that this book invites. In fact the history of ancient education in the West must be a collaborative undertaking of educational historians and others, classicists above all. I hope that this book will be something of a bridge between the two fields. All the while I am conscious of the fact that classicists have not neglected Aeschylus, as have students of the history of educational thought.

Over thirty years have gone by since Gilbert Murray published his *Aeschylus : The Creator of Tragedy* and more than twenty since Owen's *The Harmony of Aeschylus*. Before and after those publications there has been a spate of writing on Aeschylus, almost all of it by classicists. If a historian of education presumes to say anything about Aeschylus, he is obliged to intend a contribution rather different from what has been written. This book is tendered in that spirit of obligation, and with full knowledge that Aeschylus has not been ignored by all.

My basic difference with Owen and with Murray is that I do not believe that the intention of Aeschylus' Zeus—or of any other immortal in Aeschylus' tragedies—is mysterious in the first or second plays of a trilogy, only to be revealed in the final play. In Chapter IV I will elaborate on this point. Thinking more of Owen than of Murray, my difference is twofold. I hold a view on the rhythm of Aeschylean morality (see Chapter III and Part III) that assigns a distinct role to each play in a trilogy. This rhythm can be discussed as the design of Aeschylus' trilogies. I see the first play as one in which there is a transgression of some part of the moral code. Punishment of that transgression is the major theme of the second play. Both a judgment on the morality of the punishment and, at the very end of this third play, a 'harmony' prevails. If all of this is forced into one or two plays, as has been true of the *Persians*, the rhythm is manifested in the design of that play.

But the difference I find between Owen's views and mine is over more than rhythm of Aeschylean morality. The harmony of Aeschylus of which

Owen wrote is a revelation—in the final drama of a trilogy—of what Aeschylus' Zeus intended all along. Owen feels that men have not been able to fathom that intent but finally come to see what the intention was. In place of this revelation I would substitute a concept of *homonoia* and *harmonia* being *restored* in the final moments of the third tragedy. Basically I mean *harmonoia* and *harmonia* to connote a cure, a restoration of good health, equilibrium—the equilibrium of balance, of peace, and tranquility. Most important of all, immortals or mortals have become wise, which for Aeschylus I believe meant that men or gods have reawakened to the value of the moral code, the moral code represented by Zeus. If I were to single out the essential lesson Aeschylus would wish to have learned, it would be that anyone, god or man, should mold his or her life in conformity with the moral code. The cosmic order was restored when the mean, an equilibrium, prevailed. Not only did a wife act as a wife should, being like Penelope and not Clytemnestra, but the equilibrium of the body in good health was not disturbed resulting in disease. And social-economic classes did not fight one another bringing civil war to the City. Instead there was *isonomia*, the *isonomia* of the City as of the human body in which no element prevailed, a *monarchia*, over any other to make for illness. When the third tragedy had ended there was *homonoia* and *harmonia*. Garvie, certainly one of the most able classical scholars of Aeschylean thought, was quite correct in writing that it could not "be assumed that all of Aeschylus' trilogies ended with a reconciliation, that they had a 'happy' ending."[2] The *Oresteia* had a happy ending but the *Seven* and the *Persians* did not (Chapter VIII). But I propose that both ended with *harmonia-homonoia* achieved. And it would, if Aeschylus felt that his audience had been won to accepting the moral code as governing their own conduct.

Homonoia and *harmonia* are most important terms in the systematic outline of Aeschylus' thought. I shall refer to them so frequently that more should be said about their connotation. They have a great deal in common, so much that they can be thought of as generically alike. The Latin *concordia* translates both. The English harmony derives most obviously from *harmonia* but would express the idea of *homonoia*. Both *homonoia* and *harmonia* signify wholeness. The idea is that a whole or unit which has been sundered is restored when *homonoia* and *harmonia* have been achieved. That is the gross meaning. It glosses over the fact that the Greeks did have two terms. There was a subtle difference between them. *Homonoia* signifies a meeting

[2] A. F. Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices: *Play and Trilogy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 184.

of minds (more literally a "sameness or agreement of mind"); *homonoia* is verbal. For Aeschylus this pointed to persuasion—to persuasive rhetoric as it was later called. Parties could be persuaded to consensus, agreeing on what was right and righteous to do. Thus *homonoia* was both verbal and a means to an end. For example, King Pelasgus persuaded the demos of Argos to agree to receive the suppliant maidens. This was morally correct despite the threat of war. This illustration is specially useful, although I did not have all its possibilities in mind when first choosing it. The Argive choice gave Aeschylus a chance to show that most moral decisions are a matter of choosing. King Pelasgus, and the citizens of Argos he persuades, chose to shelter the suppliant maidens despite the war such hospitality makes inevitable. The image is of a beam-balance scale. Will the righteous outweigh the unrighteous choice? If it does, there will be *homonoia*. If the unrighteous choice proves the heavier, if it is chosen, there will be stasis or other forms of distress. So much for *homonoia*.

Harmonia has a less verbal and more physical connotation (literally, "a joining together of two or more separate things"). A broken bone that knits is an example of *harmonia*. This is a useful example to choose because it highlights healing. If there was a curative agent, a physician, a bit of sundered *physis* was made whole. Aeschylus taught that physical well-being, *harmonia*, required moral well-being. Surely his contemporaries would have agreed that when the cosmic order was made whole, there would be peace and prosperity. But we have left the physician and healing too soon. The point of the *Prometheia* was the acceptance of the cosmic moral order by Prometheus. Doubtless in the *Prometheus Unbound* the Titan was persuaded and agreed with the cosmic moral code. This was *homonoia*. But he also was cured of his *nosos*. Prometheus had mended; he was whole once again. Now Prometheus could understand, could be persuaded; which came first, *homonoia* or *harmonia*? The puzzle is a bit like answering that the chicken must have existed before the egg! But we can say that harmonious whole was the end Aeschylus proposed as *desideratum*. The term *homonoia* was not used by Aeschylus in the extant plays and *harmonia* seems to have been used only once and then in a choral strophe of the *Prometheus Bound* (551) where Grene refers to the "ordered law of Zeus." The failure of the terms *harmonia* and *homonoia* to appear in the tragedies is no test of their adequacy in expressing what Aeschylus wished his audience to think achieved by those who abide by his moral code.

In the harmony of that third play unlike elements arrived at harmonious equilibrium. In sophisticated and in everyday terms Aeschylus taught a lesson about the need for a harmonious union of differences. To use the

Danaid trilogy as an example, the audience saw how disastrous it was to have women opposed to men, as the Danaids were to the Aegyptii. In the satyr play, *Amymone*, which followed the Danaid trilogy, the desirability of a harmonious union of husband and wife in the happy marriage of Hypermestra and Lynceus was stressed. Aeschylus was pointing up the pre-Socratic ideal of a group of philosophers who taught the notion that something might require a combination of different elements. These parts could be hostile to one another. If they were unfriendly, 'stasis' was likely to break out. Peace, tranquility with all its promise of a good harvest, required that the elements live in harmony.

This equilibrium was to hold only when an organism or a state of affairs, such as the family or the State, required different elements that might be hostile because polar opposites. The Greeks did think man and woman, upper and lower class, as much opposites as wet and dry. But it also was common knowledge that man and woman had to live in relative harmony if a marriage was to be successful and fruitful. We do not know how many Greeks extended this course of thinking to freedom and responsibility, the individual and society and so on. But the *Oresteia* made it indisputably clear that Aeschylus wished that the individual fear to do wrong (thus inviting the punishment of the Erinyes) was to be dovetailed with the judgment of a council like the Areopagus or Apollonian cleansing of guilt through religious rite.

We can lay down as generalization that Aeschylus held that potentially conflicting opposites must not conflict if both are needed. We believe that Aeschylus conceived of this harmony as one form of the Greek Mean.

Now I will return to my notions on the rhythm of Aeschylean morality. I hope my thoughts on this rhythm will be a small contribution in partial repayment to those who have done so much on the topic of Aeschylus. My fundamental assumption is that Aeschylus hoped to teach that which was righteous—the moral code—by showing that moral transgression leads to punishment, the justice of which had to be judged before there could be a restoration of *harmonia-homonoia.* Given this overall premise I am assuming that each of the three plays in a trilogy (or, again, if the *Persians* stood alone, in the 'sections' of such a play as the *Persians*) had at least one major function.

I have offered the opinion that the first play of any Aeschylean trilogy always features transgression of the moral law, the law of Zeus. The transgression, I will argue, would be a free, albeit most difficult, choice. By far the best known of all transgressions was that of hybris. Hybris included what the Christians came to call "the sin of pride" but also was excessive

self-indulgence or stiff-necked independence or intransigence or excessive desire for very great wealth, power or status. The core of hybris was excess. "Know yourself" was a Greek cliché that reminded each Greek that he was a man with a man's limits—a man's mortality. *Mêden agan*, "nothing to excess," was the companion piece of warning against hybris. Typical of Aeschylus was the more abstract notion that there was a mean, a cosmic *metron*, which was upset by transgression. When the cosmic order was upset, there was stasis, quarreling, even war. Equally typical was the idea that no one in his right mind would commit transgression or choose to do what ought not to be done. Ergo, anyone who transgressed, or seemed to transgress, was mentally ill. To the Greeks who had encountered the phrase, "Zeus took his reason away," the illness of real or fancied transgressors was easy to accept. Much less familiar was Aeschylus' way of having a transgression follow upon unrighteous decision.

The decision in Aeschylus is the crisis; it is critical. It is as though one moved along a well-known street to a fork. The choice of roads was anguishing. The pressures to choose the unrighteous but attractive one were great. Only the principal figure of the tragedy had to choose. Only he was the center of persuasion, arguing with himself or being counseled by others. The audience was whipped by the argument knowing that there was a good chance that the unrighteous road would be chosen. If the choice was in the first play of the trilogy, that probability became certainty, but that certainty only was known to a few. Most of the audience would not know that a first play's critical decision always was a true transgression. When the *seeming* transgression transpired in the second play, it was not really a transgression but only seemed so. Punishment of the true transgression would seem a transgression but that mistake was the result of not recognizing punishment for what it was. Aeschylus was saying that punishment invariably follows transgression and if it is violent, that is the character of punishment and does not make punishment a crime. When Orestes slays his mother, the matricide is punishment not a crime because the crime was Clytemnestra's murdering her husband. She had chosen an unrighteous action; that was her nemesis and invitation to atê.

The judgment scene of the third play would give the answer and reduce the tension of the audience. The punishment did seem unrighteous. The critical decision of the first play, always a transgression, always triggering the punishment of the second play, was made to seem the lifelike anguish that does go along with so many decisions. There were such very good reasons for choosing what ought not to be chosen. The philosophically minded might have said that moral transgressions, sooner or later, invariably

were punished. Aeschylus agreed, subscribing as he did to the rule of retributive justice and even the opinion that if one transgressed with a sword, it was by a sword that one was punished. The twist Aeschylus gave the punishment was to make it realistically ambiguous. It was the lifelike ambiguity that established the credibility of the judgment scene of the third play. Who today will fail to acknowledge the technical skill of Aeschylus?

The Greeks were accustomed to a literarily picturesque way of declaring these moral lessons. They were accustomed to poetic language and would know that the punishment said to be Zeus' meant only that the moral code had been violated. We have grown more accustomed to Greek philosophy than to Greek drama. Plato transformed "He who acts, shall suffer" (*drasanti pathein*) into something for philosophers to debate. For Aeschylus the idea of punishment was something to be extracted from a play not a philosophic dialogue.

If this book seems preoccupied with the second play of a trilogy, with punishment, that is because Aeschylus was anxious that people abjure doing the unrighteous out of fear of awful punishment. That was his chief object.

Thought of as drama, Aeschylus did not offer his audience any relief in the second play. Nor was the last play of a trilogy one that relaxed. A flood of relief and optimism only came with the latter third of the final tragedy. I shall argue that the third play of the trilogy always opened with a scene of judgment, which reached its climax with a great display of persuasion. An essential part of my explication of the final play is that someone played the role of *amicus curiae*, persuading the contending parties. In the *Eumenides* that role fell to the actor playing Athena. The persuasion reconciled and where there was stasis now there was harmony; where there was the evil of hybris there was the virtue of *sôphrosynê*, "self-knowledge and self-restraint"; the fractured was made whole; barrenness of wife or field yielded to fecundity and fertility. In the *harmonia* and *homonoia* the golden mean would have been restored.

Behind this rhythm of the Aeschylean trilogy I think one can find that the figures of Zeus for Aeschylus' plays are arguments for, or lessons in, the Zeus religion. Zeus' moral code was *the* lesson which Aeschylus wished to teach—or so I think. Aeschylus taught the old, familiar and simple principle: all things are from Zeus. And the lessons went beyond the hope that Athenians would perceive Zeus metaphorically as the spring from which all specialties, all gifts, would come to mankind through the immortal intermediaries of the Olympians. Aeschylus' generalization about Zeus included the proposition that the moral law taught in the plays was Zeus': its justice

was the justice of Zeus and his the punishment of transgression and the benefits of *eunomia*. The pupils at this lesson, the audience at the playing of the trilogies, were supposed to see that the three plays were only three ways in which Zeus is involved in the life of man—in the declaring of a moral code, in punishing transgressions (or having a human as the agent of punishment), in rewarding acceptance of the code. I believe this was the great moral lesson Aeschylus wished to teach.

Part One

LIFE, BACKGROUND AND VIEWS

CHAPTER I

THE SYMBOL AND THE MAN

PLAYS AND A SYMBOL WHICH HAVE ENDURED. The plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides have not lost favor. If Aeschylus is preferred, what is the basis for that election? There is a special attraction about the tragedies of Aeschylus, something which sets them above the great works of Sophocles and Euripides. Intangible? Intangible to be sure but explicable. The point is that Aeschylus sometimes is played in the original. The modern adaptation hews close to what is thought to have been the creation of Aeschylus. But far more often Aeschylean tragedies are freely adapted. It is as though the imaginations of modern playwrights—and painters, sculptors, poets and musicians as well—were inspired to light their candle from Aeschylus' plays and then to light a scene of their own. That is what the poet-playwright, Robert Lowell, did with his *Prometheus Bound*, written at the close of the 1960's. Even more recently—and with utter freedom in borrowing—Peter Brook, collaborating with the British poet, Ted Hughes, produced the experimental drama, *Orghast* (1971), whose principal figure was Prometheus. Nor did the Prometheus in *Orghast* exhaust the events association with Aeschylus. The play had been commissioned by the Shah of Iran who was celebrating the founding of the Persian empire. *Orghast* was played above the ruins of the palace built at Persepolis by Darius and occupied by his son, Xerxes, 'hero' of Aeschylus' *Persians*.

Even that play—and who will prefer it above any of the other extant dramas of Aeschylus?—has been inspiration for the contemporary staging in *A Ceremony for Our Time*. More than a generation earlier Eugene O'Neill had turned to *The Libation Bearers* for his *Mourning Becomes Electra*. And now we have the play *The Orphan*, touched by the self-same *The Libation Bearers*, specifically by the figure of Orestes. It is easier to make use of a single play than the brace of three in which Aeschylus usually wrote. Admittedly, the trilogy is a difficult form to manage but it has been managed. It was not long ago that John Lewin looked to all three plays

of the *Oresteia* (the *Agamemnon*, *The Libation Bearers* and the *Eumenides*) in his masterful *The House of Atreus*. How magnetizing the *Oresteia* has been; but of all three of its plays, *The Libation Bearers* has outstripped its companions in imaginative drawing power. After World War II, Jean-Paul Sartre produced *Les Mouches*. Orestes had reached out to him too. The avengers, Orestes and his sister, Electra, have been more magnetic than their murdering mother, Clytemnestra, not that the Queen has gone unnoticed. There have been no plays that she inspired, but modern dance has been the richer for Martha Graham's "Clytemnestra."

Champions of Euripides will be quick to point out that *The Bacchae* have been a lodestone and that a very great many people have seen his *The Trojan Women* or Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus the King*. That is true and is just the point. *The Bacchae* have been adapted, have inspired creative playwriting, but *The Trojan Women*, *Antigone*, or *Oedipus the King*, while they are masterpieces in and of themselves, have not lighted the way to creative drama. I may be prizing the latter excessively, without proper Greek restraint. I readily admit the value judgment. It strikes me that there is a deal to be said for a man whose *Prometheus Bound* has been a true cause célèbre. *The Prometheus symbol* has exerted a tremendous force in all forms of art, even music has been affected, witness is Beethoven's "The Creatures of Prometheus." It was fitting that the genius of Beethoven was fired by Prometheus.[1] Political liberals long have held Prometheus the symbol of mankind struggling against the oppression of political tyranny and dogma. I say that it was fitting simply because Beethoven believed in the heroic stand of freemen fighting oppression.

The liberal response to the Prometheus symbol has been astonishing, both for its vigor, persistence over time and the variety of forms it has taken. It literally would be too burdensome to detail a complete record of the responses.[2] I shall simply sample them, moving across time without regard for chronological order. The most subtle response I have come across is André Gide's *Le Prométhée Mal Enchaîné*. As in so much of his writing, Gide uses the memory of the bound Titan to plead the case of freedom for expression. The symbol of Man (and artists have equated Prometheus and Man) chained and suffering has understandably been felt a

[1] One legend has it that Prometheus fashioned men from clay. These creatures or creations of Prometheus were a way of saying that Prometheus or Promethean ventures were identified with mankind.

[2] Raymond Trousson. *Le Thème de Prométhée dans la Littérature Européenne*. 2 Vols. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964. Oskar Walzel. *Das Prometheussymbol von Shaftesbury zu Goethe*. München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1932.

terrible threat to the artist. Freedom is all his desire and time and time again the artist returns to that theme of Prometheus winning his liberty. The "Prometheus" painted by Jusepe Ribera and hung in the Prado is but a sample of that plea. Carl Block's "The Liberation of Prometheus," at the Kunsthistorish Pladearkiv of Copenhagen, is another. Rubens was one of the company which found the figure and idea of Prometheus bound irresistible. His "Prometheus Bound" is in the Wilstach collection of the Philadelphia Museum of Art. Painters have been joined by sculptors. Jacques Lipchitz's "Prometheus Strangling the Vulture," stands at the entrance of the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis. Sculptors have been more optimistic than the painters. Almost all of their creations portray the Titan free at last. So it is with James Pradier's "Prometheus Delivered" which has been placed on the grounds of the Louvre.

The poets have been the most prolific of all. To return in time no farther than the late eighteenth century we find Goethe's famous "Prometheus" of 1772. Historians will wish to know that the tone of the liberal response is set in that poem. Written with Prometheus speaking and unmistakably identified with mankind, Zeus is berated for neglecting the sufferings of Man. "I honor thee, and why?" That is the liberal cry—and not only of the eighteenth century.

Fifty years later, in 1822 Shelley published his long poem, *Prometheus Unbound.* For Romanticism,[3] and not solely English, this poem was the apogee. The *Prometheus Unbound* not only denounced Zeus (Shelley used the Latin, Jove and Jupiter) but celebrated Prometheus. "Then Prometheus // gave wisdom, which is strength, to Jupiter, // And with this law alone, 'Let man be free ...' " I am tempted to quote at greater length but, if I did, Shelley's strophes would only repeat, albeit much more sentimentally, those of Aeschylus. Of course the intent of the English poet was quite opposite from that of the Greek! Shelley intended to praise; Aeschylus, tongue in cheek, had Prometheus run on in a sick, hubristic state.

But Shelley was not alone. Lord Byron's *Manfred* (1817) was a hardly disguised poem in praise of Prometheus. In Germany, Herder wrote the *Entfesselten Prometheus* (1802) only to be joined by other nineteenth century treatments of the Titan by Schlegel, Feuchtersleben and Spitteler, whose *Prometheus and Epimetheus* (1880-81) anchored the later portion of nineteenth century German writing evoked by the Prometheus symbol. Recrossing the English Channel brings us to Elizabeth Browning for whom

[3] Douglas Bush. *Mythology and the Romantic Tradition in English Poetry.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937. Christian Kreutz. *Das Prometheussymbol in der Dichtung der Englischen Romantik.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963.

the Prometheus symbol had the greatest attraction as is evident in her *Prometheus Bound and Other Poems*, first published in 1852. Elizabeth Browning had translated the Greek, giving her translation the slightest Christian-liberal tinge. There was less restraint in Robert Bridge's *Prometheus the Firegiver*, a poetic play that is only less inhibited than Shelley.

When one has reached the later part of the last century there is no point in regarding the English Channel. The responses to the Prometheus symbol are many, if not as scholarly as those of the French poet-diplomat, Paul Claudel,[4] who wrote "notre Eschyle retrouvé." How shall we understand this vitality? In part it is that the plays, as Shakespeare's, can be played in modern dress or, better, in the dress of no period or any. Aeschylus is "a man for all seasons." Especially is he a man for this one. At a time when otherwise thoughtful men are seduced by a shallow version of relativism, when self-indulgence rules, it is well to remember the stern ethic of Aeschylus and the restraint that is as typical as the twin Apollonian sayings: *Mêden agan*, nothing to excess, and *Gnôthi sauton*, know yourself (know that you are human, with human limits). Aeschylus believed in those gnomic sayings and it is a mark of our spiritual distance from him, and from his contemporaries, that we have so badly misinterpreted the Prometheus symbol.

The impact of the Aeschylean drama is all the more remarkable for the little that we know of him. How little is quite astonishing. There is a kernel of fact and quite a lot of conjecture or the sum of observations set down quite a long time after his death. What sustained this steady flow of notices was the fascination that his plays had. We know that they were played century after century. The earliest bits of the scripts we have are from the Egyptian town of Oxyrhynchus where papyri fragments were found.[5] To come to the point, what does the inventory on the life of Aeschylus have in store?

VITAL STATISTICS. The preferred date of Aeschylus' birth is the archon-year 525/24 B.C.[6] Just as the date of Aeschylus' birth cannot be specified with certainty a good deal else relating to Aeschylus is undependable. For

[4] Paul Claudel. *Œuvres Complètes*. 22 Vols. Paris: NRF, Gallimard, 1950-67. William H. Matheson, *Claudel and Aeschylus: A Study of Claudel's Translation of the Oresteia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, n.d.

[5] E. Lobel, C. H. Robert, and E. P. Wegener (trans. and eds.) *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. Part XVIII. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1941; Part XX. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1952.

[6] Archons began their annual service in the Spring: an archon-year would span two calendar years.

example, the record of Aeschylus' victories in dramatic competition is not directly accessible. The triumphs noted in Aristotle's *Nicae*, *Didascaliae*, and *Peri Tragôdiôn* can be inspected only second- or third-hand. We must rely on Aristotle, being fortified by the thought that his chief source was official records of the archons. While the latter is certain, we do not know what other sources Aristotle mined. Reaching beyond Aristotle there are the *Vita* and the *Suidas*[7] (*Suidae Lexicon*, sometimes simply called the *Suda*), the *Marmor Parium*, with its list of victories in dramatic contests and, last of all, various elegies.

We are even less certain about the titles of all of the plays, both the tragedies and satyr plays, written and produced by Aeschylus. Only seven[8] have survived and these are mutilated versions of the *Persians*, the Orestean trilogy (the *Agamemnon*, *The Libation Bearers*, and the *Eumenides*), *Seven Against Thebes*, the *Suppliants* and *Prometheus Bound*. The *Vita* says that Aeschylus wrote seventy tragedies and five satyr plays. The *Suidas* credits Aeschylus with ninety, both elegies and tragedies.[9]

The same disagreement exists in the matter of how many times Aeschylus won in the dramatic competitions of the City Dionysia. The *Suidas* has Aeschylus victor twenty-eight times but admits that some credit Aeschylus with having won thirteen first prizes.[10] And the first of these was awarded in 484/83 B.C. when Aeschylus was a mature professional. Taking the record of victories from the *Marmor Parium* (ep. 50) or the *Fasti* (as Wilamowitz calls the fragments of the dramatic contests at the Dionysis after 520 B.C.), Aeschylus won again in 472 B.C. with *Phineus*, *Persians*, *Glaucus*

[7] The *Vita* probably was written in the tenth or eleventh century. The *Suidas* (*Suda*) refers to the tenth century Lexicon in which the entry on Aeschylus appeared. Both the *Vita* and *Suidas*, together with elegies relevant to Aeschylus, are available in translation. Reference is to Gilbertus Murray. (*Aeschyli: Septem Quae Supersunt Tragoediae.* Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano, MDCCCCLV, p. 370 ff.)

[8] The seven are to be found in manuscript M, which is in Florence's Laurentian library where it is catalogued as Mediceus Laurentianus, codex 32,9. There is reason to believe M the most reliable manuscript among alternatives. For a discussion of the manuscripts reference is to R. D. Dawe, the *Collation and Investigation of Manuscripts of Aeschylus.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).

[9] A careful critique of the subject is to be found in the first chapter, "Inventaire des Oeuvres d'Eschyle," of André Wartelle. *Histoire du Texte d'Eschyle dans l'Antiquité.* (Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1971).

[10] The sum of twenty-eight is explained by Pickard-Cambridge by acknowledging that in some lists, Athenian and Alexandrian, Aeschylus' victories sometimes were entered in his own name, and in others in the name of a producer. (Arthur Pickard-Cambridge. *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, pp. 87, 100. "*Marm. Par.*, ep. 56; *Vita* (6); Plut., *Cimon*, VIII.") (Molitor. "The Life." fn. 36, p. 10.)

and satyr play, *Prometheus*. It seems fair to say that about half of the competitions Aeschylus entered he won. We know that Aeschylus lost to the youthful Sophocles in 468 B.C. but a year later won with the tetralogy that included the *Seven Against Thebes*. And nine years later Aeschylus celebrated what might have been his final victory. That was in 458 B.C. when the prize was awarded for the *Oresteia*.

These claims of victories and prizes are quite credible as is the story that after the death of Aeschylus the city fathers of the City Dionysia of Athens underwrote the cost of the chorus for anyone who would present tragedies of Aeschylus at the dramatic festivals. Nor did the matter rest there. As Pickard-Cambridge has it, a decree was promulgated that a competitor who offered his (Aeschylus') plays was to be automatically selected as one of the competitors in the contest.[11]

If there is doubt whether Aeschylus was born in 525/24 B.C. or ten years later, his father and birthplace is much less in question. Aeschylus was born the son of Euphorion and in the town of Eleusis,[12] memorable for its mystery ceremonies. Nor does there seem to be good reason to doubt that Aeschylus had two brothers, Cynegeirus and Ameinias as well as two sons, both tragedians, Euphorion and Bion.[13]

THE TECHNICIAN. The *Persians* is all that we have left of Aeschylus' dramatic use of the Persian campaigns but it is difficult to believe that an event which cast so much glory on Athens, which would have been so popular a theme, was neglected by Aeschylus. The tragedies do hint at how cleverly Aeschylus

[11] Pickard-Cambridge. *Dramatic Festivals*, p. 101.

[12] The most adequate scholarship on the subject of Aeschylus' life seems to me to have been done by Professor Michael Molitor, Department of Classics, University of Calgary, Canada. Professor Molitor generously loaned the author his unpublished "The Life of Aischylos: A Preliminary Sketch" and gave permission to quote from it.

Molitor, "The Life," p. 1, cites the following as sources: *PA*, 442; *RE*. (13), I, i, coll. 1065-1084; *Ach*., 9-11; *Nub*., 1364-1368; *Av*., 807-808; *Lys*., 187-189; *Thesm*., 134-136; *Ran*., 755-1533; *Fragg*., 153, 610, 618 (?), 643, 646, 677, 678; Telecleides, Frag. 14; Pherecrates, Frag. 94; Anaxilas, Frag. 19; Anon. Frag. 67.

There are testimonia derived from the plays of Aeschylus or from fourth- and third-century writers. But no one of these writers had any first hand knowledge of Aeschylus. They were dependent upon "(1) the plays themselves, (2) official didascalic records, (3) references to Aischylos in the works of the fifth-century writers, and perhaps (4) on oral tradition. Seven of the plays together with many scattered fragments from some of the others have come down to us. Only a few tantalizing fragments of the didascalic records, as preserved and passed on by Aristotle, are extant today." (Molitor. "The Life," p. 1 ff.)

[13] The *Vita* and *Suidas*.

used every appeal to public approval, singling out women, men, and any other group from which he might win applause. This is one explanation for his professional success, but it should not be allowed to take away from his technical skill. By way of summary testimonial there is Kitto, one of the most learned of those who have studied the history of drama. Kitto judged Aeschylus as an immensely popular craftsman who "could write for the theatre as intelligently as any dramatist and more powerfully than most."[14] Kitto was on safe ground. There really is no serious criticism of Aeschylus as a playwright other than for the slight accorded him in Aristotle's *Poetics*. I think it fair to believe that many would agree with the unknown author of *The Musical Inquiry*, who says of the tragic poet: "Aeschylus is judged the best in tragedy."[15] In this same vein, the *Frogs* of Aristophanes sees Aeschylus hailed by Hades victor over Euripides. Clearly, Aristophanes approved of the conservative position taken by Aeschylus with respect to traditional virtues.

Responses to the style of Aeschylus are a good deal less trustworthy than appraisal of his moral stand. As might be expected the style attracted scholarly notice both early and late.[16] The *Vita* has Aeschylus striving "for the grand style," hoping to achieve "magniloquence" through the use of onomatopoesias, epithetics and metaphors. The author of the *Vita* must have thought that Aristophanes was the one to quote in making this point; the *Frogs* does pay Aeschylus this tribute: "Of, first of the Greeks to raise to towering // heights the lofty verse; and to embellish the tragic trumpery." (*Frogs*. 1004 ff.) The embellishment of "tragic trumpery" was designed to add "weightiness" to the characters of Aeschylus, the better to make a serious moral point.

AESCHYLUS AND THE ORIGINS OF TRAGEDY. There are essentially two contending theories concerning the origins of Greek drama. The most flattering to Aeschylus has tragedy or *tragôidia* the creation of Thespis and tragic drama of Aeschylus.[17] As Else tells us, another theory is that Greek tragedy developed from pre-existing sources: from dithyramb, *satyrikon*, vegetation rituals, initiation rites, hero-cult, lamentations for the dead, and so on.[18]

[14] H. D. F. Kitto. *Greek Tragedy*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961. p. 63.

[15] *The Musical Inquiry* is a short treatise attached to the *Bios Aeschyli* and accompanies the Medicean (M) manuscript.

[16] For example, F. R. Earp. *The Style of Aeschylus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

[17] Else. *The Origin*, p. 2, and Chapter IV, "Aeschylus: The Creation of Tragic Drama."

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

The most popular notion is that tragedy stems from Dionysus and the satyrs. The imagination of those who speculated on the origins of tragedy fell captive to Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*, which favored a Dionysian origin.[19] For Nietzsche each of us is swayed by primal, wild, satyr-like desires, whose non-rational being is shared with others. In the satyr dramas of early days men acted out those dark desires in theatrical orgies.

Nietzsche's is a great book; Else grants that, but Else's demolition of the argument which the philosopher projected is complete and final. It does not bear directly on our effort to understand Aeschylus for us to recapitulate Else's dismissal of the Dionysac as the source of *tragôidia*.[20]

I hesitate to say anything on the etymological connection between *tragôidia* and *tragôn ôidê*, 'song of goats,' with the idea that a satyr was half-man, half-goat. It is far better to leave the matter to Else.[21] There is no reason to doubt that all over Greece there were imaginary creatures that were part-animal (sometimes horse-men, *seilênoi*, as in the Attic-Ionic sector). And, as *satyroi*, they were choreutae of the satyr-drama. But that proves nothing about the origin of tragedy from *satyrikon*. Even as Else concludes, only a wild series of mental leaps takes one from *satyrikon* to tragedy. The leaps are bizarre and Else approaches the end of his argument with that charge. To paraphrase his argument it is that the theory becomes "chaotic nonsense."[22] The crux of the matter Else finds to lie with Thespis, to whom Else attributes the creation of *tragôidia*[23] and with whom Else finds nothing at all connecting Thespis "with satyrs, goat-like or otherwise, or with the dithyramb."[24]

Confining ourselves to Aeschylus, performances of tragedies had a serious moral purpose that would have allowed a relationship to the dithyramb but not to development out of satyrs, sileni, fat men or other creatures intended to amuse rustics. No one denies that the trilogy of Aeschylus was followed by a satyr play in which the theme of the trilogy was clothes in homespun, as it were, being coarse. Aeschylus was not above writing them and, in fact, had the reputation of being one of the most successful of those who wrote satyr plays. But the satyr plays were different from the trilogies;

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 12 ff.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 15 ff.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[23] Else elaborates his argument in the third chapter of *The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy*, "Thespis: The Creation of Tragoidia."

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

they had a similar theme but lacked all the subtleties that abounded in the trilogy. Their audience was earthy and not to be charmed by beautiful, but long, choral odes (the choral ode in the *Suppliants* runs to some 160 lines, almost a sixth of the play) or involved treatment of characters and dilemmas.

What a challenge for his actors! With masks setting a mood, the voice of the players carried both lines and action. As time went on Aeschylus could be thought to have demanded more of his actors. Of course it was just as true that the qualifications of actors were enhanced as the playwright's career matured. The possibilities for performance were so much greater for the actor playing Prometheus than for the man behind Xerxes' mask. The latter could rely on histrionics; the latter was immobile and had only his voice with which to hold and move his audience. When the history of the Western actor is realistically written, there will be reason to wonder at the theatrical genius of Aeschylus. The actor is key, not primarily as a performer but as a character in a tale. If the actor is successful, the role he plays has a character, a life and career all of its own. Characters speaking *in propria persona* had been known before Aeschylus. Garvie draws our attention to Aristotle's appreciation of Homer,[25] of Homer's ability to let characters speak for themselves. The same possibilities were available to the later poets and tragedians.

The function of an early tragic chorus will have been set by the fact that the audience could identify with, sympathize with, or condemn the character projected by the actor. When the actor is also part of a chorus, as in the *Suppliants*,[26] the situation is not materially changed. The responsibility of the chorus has been absorbed into the responsibility of the actor, and the responsibility of the early Aeschylean tragic chorus basically was to chant the moral issues, to highlight some quality that the audience was to perceive in the principal(s), and to ask questions of the character being played by the actor. The chorus was subordinate to the actor, being assigned complementary and supplementary roles.

DATING THE PLAYS. The logical next step is to date the first production of the plays. Definite dates can be accepted for only three plays, the *Persians*, *Seven Against Thebes*, and the trilogy, *Oresteia*. Dates for the other tragedies are uncertain and my central purpose of pinning down Aeschylus' moral philosophy and its formulation in the trilogy only asks for a decision as

[25] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 103; Aristotle.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 106 ff.

to whether an undated play can be thought to evidence a well developed moral position and sufficient practical experience to use the trilogy as a vehicle that truly expresses Aeschylus' moral view.

With our only reliable dates being 472, 467 and 458 for the first showing of the tragedies, a sequence might be proposed: *Persians*, 472; *Prometheus Bound* (undated but, I think, displaying Aeschylus' matured thought); *Seven Against Thebes*, 467; *Suppliants*, 464/3;[27] and the *Oresteia* in 458 B.C. On stylistic and technical grounds it has been argued that the *Prometheus Bound* could be one of Aeschylus' early plays or a tragedy he composed late in life. I side with the latter view but rest my case solely on the grounds of feeling that the *Prometheus Bound* sums some of the most thoroughly worked out moral sentiments of Aeschylus. I shall say no more; a later chapter is given over to the play.

At least one of the plays can be dated by the fact that Aeschylus mentioned the eruption of Aetna, which took place about 475 B.C., in *Prometheus Bound.* (PB. 367-74) We recall that Aeschylus produced the *Aitnai* or *Aetnae* as part of the celebration of, and augury of, good living for the citizens of the newly refounded city of Atana, renamed Aitnai by Hieron, tyrant of Syracuse. If Aeschylus actually witnessed the eruption of Aetna, he would have been in Sicily before he produced the *Prometheus Bound.* A date no earlier than 475. BC. means *Prometheus Bound* would have been written late in Aeschylus' career.

[27] With but seven tragedies extant, dating the *Suppliants* on stylistic grounds is most risky. (Garvie. *Aeschylus*' Supplices, Chap. II). Earp (F. R. Earp. "The date of the *Supplices* of Aeschylus." *G & R*, 22 (1953), p. 119) however, uses style to date the *Suppliants* early in Aeschylus' career. Wolff's line of reasoning, taken in its entirety, has been more persuasive. Wolff had the benefit of Earp's study and the papyrus fragment *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (XX. 2256, Fr. 3) published in 1952. This fragment was the first external evidence bearing on the dating of the *Suppliants.* On the assumption that external evidence is of more worth than even the most scholarly dating on stylistic grounds, Wolff did well to be guided by the papyrus fragment. To sum her argument, the fragment appears to come from the conclusion of the argument to a play, stating that a tetralogy by Aeschylus, the last two plays of which were *Danaids* and *Amymone*, won first place in a competition against Sophocles. It is generally agreed that the *Suppliants* is the first play of this Aeschylean tetralogy. Therefore, if the papyrus refers to the *first* performance the *Suppliants* could not have been shown before 469, or perhaps 466 B. C., and very possibly, not earlier than 463. The earliest dating has the *Suppliants* produced two years before *Seven Against Thebes*, or perhaps four years later than *Seven* and only five years before the *Oresteia.* (Emily A. Wolff. "The Date of Aeschylus' Danaid Tetralogy." *Eranos*, 56 (1958), p. 119.)

Inasmuch as Wolff has agreed that 463 B.C. is a possible date for the first performance of the *Suppliants*, there is no great disagreement between her and other scholars who date the play about 463. (For a summary of these authorities see Alexander G. McKay. "Aeschylean Studies 1955-1964, II." *CW*, 59 (Oct., 1965), p. 42.

The dating of the *Persians* does not require a tortuous deduction. By granting that it was highly likely that Aeschylus was Hieron's guest in Sicily between about 478 and 473, the *Persians* may have been produced at Syracuse, or in another Sicilian town, before being presented in Athens in 472.[28] But we shall use 472 as though it were the date of an initial production.

We have noted that in 467 Aeschylus won with the *Seven Against Thebes*, a year after his defeat by Sophocles when, incidentally, Aeschylus must have been in Athens—making 468 B.C. the latest date for his four year visit in Sicily. Aeschylus obviously enjoyed being in Sicily, even after Hieron's death, which took place in 467/6. (Diod., XII, 66) Aeschylus could have been in Sicily between 478 and 473 and again between 472 and 468. We know that the playwright paid Sicily a final visit and died there in 456 B.C. a celebrated playwright.

[28] The events being celebrated in the *Persians* had transpired in 480-479 B.C. (the date of the battle of Plataea in which Aeschylus fought). The battles of 480-497 B.C. were glorious victories for the Athenians and it is difficult to understand why Aeschylus had not shown the *Persians* in Athens before 472. That Aeschylus was away from Athens in Sicily is a very good explanation.

CHAPTER II

MORAL LESSONS IN AESCHYLEAN DRAMA

> "Zeus, who guided men to think // who had laid it down that wisdom // comes alone through suffering." (*Aga.* 176-78)[1]

The Greek moral consensus reached beyond Athens and included other Greek cities in a community of religious and moral values. The contributions that Aeschylus made to this consensus were those of the tragedian, who persuades his audience to learn wisdom through observing the suffering of others. The audience is not deceived by a pretense that it is relatively easy not to transgress by restraining a desire either for wealth or for power or even for status. The playwright is no Plato who has Socrates resort to duping the public by telling them an old Phoenician tale. Aeschylus will not forget the pressures men have on them because of conflicting responsibilities: Orestes, who has responsibility as the sole male heir to Agamemnon and thus has the responsibility of avenging his father's murder, is at the same time the son of the murderess and thus has responsibilities to her. In the case of Orestes, what is righteous to do? Like all the 'heroes' of Aeschylus' tragedies, Orestes has to decide. However tortuous the dilemma, Aeschylus showed his heroes making decisions. As I shall argue, Aeschylus thought these decisions were made freely, however many pressures acted on the hero. The kind of man Aeschylus wished for, he let the Erinyes sing of in the *Eumenides*: "The man who does right, free-willed, without constraint ..." (*Eum.* 550-1) Aeschylus must have wanted the audience to realize that everyone must think because everyone is vulnerable—and everyone acts.

As we have seen, Greek history up to Aeschylus' day had shown an enlargement of responsibility among more and more of Athens' citizens

[1] This statement of *pathei mathos* is to be read alongside another: "Justice so moves that those only learn // who suffer ..." (*Aga.* 250-1)

as more and more of them became parties to decisions of public policy. A less able playwright would flatter them to solve the riddle being played out. Aeschylus would not have felt that temptation; the Greeks loved difficult riddles. Some of the riddles live on like the puzzling prophecies of the Delphic oracle or the long remembered riddle of the Sphinx, finally solved by Oedipus. In any case, Aeschylus made his heroes' decisions, the turning points in his plays, so subtle and so complicated that they justified a scene of judgment, which I think took up most of the third play in an Aeschylean trilogy. Aeschylus obviously hoped to keep his audience in suspense. I have no evidence outside the tragedies to call on. The "hard evidence" that scientists seek is not given us and we must rely on the design that might have fitted the moral lessons Aeschylus wished to teach. With only the *Eumenides*, as believer, and the *Seven Against Thebes* to act as examples of third plays, I shall try to make a case for thinking that Aeschylus could have used a long judgment scene to make the moral case crystal clear. There needed to be just such clarification before the trilogy ended. After so much ambiguity had been introduced as a challenge to the thinking of members of the audience, Aeschylus must have known it was wise pedagogical strategy to clarify critical points. In many of the text chapters I shall return repeatedly to this subject of judgment. It is a crucial one for those very much concerned with teaching and learning.

In reading the tragedies we have a glimpse of a master—little more than a glimpse, though, because of a good deal of corruption of the text as well as the inevitable ravages of time and repeatedly new versions of the plays. There is much of the original we never will know, but our starting point is firm because it is part of the moral code, on which there was consensus. Aeschylus built on the foundation of the moral code, putting *pathei mathos* (wisdom comes along through suffering) in a dramatic format. It will take all of this chapter simply to give the essence of that moral code. The immediate task is to sketch the minimal essentials of the Greek view of morality: after all, the Greek moral code was the abstract material out of which Aeschylus built the concrete situations of his tragedies, and was the lifeblood of his teaching.

For even an incomplete catalogue of Greek moral values, the virtue of justice, dike, must stand first. "*Dika, dika*" (*LB.* 461) was the anguished cry of Orestes caught between his obligations as the son of Clytemnestra and also the son of Agamemnon, whom his mother had murdered. "What shall I do, Pylades?" Orestes begged of his friend; "Be shamed to kill my mother?" (*LB.* 899) The dilemma was true to the superior fashion in which Aeschylus wrote his dramas. The dramatic end was well served, and Aeschy-

lus, as he did with all the crucial decisions in his plays, had taken for his pivot a keystone of Greek moral philosophy, the concept of what was righteous, what was just.

If dike was the alpha of the Greek morality, *sôphrosynê* (self-knowledge and self-restraint) was its omega. *Sôphrosynê* was the wisdom that comes to men whether through their own suffering or from the suffering they observe. *Sôphrosynê* is that to which the audience can aspire in the third play of a trilogy, at least a playwright can hope that that has helped a member of the audience to become *sophos*. When men have reached *sôphrosynê* they will have learned to be righteous, to respect dike. This reality dictates the order of this chapter, its progression from dike to *sôphrosynê*, all the while acknowledging that dike and *sôphrosynê* are not to be kept at arm's length. Binding them is the concept of the Mean (*Metron*), a complicated idea that includes the connotation that in the cosmic order nothing is either to exceed or fall short of its proper place. Brought into the affairs of men, the Mean connotes an understanding that human life is limited by death and that within one's life excess, boasting for example, is never to be exhibited. The Greeks meant a very great deal by the Mean, the sum of that wisdom being stored up in the maxims (*gnomai*) attributed to the Seven Wise Men,[2] among whom Solon almost always is listed. Principal among these were "know yourself" (*Gnôthi sauton*)—that is, "realize that you are mortal"—and "nothing in excess" (*Mêden agan*).

Aeschylus did not depart from the conventional wisdom; he reinforced it. In fact, scarcely anyone questioned it. Even the most advanced of the abstract thinkers, the Pythagoreans, for example, were thoroughly orthodox in preferring the Limited to the Unlimited. This preference was no more than the standard Greek option favoring the Mean, the measured, which was validated by the sacred injunctions, *Mêden agan* and *Gnôthi sauton*,

[2] The Seven Wise Men, statesmen of the sixth century, articulated a good deal of Greek folk wisdom. "With few exceptions the proverbs of the Seven advise the practice of self-control, particularly the conquest of pleasure (*hedone*) and passion (*thymos*) or the recognition of limits in some form ... The best-known of the sayings, *Gnôthi Sauton* ('Know thyself') and *Mêden agan*, were inscribed in the late sixth century over the entrance to the Alcmaenid temple of Apollo, who in the archaic age fulfills the hint of the *Iliad* that he will become the god of sophrosyne (self-knowledge and self-restraint). The great development of the influence of the Delphic oracle belongs to this same period—a time during which the priests of Apollo preached measure and restraint in public and private life and encouraged decency and civilized behavior in religious rites. It was at this time that sophrosyne acquired a strongly religious flavor." (Reprinted from Helen North: *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. Copyright © 1966 by Cornell University. Used by permission of Cornell University Press. Page 10.)

with all that these connote for a life of moderation. Even "obey the laws," sacred and secular, directly related to the Mean for it was because man was a man that he needed the constraint of the law. Had one asked for a brief definition of law in order to understand man's need, it would have been that the law reflected the cosmic order. The Law was the law of nature. Had one pressed to know what was meant by the law of nature, the response would have been that the cosmic order was a collection of Means, that is, of what was dike for this or that mortal and this or that immortal. The cosmic Mean, then, was the aggregate of Means, sometimes known as the justice of Zeus. Only a madman, one out of his senses, would seek to be free of conformity: Aeschylus presents us with such a man in the character of Prometheus.

For some of the Pre-Socratics the cosmic order may have been thought of as amoral, an attribute of *physis* and nothing more. Were that so, the opinion would have been held by a minority and one in which Aeschylus was not to be found. For Aeschylus maintenance of the Mean was a matter of ethical prudence necessary for peace and prosperity. To put it all in a single sentence, the essence of the Aeschylean message was a disjunctive if-then proposition: if one desired the peace and general well-being the family and the polis, for men, and for citizens, then the Mean had to be the moral code.

THE FATAL FLAW. The terms we have noted were crucial to the Greek moral code and thereby to the first play of an Aeschylean trilogy in which the code always was violated. Because Aeschylus wished to convince people that they could avoid the unhappy consequences of transgressing, the plays had to present characters who erred of their own free will.

The connotation of *hamartia* ("fatal flaw") is that virtue is equivalent to knowledge (of what is righteous) and vice ignorance. In other words, the transgressor does not know what is righteous, sometimes because he or she is overcome by drink, or such powerful feeling as excessive anger, or illness, or is seduced or persuaded to do what ought not to be done. For the Greeks there was no excuse for being swayed and, therefore, every person enjoyed freedom of will or was responsible and could be held responsible.[3] As we shall see the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had any number of examples of even a morally strong man being misled or overcome.

[3] Grube makes this very clear in writing that should an immortal order a mortal to do something, Greeks did not think that in itself relieved the mortal from responsibility. (G. M. A. Grube. "Zeus in Aeschylus." *AJPh*, 91 (1970), p. 48.)

Aristotle was to make the "fatal flaw" very well known but the concept can be found in such a play as the *Agamemnon* (vv. 212, 502, 1197) or in the *Prometheus Bound* (vv. 9). *Hamartia*, *hamartanô*, and *exhamartanô* (*PB.* 947), in the sense of moral transgression, were consistent with Aeschylean morality. But only the person who truly transgresses suffers from a moral flaw in his or her character. This is the person who does what ought not to be done, who is illegal, who is *ou themistos*. (*PB.* 262, 268, 577, 645). The character of the Agamemnon in the *Agamemnon*—not the dead Agamemnon of the *Libation Bearers*—is flawed by an excess in his military role of commander-in-chief. It is this excess that allows Agamemnon to kill his daughter and to carry on a long war, and one in which sacred places are violated and the moral code generally transgressed in the extreme.

Even in the few surviving plays not all of Aeschylus' characters are tarnished with *hamartia*. The characters in Aeschylean tragedy were neither consummately evil nor consummately good; they were characters with which the audience could sympathize. The situations were persuasive. King Pelasgus has a personal *agôn*: he wants to preserve Argos from the ravages of war; but he also wishes to have the city-state obey the moral code, which dictates that suppliants must be protected. The daughters of King Danaus come as suppliants and warn the king: "Zeus, the suppliants' god, is terrible in anger." (*Suppl.* 346) Aeschylus shows a king distraught: "... I see overwhelming troubles everywhere; // Disasters press upon me like a river in flood. // Here I am launched upon a deep and dangerous sea // Where ruin lurks, and no safe harbour is in sight." (*Suppl.* 468-71) Righteousness lies with what the suppliants ask. How will the king decide? Will he decide righteously? The King laments the war that might come if Aegyptus' fifty sons, who have been pursuing the maidens, desiring marriage, wage war on Argos. "Is it not in the end a bitter price to pay, // That men for women's sake should soak the earth in blood?" (*Suppl.* 476-7) King Pelasgus asks. In the very next lines, Aeschylus shows that the King does not have *hamartia*; his character is morally sound and he knows what is right to do: "Yet Zeus protects the suppliant, and I must fear // His anger, which of all things most is to be feared." (*Suppl. 478-9*) In the *Eumenides*, Apollo says much the same thing. (*Eum.* 232-4) For Aeschylus, supplication was not to be taken lightly.

In play after play it is the same: whenever a leading figure in the drama chooses the unrighteous course, the flaw in his character can be detected. This does not mean that Aeschylus is unrealistically harsh. There are important people in the tragedies who are pathetic but in each case Aeschylus—always the moralist—points out some important flaw. Even figures custo-

marily thought altogether pathetic fail the moral test. The three most pathetic who come to mind are Cassandra in the *Agamemnon*, Io in the *Prometheus Bound*, and if we can imagine the sequel to the *Suppliants*, Hypermestra. In the cases of Io and Hypermestra, there are extenuating circumstances; they are more to be pitied than punished. Io is almost the most pitiable, but the audience would have been expected to be on guard, the Io story being presented by Prometheus, himself deluded in his rage against Zeus.

Although we have but a fragment of the satyr-play *Amymone*, which followed the Danaid trilogy, we know that Amymone is one of the Danaids, that she is persuaded by Poseidon to yield herself to him, and that from that union is born Nauplius, progenitor of great men. The Danaid trilogy, of course, has argued the case for marriage and the eros that must precede it. Io did not yield to Zeus, as Amymone did to Poseidon. But we can be sure that Aeschylus did not mean for Zeus' desire for Io to be thought more brutal than that of Poseidon for Amymone. Incidentally, there is another wanderer in the *Prometheia*, Heracles, who appears in the *Prometheus Unbound.* As Io, Heracles is a victim, not of Zeus, but of the jealous wife. Heracles, and Io, were "driven by Hera's hate" (*PB.* 591), a "victim of jealous plots" (*PB.* 601). Was Aeschylus warning women not to be blinded by jealousy that may lead to excessive hate? Aeschylus would have taught a lesson while creating a fine bit of symmetry in his writing of the two final plays of the *Prometheia.*

And what of Cassandra? Cassandra promises to yield to Apollo in return for the gift of prophecy, but she breaks her word. Io can be pitied; she is held back by maidenly fear. But what of Cassandra? Aeschylus intended for his audience to realize that Cassandra was seriously ill—mentally ill, we would say today. "Oh, flame and pain that sweeps me once again! My lord, // Apollo, King of Light, the pain, aye me, the pain!" (*Aga.* 1256-57) Did Aeschylus wish to have Cassandra seem pitiable? Yes, but the pitiableness of Cassandra only reinforces Aeschylus' hard moral line. Her transgression has made her incurable. Cassandra can be pitied, but not healed. Story has it that Cassandra wished the gift of prophecy so that she might assist her city, Troy. In the *Agamemnon* Aeschylus does not have Cassandra say anything but that "Apollo was the seer who set me to this work." (*Aga.* 1202) That is, Cassandra has accepted the gift of prophecy in return for having intercourse with Apollo. "I promised that to Loxias, but I broke my word." (*Aga.* 1208) It makes no difference that we moderns might not be upset by a broken promise; Aeschylus wished to have promises thought sacred. As pitiable as Cassandra is, she has to die, and from her story the audience learns a hard lesson about promises.

But after all their suffering, Io and Cassandra are left with at least some recompense. Cassandra has to die but Aeschylus had the Elders of Argos praise her with what was high praise for the Greeks. "Woman, be sure your heart is brave; you can take much ... there is a grace on mortals who so nobly die." As for Io, Prometheus prophesies the restoration of her mind (*PB.* 848-9) and the Suppliants tell how Io gave birth to a child by Zeus, (*Suppl.* 312) who healed Io. After all to have a child by Zeus the Greeks thought a splendid honor.

As for Hypermestra we shall see that there was no dearth of stories of how she lived happily ever after with her husband, Lynceus. Hypermestra, while she is deprived of reason by *himeros*, really does not transgress at all in not going along with the plan to murder the sons of Aegyptus. I believe that there was a judgment scene in which this is made evident. What a wonderful opportunity Aeschylus had in which to argue Hypermestra's case even though she did disobey her father! But more of this later. Our attention for the moment must be on the general moral law and the pivotal doctrine of *pathei mathos.*

To make sense of *pathei mathos*, the absolute heart of Aeschylus' moral philosophy, it is necessary to know that he regarded the second play of the trilogy, the play of punishment, as crucial. The 'suffering' was in that play. To no one's surprise, this second play contained more than simply justified punishment; it also introduced a potential transgression, whose assessment set up the judgment scene of the third play. The moralist who taught *pathei mathos* was a playwright. We can only admire, rueful that so many teachers today cannot make their moral teachings as intriguing. Aeschylus mastered that objective without making his moral position any less stern. And it was stern.

Complementing Aeschylus' unwavering belief that a transgression invited the censure of the immortals and inevitably would be succeeded by atê, was his assurance that there was no relief—none whatever—from constant individual moral responsibility. "Not to do wrong" (*Eum.* 85) was continuously being preached in Aeschylus' tragedies. If one did wrong, there was no way to avoid punishment—no forgiveness, no mercy, no charity. Nor was there an evolution that relegated punishment, represented by the Erinyes, whom Aeschylus found admirable for dramatic purposes, to the first play in the trilogy. Punishment was not to be left behind as belonging to earlier times, or to monarchy, while the trilogy presented an evolution toward persuasion or something else more suited to the Aeschylean polis.[4]

[4] The classic statement of the evolutionary position on punishment is that of G. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens*, pp. 291, 387.

Aeschylus believed just as much in punishment when he wrote the third play as when he wrote the first or second. Athena did persuade the Erinyes to become Eumenides in the third play of the *Oresteia*, but that meant nothing else than that the third play was not one emphasizing punishment. As Aeschylus might have said about his formulation of the trilogy, punishment was appropriate to the earlier plays; but its absence from the third, symbolized by the Erinyes becoming Eumenides, did not mean that Aeschylus thought that the *lex talionis* belonged to the bloody monarchical past. Aeschylus might have added that Orestes really could not have been guilty. After all, was not this the third play whose ending would show the virtue rewarded and vice punished?

Aeschylus did not use language that indicates he believed in anything similar to the Christian idea of grace, or forgiveness of a transgression. "The wages of sin is death" comes closer to Aeschylus' meaning. It is vital to be clear about this. The moral position of Aeschylus is exactly as unrelenting as it appears to be. Consider the matter of grace (*charis*).[5] It is difficult to generalize on the true meaning of *charis* except to say that *charis* rarely, if ever, connotes forgiveness of sin.

We have argued that Aeschylus would not have wished Greeks to count on *charis*. No amount of charity from Olympus would hold back the Erinyes. To speak less anthropomorphically, punishment was a "law of nature": the doer of wrong would be punished, or else his progeny would be punished. (*LB.* 400-3 and *Aga.* 373-74)

What could have been an embarrassment for Aeschylus was his challenge to orthodox opinion, as well as to the priesthood of Apollo at such purificatory temples as Apollo's at Delphi. While we do not intend to introduce Aeschylus' perception of the immortals in this chapter, Apollo demands attention: the Greeks gave Apollo a specific role vis-à-vis their notion of the right thing to do. It only requires a moment's reflection on the *Eumenides* to see the point. The participation of Apollo in the *Eumenides* was suggestive of how important to Aeschylus was the sacred law of which Apollo was

[5] Grace is not a Greek word but *charis* is often translated as grace. There are shades of meaning carried by *charis* that shall not be taken up here. One of these appears in the *Agamemnon* where *charis* is used to lend strength to the idea that in the absence of the kings the people felt desolate, "... even death were grace." (*Aga.* 550) Liddell and Scott define *charis* as "grace of favors felt" by (1) the doer, as a feeling of kindness or goodwill and (2) by the receiver, as a sense of favor received, thanks or gratitude. (Liddell and Scott. *Lexicon*, p. 1978.)

When Cassandra told the Argive elders that she would remain and die, Aeschylus gave the Chorus the line: "Yet there is a grace on mortals who so nobly die." (*Aga.* 1304)

the chief *mantis* (wise man) or *chrêsmologos-mantis*.[6] The *chrêsmologoi* were presumed expert in this sacred literature, a good deal of which contained prediction of future events and, therefore, was material for seers, religious persons who could foretell the future. Because they were basically religious functionaries, it was inconceivable that what was to happen would not be just.

As a prophet, chief of all prophets and the 'patron' of prophets, Apollo was to be thought incapable of telling an untruth. This was strongly stated in the *Eumenides* where Aeschylus has Apollo tell the court Athena has established: "... I shall speak justly. I am a prophet, I shall not // lie. Never, for man, woman, nor city, from my throne // of prophecy have I spoken a word except // that which Zeus, father of Olympians, might command. // This is justice (*dikaion*). Recognize then how great its strength." (*Eum.* 615-19) These lines were Oliver's basis for saying that when all other *chrêsmoi* failed, Greeks turned to those of the Delphic temple. "When questions arose for which this extant ancient and Delphic literature provided no guide, there was the possibility of asking guidance again from Apollo the unerring spokesman of his father Zeus ..."[7]

When a Greek went to Delphi or consulted an oracle or *mantis* at some other place, he probably wanted advice on matters that at first glance did not seem to be strictly moral. The questions might involve foreign policy or they might be personal, but they seemed not to involve a question of whether an action contemplated might or might not be themis. And yet almost all questions could be reduced to asking whether a line of conduct was what should be done. The touch-stone was always: Is it appropriate? Is it what ought to be done? But the Greeks did not visit Delphi for advice only. It was believed that Apollo could purify one and atone for transgressions. It was in this respect to the oracles' purifying powers that Aeschylus may have been unorthodox.

The audiences of the *Libation Bearers* heard the lines of the Chorus: "What can wash off the blood once spilled upon the ground?" (*LB.* 48) This line could have been about what Christians discuss when using the word atonement. It was only in the third play of the *Oresteia* that the polluting stain of blood on one's hands, the hands of Orestes in this case, were said to be cleansed in Apollonian ritual. The crucial scene to be considered in any discussion of what might have been the thoughts of Aeschylus on purification is in the *Eumenides*. Orestes assures Athena that he is not a

[6] James H. Oliver. *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950, Chapter III.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

suppliant unpurified. The youthful son of Agamemnon claims to understand "the many rules of absolution" (*Eum.* 277) which include purification by clear water. Aeschylus has Orestes tell Athena that he has followed the rules. (*Eum.* 450-53) Knowing that the *Eumenides* is the third play in the trilogy and that the *agôn logôn* between the Erinyes and Apollo comes in the judgment scene of that third play, we are cued to attempt uncovering what it was that made matricide righteous. Apollo will not purify the truly unrighteous, that is, those who can be thoughtfully judged unrighteous. The truly righteous, of course, do not need purification. Thus, the premeditated killing of Clytemnestra is apparently to be ruled righteous, but some of the audience would wish to know why. With only minutes to go before the judgment scene ends and the persuasion begins, the audience would have to figure out why Orestes could have been purified by Apollo. As the saying goes, this was a true "cliff hanger." At this point in the analysis of Aeschylus' moral philosophy, I wish to place Aeschylus in the moral tradition of Homer. An essential element in my analysis is that Aeschylus was a conservative, conserving a moral code that can be called Homeric. For example, the playwright's frequent use of the law of retributive justice that has transgression bring punishment is Homeric. Even the Aeschylean concept of a man learning by his suffering, as Odysseus learned (and as those who learn of Odysseus learn), is an idea that was strongly evident in the epics of Homer. I will undertake to be specific.

HOMERIC MORAL LESSON: THE ILIAD. Aeschylus was presumed to have said that his tragedies were bits "from Homer's great feast."[8] Although Aeschylus modified the stories in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*,[9] the modification was consistent with the basic moral lessons taught by Homer. Many could have been learned from the *Odyssey*, which Aristotle called an "ethical epic."[10] Others especially on the subjects of pity and persuasion, were set out to be learned from the *Iliad.* Pity and persuasion often were used in those few plays of Aeschylus which have survived. So, too, being overcome by

[8] Athenaeus, VIII, 347e, (cf. Eustath. ad *Il.*, XXIII, 256, p. 1298, 56). We grant that the attribution is not to be accepted uncritically. (Garvie. *Aeschylus*' Supplices, p. 45 ff.)

[9] The edition of the *Iliad* used is *The Iliad of Homer*, translated with an Introduction by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press, 1961. Copyright 1951 by the University of Chicago; used here by permission. Random lines from *Homer, The Odyssey* by Robert Fitzgerald. Copyright © 1961 by Robert Fitzgerald. Reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc., and, for the British Commonwealth, by William Heinemann LTD.

[10] Else. *Aristotle's Poetics*, p. 594 ff.

a great passion, as Prometheus was overcome by intense anger, was in the Homeric story of Achilles. As Prometheus, Achilles finally recovers from his illness of excessive wrath. We knew that Homer has Achilles show pity and return to battle. The great warrior 'bends'; he relents and obeys his commander-in-chief, Agamemnon. In the face of the missing *Prometheus Unbound*, we can only guess—as I later will say at greater length—that the relenting of Prometheus and his reconciliation with Zeus parallels the behavior of Achilles.

Pity, persuasion and excessive anger came together in the Ninth Book of the *Iliad* when Odysseus, Aias, and Phoenix set out to persuade Achilles to recover from his anger with Agamemnon. The old man, Phoenix, who taught Achilles is shown attempting to persuade chiefly by means of pity and a warning against the great wrath which cost Meleager his life.

Phoenix reminds Achilles that "many times you soaked the shirt that was on my body // with wine you would spit up in the troublesomeness of your childhood. // So I have suffered much through you, and have had much trouble ..." (490-92) This plea for pity by the old teacher-nursemaid is the mainstay of Phoenix's efforts at persuasion but they are not all of it. He urges Achilles to honor prayer (502 ff.) and to remember Meleager's wrath, at last subdued.[11]

Achilles, like Prometheus, remains unpersuaded by all the pleas. Achilles will not be reconciled with Agamemnon. "I will join with him in no counsel,

[11] The story of Meleager's wrath (IX, 524 ff.) was a part of the oral tradition. It taught that it was well always to remember the gods when the first fruits of a good harvest were gathered. Homer had Phoenix alter the moral to emphasize the folly of extreme and persistent anger. The story had it that Artemis was angry with Oeneus, king of Aetolia, because he did not offer her the first fruits of the harvest. Artemis sent a wild boar to ravage the vineyards of Aetolia. Meleager, son of Oeneus, heading huntsmen and hounds, killed the boar. Artemis, still angry (the blinding effect of great anger applied only to mortals), set the Aetolians and neighboring Curetes to fighting for the boar's head and hide. Presumably Meleager drove back the Curetes and slew his uncle, who was a Curete. Rage had overcome Meleager and Meleager's death was voiced by his own mother, who cursed her son because Meleager had killed her brother.

Homer told the story in such a fashion that attention was riveted on the war between the Curetes and the "steadfast Aetolians." (IX, 529-32) The parallel with the Trojan War was made more dramatic in this adaptation. Having established this parallel between the wars, Homer has Phoenix remark the anger of Meleager, caused by his mother's curses, that led him to withdraw from the battle, the Aetolians thereby losing their greatest warrior. The appeal had become a good deal more personal, drawing a comparison between Achilles and Meleager. (IX, 553-94) The clinching argument was presumed to be that the gifts that have been promised Achilles by Agamemnon will be given whereas those promised Meleager were not forthcoming.

and in no action. // He cheated me and he did me hurt. Let him not beguile me // with words again ... I hate his gifts ..." (374-78)

As one reflects on the lessons taught by the behavior of Achilles, I think that one of the chief lessons of the *Iliad* was to take into account the responsibilities and rights that go with another person's role. This is the intention of the term *aidôs*. Achilles is said to be morally in error for not respecting and obeying his leader, Agamemnon,[12] exactly as Aeschylus' Prometheus is lacking in respect for, and obedience to his 'leader,' Zeus. Since we have discussed the moral implications of the responsibility attending a role, and also the problems involved in a conflict between roles, it might be enough to say that there was a moral connotation to *aidôs*.

Following Macurdy's lead,[13] we know that *aidôs* in Homeric epic often was associated with *eleos*, another translation of pity but a rendition that emphasizes mercy, as the mercy shown by the victor in battle for the vanquished. I also believe that *aidôs* and *eleos* joined in the thought of propriety. That is, the man who displayed *aidos* or *eleos* was not indulgent; he was pious. It must hastily be added that prayerful supplication and sacrifice did not relieve characters from their moral responsibility, either in Homer or in the plays of Aeschylus.

Having showed how wrong and disastrous it was for a man to be so mastered by such a feeling as anger that he is as pitiless and stubbornly insurbordinate as Achilles, Homer has his strong man relent and show pity. The change comes in the final book of the *Iliad*; for the *Prometheus*, the change is manifested at the end of the trilogy. We do not have that final play of the *Prometheia*, the *Lyomenos*, but fragments indicate that such a change is made. It allows Prometheus and Zeus, symbol of the moral code, to become reconciled. Prometheus recovers from his anger. The Titan is 'healed' exactly as one can say that Achilles is 'healed.'

As strong mortals could change, so could and did a very powerful immortal. In changing his mind, the god recognized the justice of the case at hand. Poseidon changed his mind, subduing his anger in the face of the command of Zeus that the gods refrain from taking sides in the Trojan War. As Homer told about the change, Poseidon was sorely vexed. "Great though he is, this that he has said is too much. // if he will force me against my will, me, who am his equal // in rank." (XV, 185-87) The words which then follow were worth note. Iris, messenger sent by Zeus, responded.

[12] Bowra. *Tradition*, pp. 18, 177.

[13] Macurdy had it that "the word *aidos*, shame, regard for others ... is joined with the word *eleos*, pity, in Apollo's indictment of Achilles' cruelty." (Macurdy. *Quality of Mercy*, p. 16.)

One cannot but contrast this response, which was successful in persuading Poseidon to show *aidôs* to Zeus, *aidôs* which Achilles would not show the commander-in-chief of the Achaeans, with that of another messenger of Zeus, the Hermes of the *Prometheus Bound.* (*PB.* 944 ff.) Unjustly, Prometheus called Hermes "the lackey of the Gods" (*PB.* 954), "young" and delivered of a speech Prometheus held "pompous sounding, full of pride." (*PB.* 953)[14]

The persuasive words of Iris were simple and few: "Am I then to carry, O dark-haired, earth-encircler, // this word, which is strong and steep, back to Zeus from you? // Or will you change a little? The hearts of the great can be changed." (XV, 201-3) Poseidon's answer was even more brief. "Now this, divine Iris, was a word quite properly spoken. // It is a fine thing when a messenger is conscious of justice." (XV, 206-07) The Homeric ethical generalization, then, is that no matter how strong one is, no one should stand on that strength.

We know now that there was precedent for change of heart by both strong mortals and immortals given in the *Iliad.* This teaching was not lost on Aeschylus; neither was the generalization that the formation of character in youth was the greatest opportunity of the educator. Not only was Homer aware, but the example he chose for his lesson was a young man learning to defer to an elder. With a canny eye to the attraction competitive sport has for youth, the lesson Homer wished to teach he taught in the context of the games Achilles offered in memory of his friend, Patroclus. The lesson came in dialogue between Menelaus and Antilochus, son of that wise man, Nestor. Like all such dialogues this one was but a step away from the debate, the *agôn logôn* of the Aeschylean tragedy.

Antilochus was not one whom age had taught, but he had a formal education and he probably was Homer's model of how a young man should be improved by his instruction. Antilochus was no bookworm when he entered the chariot race which was part of Achilles' games. Antilochus entered to win. The young man beat out the chariot team of Menelaus but fouled Menelaus' horses by urging his own too close to those of the King. When Menelaus asked Antilochus to swear that he "used no guile to baffle my chariot" (XXIII, 585) Antilochus did not lie but conceded the race. No sooner had Antilochus admitted the error of his ways, than King Menelaus returned the prize mare to Antilochus. The lesson was

[14] I will defend the "unjustly" later on but would call attention to an excellent discussion by Anthony J. Podlecki. "Reciprocity in *Prometheus Bound.*" *GRBS*, 10 (Winter, 1969), pp. 287-292.

clear. Antilochus had become humble and was rewarded for his humility, deference to age, and honesty. The dialogue itself is so instructive that it should be quoted.

"Enough now. For I, my lord Menelaos, am younger // by far than you, and you are the greater and go before me. // You know how greedy transgressions flower in a young man, seeing // that his mind is the more active but his judgment is lightweight. Therefore // I would have your heart be patient with me. I myself will give you // the mare I won, and if there were something still greater you asked for // out of my house, I should still be willing at once to give it // to you, beloved of Zeus, rather than all my days // fall from your favour and be in the wrong before the divinities." (XXIII, 586-595)

So graceful were the concessions of Antilochus that they invited the splendid passage of noblesse in which Homer has Menelaus respond.

"He spoke, the son of Nestor the great-hearted, and leading // the mare up gave her to Menelaos' hands. But his anger // was softened, as with dew the ears of corn are softened // in the standing corn growth of a shuddering field. For you also // the heart, O Menelaos, was thus softened within you." (XXIII, 596-600)

The speech that Homer gives Menelaus is itself a model for the gracious response of the strong and wise hearing a supplication.

Menelaus spoke to Antilochus and "addressed him in winged words." "Antilochos, // I myself, who was angry, now will give way before you, // since you were not formerly loose-minded or vain. It is only // that this time your youth got the better of your intelligence. // Beware another time of playing tricks on your betters. // Any other man of the Achaians might not have appeased me. // But you have suffered much for me, and done much hard work, // and your noble father, too, and your brother for my sake. Therefore // I will be ruled by your supplication. I will even give you // the mare, though she is mine, so that these men too may witness // that the heart is never arrogant nor stubborn within me." (XXIII, 601-11)

HOMERIC MORAL LESSONS: THE ODYSSEY. The *Odyssey* contains any number of moral lessons, but the principal one is retributive justice. The idea of retributive justice is simple enough: transgression inevitably is followed by punishment. There are a variety of transgressions in the *Odyssey*, but the outstanding moral error was that of hybris. And hybris was the flaming transgression of the suitors, living in Odysseus' palace and courting his wife, Penelope. In fact, Penelope labels them hybristic. "Never were mortal men like them // for bullying and brainless arrogance." (XVII, 584-85)

Retributive justice clouds the background. Eumaeus, himself righteous, thinks of the hybris of the suitors when Homer has the old swineherd say: "The gods ... are fond of no wrongdoing, // but honor discipline and right behavior." (XIV, 83-5) And at last the suitors are punished.

The suitors are guilty of a long statement of charges. They violate the code of hospitality, most evilly at the instigation of Antinous who throws his footstool at Odysseus and hits him when Odysseus is disguised as an old begging stranger. (XVII, 409 ff.) Antinous' "payment" for this act of evil-doing is death at the hands of the bowman, Odysseus, when the suitors are slain. Not only Antinous, but many other suitors keep mistresses, who are maidservants in the hall of Odysseus. (XX, 8 ff.) This dishonors Penelope, and it was considered especially reprehensible conduct to treat another man's female servants as though they were handmaidens of one's own.

The suitors are an almost unbelievingly bad lot. But there was Amphinomus among them, Amphinomus whose "head is clear," (XVIII, 125) Amphinomus, at whose knee the disguised Odysseus hides when Antinous shies a footstool at him, had urged his fellow suitors to consult an oracle before killing Telemachus. (XVI, 407-11) When a "portent" showed the murderous plot unlucky, Amphinomus had urged abandoning the plan. (XX, 25-51) Amphinomus had given generously to the "old beggar" (XVIII, 339) and was described as one suitor who had "lightness in his talk that pleased // Penelope, for he meant no ill." (XVI, 402-03)

It was to Amphinomus whom Homer had Odysseus address most significant lines, whose burden was that mortals are not above the moral law, however strong or fortunate. That was the brunt of Odysseus' words to Amphinomus, which conclude: "No man should flout the law, // but keep in peace what gifts the gods may give." (XVIII, 142-43) Odysseus urges Amphinomus to return to his home but Amphinomus stays. "Amphinomos, for his part, // shaking his head, with chill and burdened breast, // turned in the great hall. // Now his heart foreknew // the wrath to come, but he could not take the flight, // being by Athena bound there." (XVIII, 157-61)

The one good man among many evil men seems to have been a precedent for Aeschylus' character, Amphiaraus, stationed at the Homoloean Gate (*Seven.* 568 ff.), the one admirable soldier among the Argive champions, as we are told in the *Seven Against Thebes.* (568-96) We shall meet Amphiaraus again, for he was a symbol of how a man ought to behave.

Hybris could not go unpunished in a morality that celebrated the same retributive justice that we find in Aeschylus, but as in Aeschylus, the punishment does not take place immediately. The anger of the gods, in this instance

Poseidon's, is announced at the very outset of the *Odyssey*, but the punishment is put off to the end. Ten years of wandering by Odysseus intervene, wandering caused by Odysseus' own hybris and the greed of his crew, which led them to be mutinous and impious.

The transgression of the crew grew from greed. And, as with Aeschylus, the man who taught Greeks by means of the *Odyssey* was a type of poet, a minstrel. "All men owe honor to the poets—honor // and awe, for they are dearest to the Muse // who puts upon their lips the way of life." (VIII, 478-80) It was from a poet-minstrel that the Greeks learned that Odysseus' crew were punished by death "for their own recklessness ... children and fools, they killed and feasted on // the cattle of the Lord Helios, the Sun ..." (I, 11-12)

For his part, Odysseus learned from the 'suffering' of years of wandering. Though strong in his morality, Homer showed that even an Odysseus could transgress. The captain boasted of blinding the one-eyed Polyphemus. The crew begged Odysseus not to taunt the blinded giant. "I would not heed them in my glorying spirit, // but let my anger flare ..." (IX, 500) That "glorying spirit" was hybris.

After ten years of wandering Odysseus does return to Ithaca and the suitors are punished. And so are all those who consorted with them. Even the serving girls, who had been mistresses of the suitors are hanged; they "perish ... most piteously. // Their feet danced for a little, but not for long." (XXII, 473-5)

In the literary world of Homer, and later in that of Aeschylus, evil and virtue know no class lines. The noble suitors for Penelope's hand are not less nor more evil than the goatherd, Melanthius, or Melanthius' sister, Melantho. As the crewmen disobeyed Odysseus, so Melantho disobeyed Odysseus' wife. "She was Dolios' daughter, // taken as a ward in childhood by Penelope // who gave her playthings to her heart's content // and raised her as her own. Yet the girl felt // nothing for her mistress, no compunction ..." (XVIII, 325-9)

Granting that retributive justice was the first of all the lessons Homer would have learned, the one endorsing hospitality was essential. The granting of guest privileges by King Pelasgus in Aeschylus' *Suppliants* was thoroughly Homeric. Long before the professional work of Aeschylus, Homer had taught how praiseworthy was the hospitality shown by the poor swineherd, Eumaeus, who gave succor to Odysseus, disguised as a poor old wanderer. Again hospitality was not to be limited by social class. Penelope orders a bath and bed for the poor old wanderer. (XIX, 99 ff.)

Nor was sex a distinction in the moral lessons of Homer any more than

it would be for Aeschylus. When Odysseus visits the underworld he talks with the shade of Agamemnon. Perhaps some of the audience at Aeschylus' Agamemnon would remember the gist of that lesson. The ghost draws a moral contrast between Penelope, "Icarius' faithful daughter," and his own wife, Helen's sister, "the adultress." The summing up of this contrast was memorable. "O fortunate Odysseus, master mariner // and soldier, blessed son of old Laertes! // The girl you brought home made a valiant wife! True to her husband's honor and her own. // Penelope, Ikarios' faithful daughter! // The very gods themselves will sing her story // for men on earth—mistress of her own heart, // Penelope! // Tyndareus' daughter waited, too—how differently! // Klytaimnestra, the adultress, // waited to stab her lord and king. That song // will be forever hateful. A bad name // she gave to womankind, even the best." (XXIV, 194-206)

THE HARMONY OF AESCHYLUS. In ending this section on the moral lessons Homer taught and Aeschylus learned, the manner in which Homer ended the epic comes across to us with very great force. Once again we think of Owen's title, *The Harmony of Aeschylus*. Almost with delight we recognize that the end of the *Odyssey* could have been Aeschylus' model for the ending of his trilogies. *Harmonia* and *homonoia* have been restored, virtue has its reward and, above all, Athena has been the agent of Zeus in restoring the tranquility of equilibrium where there was stasis before the suitors were punished. There was specific precedence for the Aeschylean happy ending at the close of the *Odyssey*. At its close Athena made peace between Ithacans seeking revenge for the death of the suitors, and the three generations of Arcisiades, Laertes, his son Odysseus, and Odysseus' son, Telemachus. There was no question of where the right lay. The Arcisiades were in the right but Homer did not permit this righteous plaintiff to obliterate the claims of the male relatives of the evil suitors.

The leader of the avenging Ithacans is Eupeithes. Eupeithes is father of the chief suitor, Antinous. Homer placed before his audience the case of wrongdoing paid; "the wages of sin is death." But the payment is not complete. As there are generations of the just, there are at least two generations of the unjust. The father of Antinous leads an avenging party, as his son once led the suitors. Is Eupeithes to remain alive? Of course not, for Homer argued that justice and injustice ran in families. The resolution offered by the final book of the *Odyssey* was instructive. Eupeithes is slain, killed by the equally senior Laertes, father of Odysseus. Athena thereby shows that the gods have been aligned with the forces of righteousness, assuming that Athena can be said to represent the Olympians. Athena has taken the side of the Arcisiades in the trial of right and wrong.

When Eupeithes has died by the spear thrown by old Laertes, the moral lesson of retributive justice is taught, and the struggle must end. It is exactly at this point that Athena makes her appearance, still in the disguised form of Mentor. Homer has already said that the "will of Zeus" is that Athena conclude the matter, as Athena makes the final decision in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, a decision which leads to peace.

That Athena is responsible both for the main course of events in the *Odyssey* and also for the manner in which the principal action ends is manifest in lines given Zeus. Athena asks Zeus what he wishes. What is his will? Zeus responds to the question of Athena in this way: "My child, // why this formality of inquiry? // Did you not plan that action by yourself— // see to it that Odysseus, on his homecoming, // should have their blood? // Conclude it as you will." (XXIV, 476-80)

Matters are not left at that. Homer spelled out what the right action was, the proper conclusion. And Homer had the concluding act sanctioned by Zeus himself. In substance, that amounted to declaring the action just. Thus Zeus follows his, "Conclude it as you will," by: "There is one proper way, if I may say so: Odysseus' honor being satisfied, // let him be kind by a sworn pact forever, // and we, for our part, will blot out the memory // of sons and brothers slain. As in the old time // let men of Ithaka henceforth be friends; // prosperity enough, and peace attend them." (XXIV, 481-7) Most of Odysseus' companions are terrified, their "faces paled with dread" (XXIV, 517) when Mentor roars in a "great voice," commanding: "Now hold! // break off this bitter skirmish; // end your bloodshed, Ithakans, and make peace." (XXIV, 515-6)

Homer was careful not to have Athena appear in her form, for it would have been scandalous for Odysseus to be so out of character as to have disobeyed Athena definitely known to him. Odysseus "ruffling like an eagle on the pounce" (XXIV, 524) makes ready to carry on the fight; this prolongs the action just enough, then a thunderbolt of Zeus drops at "Mentor's" feet. The audience already knows the recommendation of Zeus; the Arcisiades now know that further fighting is not in the interest of justice. Odysseus leaves off. "Both parties later swore to terms of peace // set by their arbiter, Athena, daughter // of Zeus who bears the stormcloud as a shield — // though still she kept the form and voice of Mentor." (XXIV, 531-37) The *Odyssey* concludes with these words.

When one considers the ending of the *Eumenides*, it would seem that Aeschylus was adapting the scenes, if not the lines, that rounded off the *Odyssey*. The skirmish of Arcisiades with the kin of the suitors becomes the debate of the Erinyes and Apollo; as in the *Odyssey*, Athena is arbiter

and the will of Zeus is for reconciliation, harmony, and peace with justice. There is but one fundamental difference between the manner in which Homer and Aeschylus achieved the peace that ends both the epic and the *Oresteia*. As I think was his habit, Aeschylus concluded the *Oresteia* with a court scene, a judgment between contending parties, which dominated most of the *Eumenides*. In the *Oresteia* it is true enough that Athena founds the Areopagus but Athena's will does not put an end to the action. The court plays an essential part; Athena breaks a tie vote, showing where justice lies; but that does not negate the importance of the mortals' judgment. It is doubtful whether Homer would ever have gone this far. In the *Odyssey* he did not. He saw no need for mortal decision. Athena brings peace all by herself, and Odysseus goes off to make his peace with Poseidon, guaranteeing that his wanderings are at an end and that he will slip quietly into a gentle old age.

AESCHYLUS' LESSON: DOES ONE HAVE TO SUFFER BEFORE ONE CAN LEARN? To repeat, *pathei mathos*, ("Justice so moves that those only learn who suffer ..." *Aga.* 250-51 or "Zeus, who guided men to think // who had laid it down that wisdom // comes alone through suffering." *Aga.* 176-78) as a moral law, seems to be generally applicable to Aeschylean tragedy and thought. The law sets mortals on the right path to understanding (*mathos*) or *phronein* the latter in the sense of "to be wise, have understanding." What it comes down to is whether *pathei mathos* is to be understood as cruelly negative, i.e., that Zeus confers this benefit (setting mortals on the right path to understanding) only after the lesson is too late. An alternate to this interpretation is one which views *pathei mathos* more constructively. This second interpretation asserts that *pathei mathos* is a benefit (something positive being implied by "set on the right path") to man because men learn only from experience. Learning is man's most reliable guide to understanding or wisdom. Of course, "understanding" in this last sentence implies acceptance of the moral law. I think that Aeschylus accepted both the moral law and the second of these two interpretations of *pathei mathos*.

The imagery is important if we wish to understand what Aeschylus meant. We think that the image Aeschylus used was one in which Justice is likened to a beam-balance type of scale. On one of the trays of the beam-balance is the reward of righteousness and on the other tray atê. Eventually, we think Aeschylus implied, the scale tips. In effect it "weighs out to" someone. That "someone" was "paid what is coming to him." This is a passive interpretation of the "someone." In the active sense, the "someone" owes; he has done or acted. In a very famous passage Aeschylus stated a principle

that complements that of *pathei mathos*. "The truth stands ever beside God's throne // eternal: He who has wrought shall pay; that is law." (*Aga.* 1563-64) The principle in two words was *drasanti pathein*. The "action," of course, could have been just, right, appropriate. Of the extant plays, only the *Suppliants* makes the main decision an example of what is dikê and themis. The major decision in an Aeschylean tragedy was usually unjust, not right, inappropriate. With this understanding of the imagery serving as background, it would be useful to consider how the eminent classicist, Eduard Fraenkel, translated *Agamemnon* 250-51. "Justice weighs out understanding to those who have gone through suffering," writes Fraenkel. The stress is on understanding coming through suffering and only to the sufferer. Fraenkel balances suffering with learning. In my opinion Aeschylus' meaning seems to favor a slight revision of Fraenkel's interpretation. The reconstruction suggests that in Aeschylean doctrine, *learning did not derive from suffering necessarily, but from reflection on the inevitability* of retributive justice. The Trojans suffer "now" for what Paris did and the Trojans accepted; the Greeks will suffer later; Agamemnon will suffer yet later. Those who merely think of this sequence of crime and punishment can become wise and live righteously, just as can those who actually endure it.

Did Aeschylus use grim examples to point the moral of his lesson? Of course. Turning for examples to the *Oresteia*—(1) Cassandra bewails the sufferings of Troy, which could not be prevented by Priam's sacrifices to the gods: "They supplied no cure to prevent the city suffering ..." (*Aga.* 1171) (2) The Chorus, bewailing the *paschein* of Agamemnon killed by his wife, has the famous line: "It abides (the law) while Zeus is on the throne, that the doer suffer." (*Aga.* 1564) (3) The same lesson is told by: "It is a thrice-told tale that says this 'to the doer, suffering'." (*LB.* 313) (4) We could have added the lines of Orestes to his mother: "Suffer (or have done to you) what ought not to be done (or suffered) since you killed one whom you ought not to have killed." (*LB.* 930)

WISDOM. We have interpreted wisdom as a negative quality, as the willingness to refrain from what might be called excessive desires and be ruled by law. Aeschylus had Agamemnon say to Clytemnestra: "God's most lordly gift to man // is decency of mind." (*Aga.* 927-28) "Decency" of mind translates *to mê kakôs phronein* (literally, "not to think badly" or "to be wise"). The same phrase occurs in the *Eumenides* (850) where it is intelligence, the gift of Zeus to Athena. A moral interpretation can be given wisdom and intelligence: the one that seems obvious is having wisdom or

intelligence enough to avoid that which is neither appropriate nor fitting nor right: the wise, and therefore decent man, avoids punishment.

There is one more observation to make about Aeschylus' portrait of the wise man. He accepts the idea of inevitable punishment for transgression but remains responsible for his choices. Was this Aeschylus' own personal view; or was it merely the propaganda endorsed by his dramas? No one knows. It only can be assumed that Aeschylus was well aware that injustice was rife and sometimes successful. That may be why he lent support to so many deterrents to unjust behavior. Fear was one (*Eum.* 691 ff.), and here was the weight of propaganda for the inevitability of eventual punishment for transgression. I take it for granted that Aeschylus accepted fear as necessary. In fact, Aeschylus placed an extended reference to fear in the same speech in which Athena endorsed the Areopagus. The *Eumenides* is the third play in a trilogy. Wisdom is being unfolded; the great lessons of the *Oresteia* are being articulated and hammered home. The playwright no longer is dodging by means of images and passages difficult to interpret. All is clear; Aeschylus is straightforwardly didactic.

For Athenians "... this forevermore // shall be the ground where justices deliberate. // Here is the Hill of Ares, here the Amazons // encamped and built their shelters when they came in arms // for spite of Theseus, here they piled their rival towers // to rise, new city, and dare his city long ago, // and slew their beasts for Ares. So this rock is named // from then the Hill of Ares. Here the reverence // of citizens, their fear and kindred do-no-wrong // shall hold by day and in the blessing of night alike ..." (*Eum.* 683-92) And earlier in the same drama: "There is // advantage // in the wisdom won from pain." (*Eum.* 519-21)

In a word, Aeschylus hoped that men would be inhibited from doing wrong by fear. Fear of what? Not of Erinyes: they have become Eumenides, friendly to Athens; but fear of retributive justice, that law that binds mortals as surely as death. This may be something less than optimism. But we have claimed that Aeschylus undertook to enliven a feeling of responsibility he may have believed neglected. There is no reason to think that Aeschylus' personal thoughts invariably were revealed in what a Chorus chanted, but concerning respect for restraint, which indeed Aeschylus may have felt to be slighted, there are the choral lines that appear early in the *Libation Bearers*: "The pride (*sebas*, literally—reverence, honor, esteem) not to be warred with, fought with, not to be beaten down // of old, sounded in all men's // ears, in all hearts sounded, // has shrunk away. A man // goes in fear. High fortune, // this in man's eyes is god and more than god is this." (*LB.* 54-60)

In my opinion Aeschylus is not referring to a golden age when men habitually were just and abjured hybris; he was invoking the respect in which Homer and the Homeric values were held. North saw that the Greek reproof of hybris was standard through heroic, archaic, and classical periods. North's particular interest in *sôphrosynê* led her to contrast self-knowledge and self-restraint with unlimited or unrestrained desire for military glory, power, status, wealth, or anything resembling self-indulgence. And Aeschylus shared in propagandizing on behalf of *sôphrosynê*. North was correct; the stand-off between hybris and *sôphrosynê* was Greek. However, the few specific mentions Homer made of *sôphrosynê* did not matter. By another century there were more, and the classic Greek question had been asked: How can the gods allow evil to reap benefits?

The poet, Theognis, in the middle of the sixth century, was author of a famous reproach to Zeus for allowing the just to suffer and the wicked to prosper. North quotes the lines (Theognis, 377-80): "How, then, son of Cronus, can your mind bear to hold the wicked and the just in the same respect, whether the minds of men are turned to sophrosyne or to hybris?"[15]

And then North added: "The alliance of sophrosyne with justice in this passage marks an important stage in its moral growth, while the opposition of both qualities to hybris prepares us for the use of this theme by Aeschylus."[16]

To these Homeric values we think Aeschylus wished to add retributive justice. The Chorus follows the lines quoted with these: "But, as a beam balances (literally, and perhaps significantly: 'the sure balance of Justice, Dike') so // sudden disasters wait, to strike // some in the brightness some in gloom // of half dark in their elder time. // Desperate Night holds others." (*LB.* 61-65) The court established by Athena indeed shall be "watchful to protect those who sleep ..." (*Eum.* 705-06) but guarding them by breeding restraint, a "reverence" for the moral law. Greek tradition won a place in memory for respect for law, including the rather extreme statement attributed to Solon: "Obey the magistrates, whether it be just or unjust."[17]

There is a well-known story illustrating the Spartans' veneration of law, law understood as 'words underwriting good counsel,' counseling righteousness. Herodotus relates[18] that the memorial stone for the handful of Spartans who fell before a vastly more numerous Persian foe at the pass

[15] North. *Sophrosyne*, p. 17.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 17 ff.

[17] Frg. 37, quoted by Freeman. *Works and Life of Solon*, p. 216.

[18] Herodotus. *Histories*, VII, p. 228.

of Thermopylea leading from Thessaly into Locris bore an inscribed poem composed by Simonides of Ceos: "Stranger, go tell the Spartans we lie here obeying their laws." *Rhêmasi* is being translated as "law" but "words" might be preferred in order to remind ourselves that to the Greeks a law had to be morally sound to be worth obedience. The term "words" recalls that Greeks thought of words as vehicles for righteous—right or impious—wrong counsel.

I think it significant for an understanding of Aeschylus to realize that he might have felt truly patriotic in defending Hellas, particularly Athens, against the Persians, and to recall that the Greeks had deep respect for individuals who freely accepted the rule of sacred-secular law as opposed to despotic tyranny.

One of the most moving of the stories reported by Herodotus was the purported words of the Spartan refugee, Demaratus, made to Xerxes: Xerxes had said that he could pit 1000 against every Greek fighter and asked Demaratus whether the Greeks would fight. Demaratus, speaking primarily of the Spartans, answered that they would; the response could have applied to Greeks from many of the city-states that held out against the Persian armies. "Though they are free men," we read Demaratus as having said to Xerxes, "they are not wholly free; for law is their master, and they fear it more than your men fear you. Therefore whatever it bids them do they do; and its orders are never to flee from the battle whatever the numbers against them, but to stay in their ranks and conquer or die."[19] Respect for law had become Hellenic tradition and would remain so until well after Aeschylus' death. Is it not this care for law, which students learn from the *Crito*, that has been the exemplar for the free acceptance of law with its awards and punishments? For all its affect, Plato advocated nothing that had not become conventional thought of Greeks reflecting upon life regulated by *nomoi*. Living in accordance with *nomos* was not abhorrent to Greeks. It would not matter whether political power was lodged in many people or in one—be he king or tyrant. What would matter is whether the one or the many be indifferent to (or ignorant of) moral convention (themis).

The formalizations of these moral conventions were the *nomoi*, the "formally enacted pronouncement of a government" plus a "traditional way of life accepted without question because it was part of the social environment in which men lived."[20] But we know that well before the days of Aes-

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[20] W. J. Jones. *The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 75.

chylus[21] Greeks desired the condition of *harmonia* and *homonoia* rather than stasis, that "state of imbalance" where classes and factions were at each other's throats.[22] The presence of what was connoted by *nomos* in such a term as *eunomia* (a right and righteous social order) or *isonomia* (equal before the law)[23] for a while, was more popular than *dêmokratia* for expressing the concept of a government broadly based on the popular will. By the middle of the fifth century, however, *dêmokratia* may have had the upper hand in popularity.[24] Until the idea of law and its formal administration through courts was accepted, it would have been necessary to argue for its acceptance. Plato does not have to. He had the old and wise Socrates, whose *sophia* and *sôphrosynê* were demonstrated in many dialogues, plead a special case in the *Crito*. That case was no less than the free election of a condemned man to remain in jail and die rather than accept not to "overturn the law."

The dialogue has been a lesson to many but it would not have been a novel idea to the Greeks. Had not Aeschylus shown that respect for law and law courts was "a sentry on the land?" (*Eum.* 706) And had Aeschylus not said that this was the decision of that wisest of immortals, Pallas Athena? In the Eumenides it was Athena who said that the court—the Areopagus in that play—was better than either anarchy or tyranny. (*Eum.* 696)

SÔPHROSYNÊ: SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-RESTRAINT.[25] When we said that *sôphrosynê* was the omega of the Greek moral code, with dikê being the alpha, we meant that *sôphrosynê* by far was the jewel in the wisdom which such a moralist as Aeschylus would have wished for his fellows. Knowing the limits of mortals, considering what was appropriate for one to do, being restrained—all this sounds as though joy were being dampened. It is true, Aeschylus did not think that the reward of virtue was joy but good health, prosperity, fecundity and other good things in an economy

[21] *Loc. cit.* for Jones' reference to Pindar, which we feel allows for the assumption that what antedated Pindar antedated Aeschylus.

[22] "In direct contrast with a condition of stasis was that of eunomia, the happy position of a city where the citizens had become so habituated to obey the laws that reverence for law was instinctive in them." (*Ibid.*)

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 84 ff.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[25] While *sôphrosynê* itself never actually occurs in Aeschylus, its cognates do appear some twenty-two times. To quote from North of Aeschylus' employment of cognates of *sôphrosynê*, Aeschylus used "*sophronein* eight times, *sophron* eleven, *sophronizein* once, *sophronismaonce*, and see *Suppl.* 189 for a disputed compound noun with *sophron*." (North. *Sophrosyne*, fn. 2, p. 33.)

in which even the most wealthy or powerful were not so wealthy or powerful that they could afford to ignore the moral teaching: be sparing in desire for wealth, power and position. For the bulk of people it was important to know that they could only be thought good citizens if they had *sôphrosynê*. Macurdy seemed to have this in mind when she wrote in *The Quality of Mercy*: "The Attic orators, who are exponents of democracy and love of Athens, regard *sophrosyne* as the characteristic of the good citizen, who is also described by the word *metrios*; preserving the 'mean' in conduct, the *kosmios*, orderly, which is combined with *sophron* to describe the ideal citizen of the democracy. That ideal, formed in the fifth century and first described by Aeschylus (*Septem.*, 610) is called by the orators of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., temperate, orderly, moderate, reasonable, patriotic, philanthropic. From the time of the Persian Wars to the end of Athenian democracy the virtue most praised in their literature is this 'moderation' ..."[26]

Is it at all surprising that the *sôphrosynê* which Macurdy had identified as the characteristic of the good citizen is what Aeschylus attempts to persuade his audience is the most sure source of *homonoia* and *harmonia*? It would have been surprising if Aeschylus had not attempted to persuade his audience to strain to show themselves possessed of *sôphrosynê*. And the persuasion scene of the third play, just before the happy ending, was the appropriate place for urging *sôphrosynê*. "Good understanding giveth favour ..." Although North did not write of *sôphrosynê* with this in mind, it is in the third play of the *Oresteia* (and in the third play of any Aeschylean trilogy) that *sôphrosynê* would be unveiled as the most desirable virtue.[27] In mentioning North we have reference to Athena's persuasion of the Erinyes to become Eumenides. The Erinyes are persuaded and "when the Furies have consented to renounce their bitter resentment and become kindly goddesses, their benediction to the Athenians (comparable to the *sophrones* prayers of the Danaids for Argos) visualizes the citizens seated beside Zeus, beloved by Athena, learning wisdom in time ... Here is the true outcome of the doctrine of *pathei mathos*: the establishment of sophrosyne with justice as the foundation stones of the Athenian polis, and the union of sophrosyne with reverence to achieve the Mean in government. *Phobos* has been made acceptable, just as *Peitho* (Persuasion), who was entirely evil and deceitful in the *Agamemnon*, becomes in the *Eumenides* a beneficent

[26] Grace H. Macurdy. *The Quality of Mercy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, p. 87.

[27] For North's treatment of tragedy in Aeschylus see his *Sophrosyne*, p. 33 ff.

and wholesome power wielded by Athena, appropriately enough, in the first Athenian law court. She even connects the two, when she bids the Furies hold sacred the *peithous sebas* ('reverence for Persuasion' 885) and give up their wrath."[28]

Earlier in her book North had set down characteristics that she felt Aeschylus was for and those he opposed. The list is sufficiently instructive of Aeschylus' thought to be repeated here.

I would, and I will, extend the theses and the antitheses of North but my opinion is that North was correct in thinking that the tension in the conflict between hybris and sophrosyne was fundamental to Aeschylean drama. It had been fundamental in Homer and that was one of the "lessons" that Aeschylus taught as Homer had taught it to him. If Pindar celebrated those who had been victorious and had won fame,[29] Aeschylus urged men to show wisdom by attributing their poetic inspiration to the immortals by describing themselves not as sole victors in battles but partners of the gods in the search for retributive justice, and other parts of the moral code. Aeschylus repeated his lesson, which was well known, not as the way of the wise but the prudential wisdom of those who would not tempt the gods by overstepping the bounds of mortals. Xerxes did, for he showed *thrasos* (rashness induced by too great ambition), and the suppliant maidens also departed from the Mean, that is from what was appropriate for women —to marry and have children.

In Aeschylus' concept of morals there were a variety of roles to be played, and it was important to know which were natural and necessary. For the young woman, or for Penelope, a woman whose husband was gone ten years to the Trojan War, "to be chaste," *sôphronein*, was a virtue. Marriage and child-bearing, on the other hand, were natural for a mature woman whose husband was with her. For a father and mother there were appropriate (natural) things to do vis-à-vis children, and so for a husband or a wife vis-à-vis his or her spouse. If a man or woman played each of his natural roles well, he or she could be said to be in harmony with the order of the universe, which was the same as living in accordance with the mean (*to metrion*). Such a person was well; he enjoyed *harmonia* and his heart dictated the righteous decisions that led the Erinyes to chant: "out of health // in the heart issues the beloved // longed-for, prosperity." (*Eum.* 535-7)

[28] Reprinted from Helen North: *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. Copyright © 1966 by Cornell University. Used by permission of Cornell University Press. Page 49.

[29] Pindar. *The Odes of Pindar*. Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947; C. M. Bowra. *Pindar*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

This line from the *Eumenides* jars us into recognition that Aeschylus believed that there was no division of mind and body. Aeschylus was no dualist but a moral monist who assumed that an action that was morally correct was taken by someone in good health. As there was no great gap between body and mind, there was almost none between poets and the scientific sophists, no "two cultures" that would make it unlikely that Aeschylus think of the disease of *monarchia* as a kind of *imbalance* in which some one element dominated the body upsetting the natural equilibrium of health. (And the real meaning of the poetic-medical term *hêsychia* is the tranquility of being in equilibrium rather than agitated by stasis.)[30] In bringing this chapter on morality to a close, it is the poets of Aeschylus' day who will bear witness to the prevailing moral code.

We have come to the end of this chapter on the moral code. While the Greek moral tradition did not die with Aeschylus, one of its most effective teachers did leave the scene. Its next great teachers will be Socrates, Plato and then Aristotle, but these men were philosophers, and their moral abstractions, philosophically far better articulated than their manifestations in Aeschylus' plays, only instructed those whose formal education already was far advanced. A most effective teacher of the people was gone. Lessons in the moral code were to be given to the masses by such orators as Demosthenes and Isocrates, who, if not himself much of an orator, was a masterful teacher of those who were. We shall meet oratory again, because orators made use of a technique that truly featured the *agôn logôn*. The persuasion to which oratory was host made a highly effective tool of something for which Aeschylus had the greatest respect and which always was the prelude to the *homonoia* and *harmonia* of his third play.

It is Herington who points out that it was no wonder that sophistic rhetoric appears in *Prometheus Bound*.[31] A sophistic / rhetorical cast of language and thought should not be unexpected in a tragedy whose author is convinced that mortals should be convinced by persuasive arguments demonstrating that knowledge of what is just should guide all decisions. One would predict Aeschylus to have been aware of the potential of rhetoric. We do not know whether he was sceptical, nor to what degree he might have been. Herington offers another reason for Aeschylus' use of sophistic rhetoric. As is known, Aeschylus lived his last years in Sicily. If, as Herington thinks, the *Prometheus Bound* was written in Sicily, it is well to know that "the rhetoricians Corax and Tisias and the young sophist-rhetorician

[30] North. *Sophrosyne*, p. 15. North recognizes that *hêsychia* is as much a medical term as political.

[31] Herington. *The Author*, pp. 94 ff., 111, 114.

Gorgias were now also at work in it. I would stress that, according to Cicero (*Brutus* 46), Corax and Tisias wrote the earliest *Art of Rhetoric* known to antiquity ... some time in the years following 466 B.C. Their activity therefore coincided almost exactly with our postulated 'last phase' of Aeschylus' career and must have overlapped with his final Sicilian residence of 458-456. In that way the sophistic / rhetorical influence that is so apparent in *PV* becomes immediately intelligible. The Sicily of that date—but not of an earlier period in which Aeschylus is known or conjectured to have visited there—was in this respect, as in other, far in advance of Athens. We need only recall the impression made at Athens by the arrival there of the elderly Gorgias in 427 B.C., almost exactly a generation later than Aeschylus' death!"[32]

The third play in a trilogy recalls the first and the second to mind. Perhaps this had something to do with the passage of time. Perhaps there was development, even evolution in the great forces personified by the gods, the leader of whom was Zeus. Did Aeschylus really mean to have Zeus appear a tyrant similar to the tyrant of the archaic period of Greek history? Was Zeus to evolve[33] in the course of a trilogy as the Greek way of life evolved from a familial, clan and tribal structure into the polis, in time governed by the demos? Was a monarchical god to evolve into a democratic one, who governed by persuasion rather than ruling by force? These questions are among the topics of the next chapter. Zeus and the other gods have so much to do with the Greek moral code that it makes sense to discuss Aeschylus' view of immortals and the relationship of mortals with immortals before we take up other aspects of Aeschylus' environment, which help us to appreciate the place of the *technai*, which Prometheus said that he had given to mankind.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 114 ff.

[33] The classic statement of the evolutionary position on punishment is that of Thomson. *Aeschylus and Athens*, pp. 291, 387.

CHAPTER III

TIMÊ AND TIME

Two topics dominate this chapter, both vital in Aeschylus' moral philosophy of education. One has to do with *timê*, usually thought of as "honor" of a god. I will be concerned with specialties and powers of which an immortal is patron, assuming that specialty essential to the immortal's identity. Mortals who wished to avail themselves of a certain service would have to propitiate the patron god whose specialty it was. A Greek boy or girl could not be thought to have had a well-developed religious training had he or she not been introduced to those specialties. The other dominant topic of the chapter is that of time. It was to this that we looked at the end of the last chapter. In the closing paragraph of the chapter I asked rhetorical questions that amounted to questioning the validity of the hypothesis that Zeus evolves from the first to the third play of a trilogy.[1] I maintain that, despite the differences which one can observe, there is no evolution. There is change and even development in the trilogy, but it is not an evolution from one conception of Zeus to another. The healing of illness, the restoration of the Mean, the socialization of the delinquent all will be achieved in the attainment of *sôphrosynê*, which is requisite for *homonoia* and *harmonia*. But Zeus does not evolve; neither will any other god. A god of nature will

[1] One of the more recent examples of the evolutionary mistake is *The House, the City, and the Judge* by Richard Kuhns. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, p. 29 ff.) A good deal has been published directly relating to the subject. Dodds' chapters (E. R. Dodds. *The Ancient Concept of Progress*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) on the *Prometheus Vinctus* and the *Oresteia* again endorses Dodds' belief idea that Aeschylus intended Zeus to be understood as evolving towards a more humane and civilized god as the Aeschylean trilogy unfolded. Golden (Leon Golden. *In Praise of Prometheus: Humanism and Rationalism in Aeschylean Thought*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962, pp. 107-26) believes that the Zeus of the *Oresteia* evolves from being a god of nature to one who fits the polis. This is part and parcel of what I term the evolutionary hypothesis. A good deal of the relevant argument has been summarized by Grube. (G. M. A. Grube. "Zeus in Aeschylus." *AJPh*, 91 (1970), pp. 43-51.)

not evolve a Zeus who can be revered by civilized citizens of the polis. Monarchy will not give place to democracy any more than night can be said to give way to day.

This makes all the difference in Aeschylus' educational philosophy. The latter becomes an unchanging body of morals do's and don'ts—with one important addition. Although there is the moral code, a man or woman must be thought independent or free, obligated to decide on a course of action, even if commanded by an immortal to act in a way that strikes him or her as wrong. This leads directly to the issue of the critical decision, the turning point of a single play or an entire trilogy. I cannot emphasize the role of the critical decision too much. If we think of it as a point in time, and that is a good way to think of it, we will be helped to think of that point as a temporal and moral equivalent of a continental divide. At that point a decision is made that allows the subsequent and related action to be categorized as righteous or not righteous. A second use Aeschylus made of time manifested itself in the notion of three generations and the "long time" which are frequently found in the plays. Aeschylus reflected a society in which three generations were the usual way of comprehending a complete familial cycle, just as birth, marriage and death were the three turning points of a single life.

AESCHYLUS AND THE OLYMPIAN RELIGION. The Aeschylean Olympians were a family more tranquil, of greater *hêsychia* than the Homeric Olympians whose stasis manifests itself in their taking sides either with the Achaeans or Trojans. This choosing sides and the *hêsychia* imposed by the Homeric Zeus is far less advanced, if that value judgment be permitted, than the reconciliation and *homonoia-harmonia* in the Aeschylean version of Zeus religion. By writing of the Aeschylean version my object is to cast in relief the subtlety of Aeschylus' perspective. The greater subtlety in Aeschylus' Zeus religion comes from his connecting the religion with a moral code.

There is no better illustration of this connection than the manner in which Aeschylus conceives of the father of the Olympian family. We can discuss Zeus or Apollo or Aphrodite as individuals, but the familial relationships among them illustrate relationships Aeschylus thought should pertain among mortals as well as immortals. These immortals complemented each other in such a way that the Olympian family as a whole represented a complete set of specifics that related to the roles or functions to be found in a mortal family. And at the head of the Olympian, paternalistic family was the father, Zeus, and the mother, Hera, the one representing all the male specialties and the other all the female. Unfortunately the tragedies

of Aeschylus that have survived do not offer us enough examples of the female tasks. Similar to the Olympian family, the society of Aeschylus, and that to which he looked in retrospect, was patriarchal. Aeschylus' tragedies are not as anti-feminine as Hesiod's *Works and Days*, in which women, especially attractive young women, were written off as nuisances and distractions from work. Aeschylus was committed to a realistic pattern in which the male and female are properly related in the whole or the Mean. But the male has the greater responsibilities and more of the qualities which the Greeks found necessary.

I do not think that there is any question of Aeschylus sharing in the Greek convention of male ascendency. The *Oresteia* is an admirable example. Later on we will take up the trilogy in some detail; now it is only the balance of female and male that is in doubt. As was customary in Athens, Aeschylus weighed the male more heavily than the female. Take transgressions as an example. Agamemnon transgresses in sacrificing his daughter, Iphigenia, but that killing of a female is weighted less than the transgression of Clytemnestra slaying Agamemnon. Orestes putting his mother to the sword is forgiven as merited punishment. Finally, there is the famous passage in the *Eumenides* where Aeschylus has the actor playing Apollo say that the male not the female, is responsible for a birth. This is not a moral matter but it is a way of asserting the primacy of the male. Or, shifting away from the *Oresteia*, Hypermestra disobeys her father Danaus who commands that the husband of the maidens be put to death. That was a transgression but how does it weigh against *not* butchering the males? Is there serious doubt of what a male-weighted moral judgment would be?

It is not an abrupt change of topic to ask after Aeschylus' esteem of the family. It is the role of the female in the establishment and maintenance of the family that gives her significance for Greek thought. Only consider Electra in *The Libation Bearers* and *Eumenides*. In *The Libation Bearers* Electra is heard from in the traditional female mourning for the dead, a dead male in this instance. (Antigone and Ismene also mourn for males in *Seven Against Thebes*.) Electra's only role in the *Eumenides* is to provide a wife for Orestes' friend Pylades. Pylades thus is assured of the perpetuation of his family name. And for what is Orestes most thankful? That his family will not be wiped out.

Institutional care for the needs of the individual and the services which institutions render to society and state are a conspicuous part of Aeschylus' tragedies. It goes without saying that the patriarchal family was a most essential institution. Greek society of Aeschylus' day was alert to familial relationships and familial responsibility—even its responsibility to the traveller who asks for hospitality.

The family was the institution through which most of the primary needs of the individual were tended: the needs for food, clothing, shelter and care for sexual gratification, all were to be satisfied by the family. Less obvious was the need for harmonious relationships between the interdependent member of the family if individual needs were to be satisfied. Even social and political good depended on the good health of the family. If the husband of the family was away at a war, his wife had to discharge many of his responsibilities vis-à-vis the governance of the community.

Unfortunately my case is not supported by citing Hera, the wife of Zeus, as the embodiment of female powers. In part that is because Greek society was too partriarchal for Aeschylus to have written of Hera in a way complementing his description of Zeus. Jealousy is the overriding characteristic of Homer's Hera.[2] We do not think of the powers of Aphrodite, Artemis or Athena as being derived from Hera in the way that we can think of Zeus as containing all of the specialties and powers of the male gods to whom Zeus originally gave their powers (*Eum.* 392-3) after his war with the Titans.[3] Zeus is Zeus *Teleios*; he is Zeus the accomplisher. "For what thing without Zeus is done among mortals?"

Aeschylus did not inherit a Homeric depiction of Hera as a homemaker. The family life of the Olympians simply is not pictured. And it would have been skimpy. There was no need for cooking; the gods ate ambrosia. Except for very special articles of dress, there was no need for related crafts. And the only children born were born to mortals. Even immortal marriage was a rarity; the union of Zeus and Hera, of Hephaestus and Aphrodite being exceptions. Even these exceptions are questionable. Of the union of Hera and Zeus, the god's wife is remembered for her jealousy and seduction of the lord-and-master. And as for Hesphaestus and Aphrodite, who

[2] For evidence that Aeschylus intended Hera, the jealous wife, to be thought the one who persecuted Io, not Zeus, there are not only the lines of the *Prometheus Bound*, that often mentioned Io, but those of the earlier play, the *Suppliants*. The Danaids, descendants of "Io the bride of Zeus" were pursued, even as Io was by the jealous Hera. Twice, with identical lines, the Danaids chanted: "Anger of gods, alas, // Searches you out, Io, for punishment; // I know the wedded jealousy of the heavenly ones: // From a wind that blows in anger a storm will follow." (*Suppl.* 162-5, 172-5)

[3] In his *From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957, p. 15, Originally published in 1912), F. M. Cornford writes that *Moira*, Fate, long before Aeschylus' time was thought of as a "system of provinces." Hesiod's cosmogony took the Homeric position that the Olympians had been allotted their jurisdiction by Zeus. (Hesiod. *Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica.* Hugh G. Evelyn-White (trans.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914, p. 117 ff.)

has read Homer without smiling at his description of the affair between the golden Aphrodite and Ares? True, Hephaestus punishes the transgressing pair but I doubt if any Greek thought that a persuasive example of retributive justice. No, marriages of mortals were taken more seriously by Greek writers than marriages of immortals. It almost seemed that the Greeks thought of marriage as an unfortunate mortal necessity which, as work, disease or aging is to be accepted by men but with a sigh. Odysseus certainly was said to long for his faithful Penelope but he took ten years, much of it with beautiful immortals, to return to rocky Ithaca. Apparently the Greeks associated family with obligations with which they could not afford to enmesh the gods. There were other roles to be played by the Olympians above all a moral one for the gods of Aeschylus. The burden was a heavy one and he who bore the lion's share was the father of the gods, Zeus.

It would not have strained the imagination of a Greek to be persuaded that if Zeus assigned the immortals their several powers, functions or specialties, then Zeus may be thought of as representing those powers, each and all of them in concert. Zeus had not been diminished by his gifts to the gods, any more than they lost their specialties by being patrons of mortals who were related to the gods, for example, the smiths to Hephaestus, or the potters, that complement of metalwork in the Athenian economy, to Prometheus. Patrons in our sense did not give up their specialties when they gave *of* them. Men did not take the specialties of any immortal away from him or her. A mortal reverenced a divine patron for some power (i.e., specialty) in the hope that by sacrifices he might insure the help or at least the friendliness of the god.

From what we read in the *Eumenides*, Athena seems to be the immortal that Aeschylus felt to contain or represent *homonoia* and the power of persuasive argument. Although it would be presumptuous to draw conclusions on the basis of a single play, the *Eumenides*, or even by the whole of the Orestean trilogy, we think that Aeschylus chose Athena for the role of persuader for the further reason that Athena was the patron goddess of Athens, and she—and therefore Athens—was known for rationality, an essential ingredient of righteous (persuasive) rhetoric. Aeschylus had Athena say that her arguments are the 'sense' of Zeus. Zeus is the mighty wrestler of the Hymn to Zeus, (*Aga.* 167-73) who has proved himself stronger than his father and grandfather. Zeus is Zeus *Agoraios* (*Eum.* 973), whose justice "guides men's speech in councils" and stands for all justice, and Dike is the "very daughter // of Zeus ..." (*LB.* 948-9) Zeus wills that justice be done and Zeus' will is handed down as the law by Zeus' daughter, Athena.

But how can Athena be associated with Zeus? The response is one more

evidence of the conventional Greek belief in the commanding position of the male. Aeschylus has Athena say that she was not born of a woman. Following the lead of a popular myth, Athena claims that she sprang from the forehead of Zeus, fully armed and prepared to defend the justice that was Zeus' will.[4] (The head was thought to be the place where semen was produced.) Aeschylus was saying that Athena shared most intimately the will, or justice of Zeus. Athena represented the persuasive nature of the right, the righteous, and the rational, not the hysterical emotionalism and the wily charms the Greeks ordinarily associated with the female. For the Greeks, the emotionalism of women, their Mean, was evidence of their natural dependence on the calm wisdom of males. Female charms were supposed to demonstrate a dependence; women are charming because they must attract a guardian male, the nurse of whose children they will be. For the Greek patriarch, women were as dependent as infants. Artemis guards both the very young and the female, especially the most dependent female, the pregnant.

The unique legend of Athena's birth as well as her connection with Athens made her doubly attractive to any Athenian writing tragedies. There was even more to enhance her attractiveness to Aeschylus. The goddess was a fine example of the reconciliation of the old gods and the new. Athena *Polias* was reconciled with the older Athena *Parthenos*.[5] There was a time in Greek history when Athena was not only a goddess of war but of fertility and agriculture.[6] Herington put the matter neatly in the beginning of his instructive book on Athena. In reading Herington one remembers that Athens, while still economically nourished on its agriculture, once was thoroughly given over to field, vine and domestic animals. There was the famed acropolis of Athens in those days—every city built first on the hill

[4] The mythology on Athena, really on the birth of Athena, has been summarized with bibliographical citation in Graves. *The Greek Myths*, Vol. 1, 8.a-8.3; M. W. M. Pope. "Athena's Development in Homeric Epic." *AJPh*, 81 (April 1960), pp. 113-135. A very important correction to the conclusion usually drawn from the birth of Athena from the forehead of Zeus is that Greeks of the fifth century and earlier did not mean that Athena was shown to share in Zeus' wisdom by springing from the forehead of Zeus. The forehead, as the chin, was most productive of hair. It was thought that generative stuff, as the brain or the marrow of one, accounted for that hair as it accounted for generally. (Richard B. Onians. *The Origins of European Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, pp. 111, 233.)

[5] C. J. Herington has reviewed the cults of Athena in Athens in the mid-fifth century in his *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias: A Study in the Religion of Periclean Athens*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1955.

[6] Pope. "Athena's Development," p. 114; Herington. *Athena*, p. 46 ff.

that offered protection against invaders. There were gods and goddesses on that Acropolis. "One, perhaps the older, was worshipped with 'service quaint' on the north side of it; she was a farmer's goddess, the peaceful mother of the fruits and offspring of the land. A little to the south was the sanctuary of a fighting goddess, who defended the heights of many a Greek city, the goddess of warriors organized in their fortress. As such she was established there by the Mycenaean invaders, and her name was Athena, called the Maiden-Warrior, Pallas or (at Athens) Parthenos ... As the generations passed, the difference between the two was blurred, and the two goddesses became the one supreme goddess of the city, Athena Polias. But the sanctuaries remained, and the associations of the sites were preserved in the abiding forms of the images, and in the cults ... The earth-goddess was the more primitive in type, if not also in date. She existed less as a person than as a numen to whom carefully selected offerings must be made and all due observances paid: she was immutable: she might, indeed, be given a new house, but the image in which she inhered and the complex of custom that had settled round it, could not be destroyed or meddled with."[7] In reconciling the goddess of Athena, Athena *Polias*, with the more venerable Athena *Parthenos*, Aeschylus had won both the urban and rural portions of the audience and showed Athens strong and prosperous.

If a composite of Athena *Polias* and Athena *Parthenos* is to be imagined in terms of persuasive case of *homonoia*, who among the immortals links with *harmonia*? Athena's brother, Apollo. Apollo is the arch-healer, "Healer Apollo" (*Aga.* 146) who cured or cleansed Orestes of pollution (*Eum.* 578) exercising the gift of Zeus *Katharsios*; the immortal who restores *isonomia* and *eunomia*—when both connote a state of well-being, and *hêsychia.* As chief *mantis* and healer, Apollo, as well as Athena, symbolizes justice. The giving of council in prophecy (*Loxias*),[8] restoration of health and the Mean, had the restoration or acceptance of righteousness as its end, not

[7] Herington. *Athena*, p. 46. Quoted by the kind permission of Manchester University Press.

[8] Apollo sometimes was called *Loxias* and the sibyl of Apollo's famous temple of Delphi was called the Pythian, no doubt after Python, presumably sent by Hera against Leto, mother of Apollo.

Doubtless we should think of Apollo *Katharsios* even though we cannot be certain at what Apolline hearth Orestes actually was purified. (R. R. Dyer. "The Evidence for Apolline Purification Rituals at Delphi and Athens." *JHS*, 89 (1969), pp. 38-56.) The thought of calling both Zeus and Apollo *Katharsios* is no more troubling than thinking of God, Christ and the Holy Ghost sharing one divinity. In fact the concept is easier because the Greeks did not add a Holy Ghost. Apollo, being Zeus' son, it was easy for the Greeks to think of Apollo having (representing) one of his father's principal powers.

the restoration of health for its own sake or the selection of the wise course of action, merely for the sake of having that choice likely to bring material advantages.

The curing and advising functions of Apollo might blind us to his role as the archer whose arrows, as in the first book of the *Iliad*, execute the justice of Zeus. Even as Zeus *Sôtêr* (*Aga.* 1387) was the steersman who drove Agamemnon's ships to destruction after Agamemnon had behaved uprighteously in Troy, Apollo drives Orestes to exacting payment for the impiety of Clytemnestra, who must pay with her life. Again, Zeus must be seen as the grim embodiment of retributive justice. In the context of *pathei mathos* Zeus is Zeus *Katachthonios* (is it any wonder that Aeschylus felt that the chthonic powers and the Olympian could be reconciled?). Zeus *Katachthonios* is king of the underworld, lord over Hades, and he was among those Orestes invoked when, in *The Libation Bearers*, he called on the "lordships of the world below" (*LB.* 504) when contemplating revenging his father's death.

Apollo was known to the Greeks not only as the patron of healers but also as the patron of those who served as judges and jurymen. Apollo had the administration of justice among mortals as one of his allotments from Zeus, who for Aeschylus was identified with *Moira*, the symbol of destiny or lot. (*Eum.* 392-3) In one version of his functions Apollo is the gatekeeper, because no unrighteous person, i.e., sick with pollution, could enter a temple or have his supplications heard by a god.

Aeschylus surprised no one when he had the Apollo of the *Eumenides* address the Areopagites: "I shall speak justly. I am a prophet, I shall not // lie. Never, for man, woman, nor city, from my throne // of prophecy have I spoken a word, except // that which Zeus, father of Olympians, might command. // This is justice. Recognize then how great its strength. // I tell you, follow our father's will. For not even // the oath that binds you is more strong than Zeus is strong." (*Eum.* 615-21)

Does any question remain why Zeus had many titles throughout Hellas? The names of Zeus would outnumber those of any other Olympian immortal and that, too, would be understandable. Zeus was so great that he was mentioned in a man's sacrifice to any one of the gods; it never was proper to omit naming Zeus. When all is said and done was not Zeus the giver of the power being asked for when calling on Artemis, or Athena, or any other Olympian? Knowing this well, some of the audience at the *Prometheus Bound* could be counted on to know the meaning of the line: "For only Zeus is free." (*PB.* 50) The *eleutheria* of Zeus was incorrectly interpreted by

Kerenyi[9] as having to do with an order from Zeus in the *Prometheus Unbound* setting Prometheus free. Aeschylus assigned the line to the actor playing Might and followed it with another which said that "only Zeus is free." Zeus, being father (and, therefore, guide) of the immortals, was without occasional unpleasant obligations. It is this freedom from obligations or labor that was meant by "only Zeus is free."

Might was addressing Hephaestus who had said that he disliked impaling and chaining the Titan: "O handicraft of mine—that I deeply hate!" (*PB.* 45) Aeschylus had Might tell the divine smith that Hephaestus' smithing was a province altogether distinct from the deception and theft for which Prometheus was being punished. The reason that being father to the gods, granting each his or her jurisdiction, was without pain, was twofold: Zeus had no specialty and, in the second place, Zeus did not have to learn wisdom through suffering. Zeus *was* wise and just. These two reasons combined into one with the doctrine that everything should remain in its proper place, everyone with his proper place, everyone with his proper work, status and so on. The whole made of parts in their proper places is a stable whole, a *homonoia* without stasis. *Homonoia* was the condition of justice; it also was the condition of the stable whole. Zeus symbolized this two-part notion. The idea was the most subtle in the Aeschylean philosophy.

THE IMAGERY OF AESCHYLUS AND THE EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS. A service has been done by showing the change in imagery from one play to another of the *Oresteia.*[10] My conclusion is this: the imagery of the three plays in the *Oresteia* does change but the change does not reflect an evolution in the nature of Zeus. What it does reflect is the difference in the emphasis of the three plays. Transgression is the dominant theme of the first play; punishment—sometimes punishment in the shape of revenge by a mortal instrument of Zeus, representing justice—rules the second play; and the third play emphasizes harmony. One would expect a second play to show the transgressor ill or otherwise strayed from the Mean. It is no surprise that the Titan in *Prometheus Bound* was described in images of illness.[11] An

[9] C. Kerényi. *Prometheus: Archetypal Image of Human Existence.* Translated by Ralph Manheim. Bollingen Series 65. I. New York: Bollingen Foundation, Pantheon Books, 1963, p. 123.

[10] John J. Peradotto, Jr. "Time and the Pattern of Change in Aeschylus' *Oresteia.*" Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1963.

[11] Barbara H. Fowler. "The Imagery of the *Prometheus Bound.*" *AJP* (1957), pp. 173-84, and "Aeschylus' Imagery." *C & M,* 28 (1970), pp. 1-74.

We know that *Philoktetes* was the name of one of Aeschylus' plays. (*P. Oxy.* 2256, Fragment 71) What better representation of the Aeschylean idea of healing could there

immortal or mortal who transgressed was ill. In Prometheus' case excessive anger was his sickness. It is also reasonable that Aeschylus would show an ill man cured in the last play. The restoration of Orestes' sanity and his acquittal is just that. *Harmonia* would reign when the trilogy ended.

The evolutionary hypothesis contradicts with this conclusion: it holds that the first play in the trilogy showed Aeschylus reflecting a pre-Olympian religious view, the old political system of monarchy. The evolutionary hypothesis is at something of a loss to explain the middle play, but it has no difficulty with the one which ends the trilogy. As Herington suggests, Aeschylus was now looking at the new political order.[12] In the last play, then, the political style would be that of democracy in the polis. I think it likely that Aeschylus approved democracy, which did not contradict his moral philosophy. But Aeschylus' political preference had nothing to do with what he felt was a satisfactory ending of the trilogy. No, Aeschylus was indifferent to time, but most attentive to living in conformity with the moral code.

Having laid out my conclusion, I wish to repeat some of Peradotto's findings on the imagery of the *Oresteia*, but reinterpret them. Peradotto thinks that the imagery testifies to evolution. I find the imagery Aeschylus' way of symbolizing the dominant themes of his trilogies. The imagery reinforces what Aeschylus wishes to communicate about the transgression that preempted the moral of the first play, the punishment that dominated the second drama, and the climactic third tragedy which ended with a promise of tranquility and prosperity if men lived up to the moral code.

The moral lessons do not dim the images into pedantic stereotypes of virtues and vices personified. Aeschylean tragedy is no simple morality play. Rather it is sophisticated artistry which made use of images and metaphors. How often has Western literature produced the equal in strength to what Fraenkel called the "grandiose blasphemy" of Clytemnestra's lines that boast of her husband's murder at her hands? "I stand now where I struck him down. The thing is done. // Thus have I wrought, and I will not deny it now. // That he might not escape nor beat aside his death, // as fishermen cast their huge circling nets, I spread // deadly abundance of rich robes, and caught him fast. // I struck him twice. In two great cries of agony // he buckled at the knees and fell. When he was down // I struck

have been than Philoktetes cured of his dreadfully wounded foot? Somehow the acquisition of Heracles' bow would have to appear an impious act for which the wound of Philoktetes was the punishment and the cure perhaps made possible for Philoktetes participating in the righteous punishment of Troy, being dramatized in the ending of the play.

[12] C. J. Herington. "Aeschylus: The Last Phase." *Arion*, 4 (1965), pp. 387-403.

him the third blow, in thanks and reverence // to Zeus the lord of dead men underneath the ground. // Thus he went down, and the life struggled out of him // and as he died he spattered me with the dark red // and violent driven rain of bitter savored blood // to make me glad, as gardens stand among the showers // of God in glory at the birthtime of the buds." (*Aga.* 1379-1392)

Peradotto commented most effectively on the imagery of light and darkness in the *Oresteia.* Though I will depend on Peradotto's analysis, it is an oversight to attend to the terms in the plays and forget the old, chthonic, underworld powers, headed by Hades but including the Erinyes, to be reconciled with new or young gods, high in airy Olympus, lighted by Apollo. Following my formula, the *Eumenides* should find the darkness of night benevolent, as sleep untroubled by the nightmares of the guilty. Death itself was to be the natural ending of a long life that had nothing to hide from the light which exposes guilt. On its side, light no longer illuminated transgression. Day and night complemented each other like work and restful sleep.

As a poet Aeschylus made his terms for light and darkness, or weather imagery, carry a portion of the burden of his moral teaching. The imagery was useful because so suggestive. For the sake of suggestion, Aeschylus blends the actual and the metaphoric. "The pattern is characterized in the first play by a corruption of light as the natural symbol of life, joy, and safety into a symbol of vengeance, death and destruction, while in the last play it assumes its wholesome connotation, and darkness, which throughout the first two plays had been synonymous with the adverse and the sinister, becomes, like the Erinyes, a symbol of the benevolent and the gracious. The ambiguity of the *Choephoroi* is supported by the image of shadowy obscurity ... which dominates the play."[13]

The Libation Bearers opens with dusk and closes when the light of dawn is breaking. Who brought the light of Apollo to the house of Atreus? Orestes, whom Apollo guided. Orestes was the light of rescue for the house of Atreus. (*LB.* 131) But the character of that light was special; it was the light of vengeance to Agamemnon's darkness. (*LB.* 319)[14] By having light stand for vengeance Aeschylus found one more way of affirming that his were morality plays.

If a critic might be in danger of reading things into the *Agamemnon*

[13] Peradotto. *Time,* p. 181.

[14] We are indebted to Peradotto for this point. In elaborating the idea, Peradotto wrote that the *kommos* "is an attempt to rouse the kind from darkness to light ..." (*LB.* 459) Peradotto. *Time,* p. 185.

and *The Libation Bearers*, the *Eumenides*, at least, was unambiguous. In the Erinyes' metamorphosis into Eumenides, there were instructive shifts in terms from words connoting darkness to words connoting light. Until the Erinyes became Eumenides, they were described as children of Night. (*Eum.* 72-3) To us such words as evil and loathed suggest mere repulsiveness. The Greek connotation differed. Vengeance was feared; it came as an unhappy experience. In this sense, the Erinyes were evil. "Loathed" has this same connotation. The Erinyes were loathed in the sense that the punishment or vengeance that followed transgression of the moral code is frightening. Greek vocabulary has no words for "death wish" or masochism. The Greeks would have said "no one in his right mind, no well person, would seek unhappy experiences."

The Erinyes had work to do whose character was best expressed by terms connoting darkness, even the darkness of death and the realm of the dead. It was the Erinyes who felled the man whose high-vaulting ambition made him seem to soar. This man of hybris may not know what hit him or that he was sick with the moral illness, the moral flaw of *hamartia*. "He falls, and does not know in the daze of his folly. // Such in the dark of man is the mist of infection // that hovers, and moaning rumor tells how his house lies // under fog that glooms above." (*Eum.* 377-80)

Once Athenians have accepted the moral law the Erinyes become Eumenides; the terms connoting a hurtful darkness are replaced by words connoting beneficial light. The light of Apollo no longer lights the way to vengeance. The Eumenides "pronounce words of grace": "Nor blaze of heat blind the blossoms of grown plants." (*Eum.* 939-40)

The playwright used the words denoting weather after the same fashion as words denoting light and darkness. In both instances the connotations of words set the action in relief. At Aulis there were "cross winds" (*Aga.* 148) and winds that "blew from Strymon" (*Aga.* 192), adverse winds for ships bound for Troy. These winds made for "sick idleness ... distraction of the mind" (*Aga.* 193-4) which were as ruinous of the health of men as of "hull and cable" (*Aga.* 195). Skillfully used, the Greek permitted Aeschylus to suggest a very great deal with very few images. In addition, the gods were involved. Zeus was connoted, for Zeus was the god of winds. Justice was connoted. Zeus was the god of so many forms of justice. Decision was denoted by having these same winds, cross winds, whose variability connoted choosing this option or that.

Zeus has three roles in Aeschylus' moral philosophy, each role typified by what Zeus means in each play of the trilogy. As one, we might expect Zeus to stand for the moral code, or that aspect of the code to which the

trilogy calls attention. Zeus is also the symbol of punishment for transgression of the moral code, and finally obedience to the moral code. Aeschylus traded very heavily on the veneration so many Greeks held for Zeus. While that may be obvious, the special way in which Aeschylus added strength to the highly regarded god was worth note. In addition to saying all the conventional things that were said about the power of Zeus, Aeschylus increased an already awesome quality by implying that the father of the gods is the repository of all the special powers of the Olympians. To make Zeus seem even more impressive, and thereby make it the more likely that the rank-and-file would abide by the moral code, Aeschylus did not have Zeus appear in the extant tragedies nor, I think, in any of the plays. There were epiphanies of other gods,[15] as there had been in Homer, but Zeus appeared only to men in the wind, thunder and the spectacle of lightning.

JURISDICTIONAL RIGHTS. *Timê* in the *Prometheus Bound* and throughout the *Oresteia* customarily referred to a function or special identifying symbol with which one might associate an immortal—as the fire of Hephaestus' forge. It was a god's *timê* that justified the sacrifices that men directed to the gods. These sacrifices were petitions; men, being dependent on the *timai* of the gods, were pitiable. To say that men were pitiable because, as mortals, they were limited by mortality, was stating the same proposition. That is, mortality connoted not having the *timai* of the gods. Prometheus had taken from Hephaestus a *timê* that guaranteed Hephaestus sacrifices for all time. The Titan had not only invaded a province that was not his, but he had robbed Hephaestus of a chance to have the quid pro quo relationship which the Greeks accepted as one of the ways mortals and immortals were tied together. This *timê* (or *geras*) of a god had a major place in Aeschylus' design for drama. Not only was Zeus the custodian and guardian of the *timai* which were his gifts to the Olympian gods but these *timai* were a god's. The *timai* were not shared.

In the *Oresteia* and *Prometheus Bound* Aeschylus employed *geras* interchangeably with *timê*, as for example when Aeschylus had Hephaestus say that Prometheus "... gave honors (*timai*) to mortals beyond what was just." (*PB.* 30) Seven lines further Might (*Kratos*) said: "Why do you not hate him, since it was your *geras* he betrayed to men?"[16] Such words as honor,

[15] M. P. Nilsson has written at length on epiphanies of the gods in *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and Its Survival in Greek Religion.* Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1927, Chapters X and XI.

[16] The classic association of Hephaestus is with the crafts of fire or, more exactly, the blacksmith's fire; Hephaestus was blacksmith to the gods. (Graves. *Myths*, Vol. 1, 23a-23.2.)

privilege, and power[17] in English connote status and hint at monopoly privilege. But in Greek this connotation is inapplicable. *Timê* and *geras* signify only an allotted function, or the "position" (*Eum.* 419) or the "office" (*Eum.* 209).

Perhaps the term *lachos* (most often "lot") is related to these terms. It comes closest to a moral significance, though, because of the implication that that which is "destined" is "just." The term *lachos* most clearly attests the quality of responsibility that cannot be escaped. "Lot" is fated. In the *Eumenides* (309) the Erinyes refer to what they have to do in executing retributive justice as an assigned "lot." The line is more literally rendered by: "How our troops assign the lots according to each man." In this fashion the Erinyes tell that inflicting punishment was assigned them: "When we were born such lots were assigned for our keeping." (*Eum.* 349) Earlier (*Eum.* 334) the English word "purpose" was used by Lattimore to translate *lachos* but the meaning of "purpose" does not materially differ from "lot."[18] Work that is a duty can be read out of the line that referred to the responsibilities of the Erinyes: "Yet these, too, have their work" (*moira*). (*Eum.* 476) It was this religious-moral quality that we think typical of the Aeschylean outlook.

Aeschylus does not choose to hint that the provinces of craft were allotted by Zeus, which would have been one way of signifying the justice of the allotment. One bit of speculation on the reason for this is that in the *Prometheus Bound* Zeus has not become the embodiment of justice; he is not the paradigm of justice.

Rather, then, than using the name of Zeus to stamp Hephaestus' jurisdiction as valid, Aeschylus used Moira. It is the allotment from Moira that makes a forecast or a province, such as Hephaestus' right. The evasion of the forecast or the invasion of the allotted province is punishable. The crime of transgression may be held up for more than one generation.

Throughout this chapter there are references to lines of the dramas where the cited terms may be found. These references almost always are but a sampling. For the total references see Gabriel Italie. (*Index Aeschylus.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954-55.)

[17] "Power" probably should be spelled out a "sphere of power" as opposed to physical, brute force.

[18] "This purpose (*lachos*) that the all-involving destiny spun ..." (*Eum.* 334-35) *Lachos* denoting "duties" undoubtedly has the meaning of responsibilities in: "We drive through our duties (lachos), spurned, outcast." (*Eum.* 384-85) The religious and moral character of the "lot" is very well exposed in the line given to the Erinyes in their exchange with Apollo: "You honor bloody actions where you have no right." (*Eum.* 715) The thought of a task "being destined" and, therefore, a responsibility, is hammered home by the term *moira.* Once again *moira* is without the connotation of mortality, "destined to die."

The principal denotation of *lachos*, however, was lot in the sense of limit or boundary, that is to say, the boundaries around mortality or the limits appropriate to mortals or those appropriate to immortals. On the assumption that Aeschylus was preoccupied with guiding the behavior of humans and not gods, it would be well to recall that the lot (or fate) of men, like those of the gods, was determined by the three Fates, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos.[19]

Homer's use of *hyper moron*, "usually translated 'beyond fate,' " is one of the points Nilsson clarifies in his *Greek Piety*. Nilsson simply argued that "beyond fate" was not a satisfactory rendition. For one thing, "beyond fate" was an expression which involves a self-contradiction; the real meaning was "beyond the allotted portion."

Nilsson's remarks on *moira* and *aisa* are most apt: "... the Homeric words *moira* and *aisa*, usually translated 'fate,' signify 'allotment,' 'portion,' for example, a share of booty or a 'helping' at a meal, and hence the regular, proper share which falls to a man's lot; he can lay hold of more than this, take 'above his portion,' and this, in a later age, is *hybris*. From the idea of orderliness which is contained in the above-mentioned words develops the idea of destiny ..."[20] Nilsson's conclusion was one with which we wish to side, in understanding not only Homeric, but also Aeschylean retributive justice. How often are we reminded that the Greeks were taught *Mêden agan*! Niobe, Midas, Narcissus, Icarus and many other central figures in legend taught Greeks about the punishment of those who went beyond their limits. They were punished, like Tityus who desired to the point of raping Leto, the mistress of Zeus, "the allotment of Zeus." (*OD.* XI, 543-50)

JEALOUSY OF THE GODS. The gnomic wisdom of *Mêden agan* was hidden in the stories of Niobe or Icarus, but the Greek aim may have escaped the modern reader. Because the ideal of restraint has been overlooked, the Greek gods have gotten the bad reputation of being jealous gods in the sense of nasty personages with inflated egos likely to be so offended. When, for example, a mortal wove beautiful designs in cloth, a goddess, whose *timê* was weaving, would be jealous and might change the mortal into a spider, the atê of Arachne. Aeschylus would not perpetuate a story about

[19] Some of the myths clustering about Fate are identified by Graves. (Graves. *Greek Myths*, Vol. 1, p. 10.) The Fates, *Moirai*, "gave" men and gods their fate, what was destined to happen. An extended review of *moira* would go beyond the scope of this study but one would profit from reading B. C. Dietrich's *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1965) as well as the earlier volume of Greene, *Moira*.

[20] Nilsson. *Greek Piety*, p. 52.

Athena jealous of a mortal's weaving. We have seen what Athena represented in Aeschylus' tragedies.

Perhaps one strikes closer to *phthonos*, with the meaning of envy, when Agamemnon agrees to walk on purple robes, a sacrilegious act. "And as I crush these garments stained from the rich sea // let no god's eyes of hatred (*phthonos*) strike me from afar." (*Aga.* 946-47) In the same vein one reads: "Let me attain no envied (*aphthonos*) wealth." (*Aga.* 471)[21]

The immortals served a very different purpose for Aeschylus and he could have them fulfill that end without having to give up composing tragedies. The objective of Aeschylus was that the specialties of the gods, their special powers, be used for reinforcing his moral lessons. Jealousy is the jealousy of the old Testament Jehovah. "I am a jealous god," means that if men carve images of gods and worship other gods than the God of Abraham, he will punish the idolators. It was morally wrong to carve statues of gods because that signaled a theology inconsistent with Jewish monotheism. It would be perfectly acceptable to say that the Zeus of Aeschylus bordered on a monotheistic God in representing all the characteristics of the moral code, or all the male characteristics, presuming there were any for which Hera, the female role, was responsible. Aeschylus would go even to the length of showing one of the immortals, one once allied with Zeus—that is one who once subscribed to Zeus' moral law or the cosmic moral law represented by Zeus—rebel but finally returning to obedience to the moral code. That was the moral of the *Prometheia.* Or the chief among mortals, such a mighty king as Xerxes, would be taught wisdom through suffering. No one was exempt. Not even Zeus was amoral in Aeschylean tragedy, even though he seemed to stand outside of the passage of time.

THE FUNCTION OF TIME'S PASSAGE IN THE DRAMAS. If it is a fact that Aeschylus did not hold to an evolutionary or developmental view of allotments, powers or specialties of mortals and immortals, he did use concepts bound up with the notion of time. Aeschylean trilogies move to the final play with the inevitable surge of the waves. If the sweep is not evolutionary, it does reveal a change from a less happy to a more happy state of affairs.

De Romilly[22] has found some four hundred uses of *chronos* in Greek tragedy. The term was apparently not without its attractions to the Greek playwrights. As a new toy *chronos* seems not to have been much used earlier

[21] The "slow" (literally 'grudging' *Phthoneros*) "anger" of the earlier line (*Aga.* 450) is but an adjectival usage.

[22] Jacqueline De Romilly. *Time in Greek Tragedy.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968.

than the fifth century.[23] Later it is frequently encountered, although employed differently by each tragedian. One way in which Aeschylus thought of time had time assume a reality all of its own independent of people.[24] In this sense of time wisdom would be discovered "in good time," in the third play of the trilogy. De Romilly quotes a letter in which the Danish scholar, Carsten Hoeg, wrote of time having an "ontological independence" in the plays of Aeschylus.[25] This reification of time made it something which both moves on with a person and maintains a separate existence. De Romilly cites the most famous example, the passage "in the *Agamemnon* where Clytemnestra says she saw more disasters in her dreams than could happen while she was asleep—or, to translate exactly what she says, more than the time who slept with me (894: *touxuneudontos chronou*). Time sleeping with the sleeper, what could it mean, if not the time when he is asleep? This abstract power, suddenly alive side by side with us, lives our own life. It is with us (xun-—) and yet different."[26]

The parallel that time ran in its course by the side of this man or that woman had as a complement the notion that time displayed or unfolded itself. The etymological derivation was from *anaptussein*, to unfold, display.[27] At the expense of being repetitious I wish to suggest that Aeschylus had the final play of the trilogy display what was righteous and right, what, therefore, was benign and healthy, or more precisely, what conduced to health, and the healing of one who makes a harmonious whole of what was a collection of warring parts.

The notion of time 'displaying' events had at least one other complement that fitted the legal aspect of Aeschylean moralism. The idea was De Romilly's "As time displays everything, it is a witness who brings proof for

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 3 ff.; Peradotto. "Time," p. 18 ff.

[24] De Romilly, writing of Aeschylus' perception of time as somehow having a life of its own, although intimately related to a life of action, appreciated the playwright's ability to write powerfully. "This concreteness, of course," De Romilly says in her chapter on personification of time, "is mainly due to Aeschylus' own genius as a poet; for his images are always powerful, and his world is a world where everything becomes alive with intense life." (De Romilly. *Time*, p. 47 ff.)

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 43 ff.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 43 ff. Peradotto. "Time," p. 21 ff., did not write of the personification of time but contrasted the Aeschylean with the archaic conception, "most fully developed in Pindar," in whose odes "time was a force bringing all things into being—a wind, as it were, blowing events towards us—and, therefore, always conceived of as 'coming,' as *later*, as *future*." In contrast, time for Aeschylus was "removed from events and located in the observer, intimately related to his experience, and flowing *with*, not *against* him." (21 ff.)

[27] De Romilly. *Time*, p. 51.

or against anyone. Already Pindar called it the only witness for authentic truth.[28] In a more precise way, Euripides will call it by the word used for witnesses in a lawsuit: it is *mēnutēs* in the Hippolytus (1051)."[29] De Romilly did not illustrate the uncovering by time in the surviving tragedies of Aeschylus but this mode of picturing time fits the mold of Aeschylean thought and language. The playwright over and over again keeps justice and right and righteousness together in a tight triad. But Aeschylus was also an educator, and as an educator the playwright wrote what De Romilly reported: time teaches lessons. (*PB.* 981)[30]

This educative role of Aeschylus was less consciously taken than the role of judge. Time was crucial. "Time is a witness, and time is a sovereign power: when these two qualities combine," De Romilly wrote of Aeschylus, "he becomes a judge and the most terrible of judges."[31] It was precisely this overlap between the concept of time being sovereign and the portrayal of Zeus as sovereign, all-powerful, that led us to say that the expression of perfect justice could be expressed by the term, Zeus, and Zeus-Justice was all-powerful, however much time it took to demonstrate the triumph of Justice-Right-Righteousness-Zeus.

De Romilly's lead into Aeschylus' thought on time was the shrewd observation that Aeschylus trusted time.[32] "Trusted in time" would not distort De Romilly's insight but might edge a bit closer to what Aeschylus intended. Aeschylus, as educator, trusted in time; "it teaches a lesson (*ekdidaskei*, *Prometheus*, 981). But this lesson may be more or less severe. Its first form is the simplest and hardest: time brings out divine punishment."[33] De Romilly overstated the case when she wrote that: "Time is not only with him (Aeschylus) a theme for easy remarks and moral reflec-

[28] Pindar. *The Odes of Pindar*, "Olympian Odes," Z, 54.

[29] De Romilly. *Time*, p. 51.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 55. De Romilly expands this essential notion of time as judge, including, in this extension, the Erinyes whom we have claimed could be thought of as the representation of vengeance, of the law of retributive justice, which was one aspect of the whole or perfect justice, which was Zeus. In her extended concept of time, De Romilly had time seeing all, "as the sun does, but also as do Zeus and the Erinyes. No doubt that is the real meaning which tragic authors wanted to convey. Already this is what Pindar meant when he said 'Time is the saviour of just men' (fr. 159, Bruno Snell). And, surely, it is the meaning we must give to the utterance in the *Oedipus Rex* (1213) when the Chorus exclaims: 'Time, who sees all, has found you in spite of you.' It is also the meaning we must give to the lines in the *Coloneus* (1453-1454) where the Chorus similarly says (but without the article before *chronos*!): 'Time sees these things; he sees them always.'" (p. 56.)

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

tions: these reflections finally join together to form a real doctrine, which conversely, accounts for the whole structure of his plays."[34] Dare I say it again? Crime and punishment were played out in the trilogy. In my opinion the last play always tried to make plain that virtue is rewarded. More important is the lesson that transgression certainly would be punished. It is the observation of the punishment that leads men to be fearful and, thereby, so righteous that they could enjoy the fruits of virtue.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Part Two

THE *ORESTEIA*

CHAPTER IV

AGAMEMNON[1]

AGAMEMNON

Dramatis Personae

Agamemnon, King of Argos, Commander-in-Chief of the expedition against Troy
Aegisthus, Lover of Clytemnestra and son of Thyestes, Cassandra, Agamemnon's prize of war, daughter of Priam, King of Troy
Chorus of old men of Argos
Clytemnestra, wife of Agamemnon, mother of Iphigenia
Herald
Various attendants of Clytemnestra and Agamemnon; bodyguard of Aegisthus (all silent)
Watchman

The play opens with anticipation of Agamemnon's triumphal return from the Trojan war. The playwright infused the tragedy with a bitter-sweet atmosphere: Agamemnon has conquered Troy—he has been the agent of Zeus' just punishment of Paris' city—but in the process he has sacrificed his daughter and incurred the hatred of his wife, left many Argive homes in mourning, and commanded men who violated sacred places in Troy and did other things that they should not have done. This is the heavy mantle of guilt that Agamemnon wears in returning to Argos. With him comes a prize of war, Cassandra, daughter of Priam. Cassandra tells of the curse on the House of Atreus initiated when Thyestes, father of Aegisthus, cursed his brother, Atreus, father of Agamemnon. Atreus was cursed because he

[1] Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* translated by Richmond Lattimore in *Greek Tragedies* (edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore), volume 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1960. Copyright 1953 by the University of Chicago.

fed his brother the flesh of a son of Thyestes. Cassandra foresees the death of Agamemnon, but not until the murder of Agamemnon by his wife, Clytemnestra, has been further warranted. The death of Clytemnestra's daughter is the first justification; Agamemnon's walking on crimson robes, conventionally reserved for the gods, is the final one. The play draws to an end with Clytemnestra and Aegisthus excusing their plot against Agamemnon.

The Libation Bearers[2]

Dramatis Personae

A follower of Aegisthus
Aegisthus, now king of Argos
Cilissa, the nurse
Chorus of foreign serving women
Electra, daughter of Clytemnestra and Agamemnon
Orestes, son of Clytemnestra and Agamemnon
Pylades, friend of Orestes
Various attendants of Orestes, Clytemnestra, Aegisthus (silent parts)

The palace of Agamemnon was the backdrop for the first play of the trilogy. The second play opens before the tomb of Agamemnon. Electra mourns her father and reinforced by the Chorus, cries for vengeance. Orestes appears and a vow of vengeance is made. Clytemnestra, whose pleas fail to still the hand of Orestes, is slain by her son, who also kills Aegisthus. The play ends with Orestes, feeling himself going mad, fleeing to Apollo's temple at Delphi.

Eumenides[3]

Dramatis Personae

Apollo
Athena
Athenians who become the first members of the Areopagus

[2] Aeschylus, *The Libation Bearers* translated by Richmond Lattimore in *Greek Tragedies* (edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore), volume 2. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1960. Copyright 1953 by the University of Chicago.

[3] Aeschylus, *The Eumenides* translated by Richmond Lattimore in *Greek Tragedies* (edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore), volume 3. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1960. Copyright 1953 by the University of Chicago.

Erinyes, the Angry Ones who persecute Orestes and then become a Chorus of Eumenides, the Friendly Ones (first Chorus)
Ghost of Clytemnestra
Hermes
Orestes
Priestess of Apollo, the Pythia
Women of Athens (second Chorus)

As the second play has two backdrops—the palace and the tomb of Agamemnon—this final drama of the *Oresteia* opens at the temple of Apollo in Delphi and then shifts scenes to the hill of Ares where the Areopagus comes to have its traditional seat. At Delphi the ghost of Clytemnestra spurs the Erinyes who have been put to sleep by Apollo. The Erinyes hound Orestes and pursue him to Athens where Apollo has sent him to be a suppliant of Athena. A judgment scene occupies much of the play. With Athena acting first as mediator, then as a member of the Areopagus casting the deciding vote, Orestes is cleared of the charge of matricide. The charge is brought by the Erinyes, who after Apollo wins his defense of Orestes, change into Eumenides vowing protection of Athens. The *Eumenides* ends with a torchlight procession.

Introduction

With so many of Aeschylus' tragedies lost to us, it is a stroke of luck to have a complete trilogy from the last phase of his writing.[4] I believe that the plays of the *Oresteia—Agamemnon, Libation Bearers,* and *Eumenides*[5]—testify to a moral position to which Aeschylus held and never changed in any significant way. In contrast, during the course of his career as a playwright, Aeschylus could have been expected to vary his styles of writing and producing tragedies and satyr-dramas. There could have been variation in the technique without substantial modification of the moral philosophy. In a chapter on the Danaid trilogy I will spell this out. In that chapter the gist of my conclusion will be that there is no convincing distinction between the technical elements of the plays we have from earlier in Aeschylus' career and such dramatic works as the *Oresteia* or *Prometheus Bound.*

[4] Herington. "Aeschylus: The Last Phase."

[5] The texts used for the tragedies of the *Oresteia* are in the series edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore. *Greek Tragedies.* 3 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

I think that speculation on what might have been Aeschylus' moral philosophy, together with interpretations of Aeschylean tragedies, is mandatory in the record of ancient education in the West. In Chapter II the essentials of the moral viewpoint were stated. In that analysis only the barest reference was made to the tragedies themselves. Beginning with this chapter, and continuing to the end of the book, our whole attention will be to display Aeschylus' moral lessons as they appear in his plays. Unhappily I cannot subscribe to the interpretations that have been made of those plays—with the exception of the *Suppliants*, which will be acknowledged in Chapter VII. That is the one exception which forces me to spend more time and space on interpreting the plays than one might expect to find in a book on a portion of Western educational thought.

Although there are but seven plays to choose between, the question of the order in which they will be reviewed does present itself. We have chosen not to follow a chronological order, but rather to make a start with a trilogy that probably came at the end of Aeschylus' career. Striking out with the *Oresteia* does give us a chance to reflect on Aeschylus' moral lessons in the matrix of a full trilogy. We have the lesson from start to finish.

The *Agamemnon*, the first play of the *Oresteia*, is a tragedy whose plot and action gravitates around transgression. The major transgression is the premeditated murder of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra, his wife. Looking forward to the judgment scene of the *Eumenides*, the playwright was interested in having Clytemnestra's punishment be for something worth thinking about. Could Clytemnestra have been at all justified, or was the murder of her husband an open and shut case? The Greeks enjoyed thinking, and Aeschylus handed them a problem in the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Was Iphigenia's death a proper sacrifice, or was it murder? If it was murder, then was Clytemnestra justified in revenging herself on Agamemnon? Perhaps Agamemnon's death was no more than the last bloody act of a tragedy which began with Thyestes cursing his brother, Atreus.

In my opinion Aeschylus did not intend Thyestes' curse—or any curse for that matter—to be a great force. If Aeschylus intended Thyestes' curse to be effective, why did he not explain why Orestes was free of it? My argument goes further. Orestes is free of the curse because he has not transgressed, which is a locution for 'being cursed.' And that is the nub of the matter. Having been cursed is equivalent to 'having transgressed and having to pay for the transgression.' Was Atreus' other son, Menelaus, also cursed in losing Helen? Of course not; there is no Greek story that would justify thinking of Helen's loss as a punishment. To think in terms of the number of generations over which the curse on the House of Atreus reached, we

are pulled up short by the knowledge that Menelaus was not affected—to say nothing of Orestes. And Orestes might have been expected to be tainted, for he did fall within the Greek maximum of three generations for a curse's outreach. But a curse was not binding on all, even all males, within the second or third generations. Nor did Aeschylus intend it to be. The curse on the House of Atreus, or any similar curse in Aeschylean tragedy, marks the individual who is morally flawed and whose transgression is major.

I will come to a similar conclusion about the force of a curse in writing about the *Seven Against Thebes*, but in the *Agamemnon*, or in the *Oresteia* as a whole, there is no need to do more than raise the question about Orestes. The long and the short of it is that *Agamemnon* served Aeschylus in two ways. Aeschylus was able to play a play within the trilogy about retributive justice. In addition *Agamemnon* served to raise doubts about Clytemnestra's character in her role as wife and mother, who had been provoked by the death of her daughter, Iphigenia. To make sense of the *Oresteia* entails deciding whether Clytemnestra has been sufficiently evil to justify matricide; that in turn entails being clear about the *Agamemnon*. And this last explains why so very much learned dispute has centered about Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia. I cannot but add to the investment, but I will limit what is said now to such minimal essential as a discussion of Artemis' anger.

Agamemnon and his allies are kept in Aulis because the winds do not blow. The Achaeans could not sail against Troy, even though Troy deserved to be punished. In typical fashion the audience is told that the winds are stilled because Artemis is incensed that the portent sent Agamemnon by Zeus involves eagles devouring a pregnant hare, with its unborn offspring. The eagles are symbols of Zeus' justice, i.e., to destroy Troy is just punishment.

In what Lloyd-Jones calls the "world of portent," as distinguished from the "world of reality," Artemis' anger presages the doom that will overtake Agamemnon and so many of the Achaeans.[6] I reject that basic distinction and do not think that it is necessary to remember that in the *Iliad* Artemis is aligned with the Trojans to know how Aeschylus would have employed the Artemis symbols in the *Agamemnon*.[7] Few in Aeschylus' audience might have remembered Artemis' role in the *Iliad*, but many, especially the women, would have known Artemis as the patron of the pregnant female and the guardian of the defenseless young.

[6] H. Lloyd-Jones. "The Guilt of Agamemnon." *CQ*, 12 (1962), p. 189.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

Since Agamemnon is to kill his daughter, what better way of suggesting the impiety than masking nemesis as the wrath of Artemis angered by the slaying of a pregnant hare? But Artemis' anger is too personal, a critic might say, to allow a linkage between what provokes Artemis and what Agamemnon is to do at Aulis. The weakness of that protest lies in the fact that the Greeks were accustomed to symbolism and found its manipulation entertaining. And, remembering what was said about *timê*, Artemis was Zeus' daughter, twin of Apollo. Not only had Artemis received her specialty from Zeus, but her birth of the union of Leto with Zeus symbolized her *timê* as intimately associated with Zeus, that representative of justice.

The critic has only to remember that eagles symbolized the punishment that always follows the transgression of justice. If the justice is called Zeus' justice, and the eagles Zeus' eagles, no Greek would be deceived by the poetic manner of expressing the abstract moral philosophy. Neither would a Greek be troubled by Aeschylus having someone discuss Artemis' anger. A contemporary of Aeschylus' would have known that Artemis' anger at the destruction of the pregnant hare and the unborn of her womb was a poetic way of saying that there was going to be an excess of killing of both Trojans and Argives, and an impiety in the killing, both at Aulis and then at Troy. Aeschylus' audience would have appreciated the fact that the author of the *Agamemnon* had managed to link the sacrifice of Iphigenia with the bloodshed of the Trojan War, link them in the embrace of a common morality that held both impious.

The playwright has presented the audience with the first of his leading questions: why is Artemis angry? This query leads naturally enough to the first great puzzle of the *Agamemnon*: is the sacrifice of Iphigenia themis? And what about the force of Thyestes' curse? Is that enough to justify Aegisthus' plotting against Agamemnon and consorting with the king's wife? Not until the end of *The Libation Bearers*, not until Orestes sees the Erinyes that came to punish him for the death of his mother, does the audience know that Aeschylus did not intend the curse to excuse Aegisthus. Not that Aegisthus is punished by the Erinyes; he is not, but Aeschylus clearly intended that Aegisthus be thought of as evil, as one whose death is deserved.

The *Agamemnon* ends. Its hero has been murdered, and in his death he has paid for his transgressions and provided the raison d'être for the next two plays. Was Clytemnestra sufficiently bad to justify Orestes' matricide as themis? That is *the* question.

Punishment is the theme of *The Libation Bearers*. Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are punished. The revenge in the punishment sustains the interest of the audience and prepares for the judgment scene of the *Eumenides*. But

The Libation Bearers should not be passed over as no more than a play about punishment. Aeschylus does succeed in making Clytemnestra convincingly pitiable, but still unrighteous and deserving of death.

The play opens with the lamentation of Electra and the mourning of the Chorus. Their words on the dead Agamemnon serve to burnish the image of king, and the audience is prepared to adjust their ideas about Agamemnon.

In the action of *The Libation Bearers* Orestes and Electra[8] are reunited and Orestes begins to plan the punishment of his mother and her lover. There is a most moving *agôn logôn* between Orestes and Clytemnestra, when Aeschylus has the queen know that Orestes means to kill her. Once again Aeschylus succeeds in making Clytemnestra pitiable.

The play ends with Orestes seeing the Erinyes, an act approximating hallucinating. I think Aeschylus meant for his audience to understand that Orestes is ill, his mind 'overcome' with doubt.

Aeschylus makes outright propaganda for fear. The *Eumenides* opens with the Erinyes put to sleep by Apollo in the chief of his temples, the one at Delphi. Apollo then sends Orestes to Athens and tells him to be a suppliant at the statue of Athena. The judgment scene unfolds with a lengthy debate between Apollo and the Erinyes. The latter represent punishment and the fear of transgressing. Only when the latter is honored do the Erinyes metamorphize into Eumenides. Apollo and the Erinyes are reconciled. The principle of male supremacy triumphs.

The illness of Orestes is cured. There is a happy ending, once the Erinyes are persuaded to metamorphose into Eumenides. The change from moth to butterfly is no less miraculous, but this metamorphosis does not take much of Aeschylus' time. The playwright is more concerned with preventing transgression. His purpose is to instill fear. Barely the last third of the play is taken up with the happy ending. Most of the play concerns itself with the puzzle of Orestes' guilt and the justification of fear. The puzzle is intellectual; Aeschylus makes outright propaganda for fear.

My prolegomenon now can be completed with a brief recitation of the topics that I will take up in this and the succeeding chapter on the *Oresteia*. The very first and most controversial topic revolves about two rhetorical questions: Was the killing of Iphigenia themis? Was Agamemnon compelled

[8] Electra is not a major character in the *Oresteia*. To have made her more than minor would have distracted from Agamemnon, Orestes, and Clytemnestra. Electra's role was to begin the herculean task of restoring Agamemnon's image while, at the same time, tearing down Clytemnestra's. I think Aeschylus was successful, and that was quite an achievement.

to do what was impious, or was he free to decide whether to kill Iphigenia or not? I will be arguing that Aeschylus intended to have Agamemnon thought a transgressor, and furthermore a free agent, who arrived at the decision to transgress without coercion.

In the course of attempting to persuade readers of this point of view, it will be necessary to broach an issue that is central in Aeschylean tragedy. Succinctly put, the issue concerns identifying the keystone of Aeschylus' theology. The role of Zeus was dominant: this is a claim few will dispute. But three leading scholars of the *Agamemnon*, Fraenkel, Denniston, and Page, have come to the conclusion that Zeus' meaning in the *Agamemnon*, and presumably in the other surviving tragedies of Aeschylus, is thoroughly mysterious. On this, Denniston, Page and Fraenkel agree, though they come to opposite conclusions on the freedom of Agamemnon. My position is that Aeschylus presented a limpid picture of what the role and function of both Agamemnon and Zeus were supposed to have been. The parodos of the *Agamemnon* will be the matrix for my analysis.

AGAMEMNON IN THE PARODOS OF THE AGAMEMNON. The combined anapests (vv. 40-103) and the lyric song (vv. 104-257) make the parodos of the *Agamemnon* the longest in all surviving Greek drama. In itself this quantitative "first" was not what attracted some of the most able of the modern students of Aeschylus;[9] it was the twin issues of whether the demand of the chieftains that Agamemnon's daughter be sacrificed was themis (right, righteous) (*Aga.* 217) and whether the words: "... when necessity's yoke was put upon him ..." (*Aga.* 218) meant that Agamemnon had been forced to sacrifice Iphigenia.

The parodos, of course, features the Chorus and relates the events which took place ten years before at Aulis, when Agamemnon was there with his brother, Menelaus, and their allied chieftains. The Achaeans had gathered to avenge Menelaus, whose wife had left for Troy with Paris, son of Priam, King of Troy. The parodos leads up to the climactic decision of Agamemnon to sacrifice Iphigenia to appease Artemis, who was detaining the fleet in Aulis. The Achaeans were eager to be off to war. They were instruments of Zeus' punishment for transgressing the law of hospitality. The high place of this law was symbolized by having one of Zeus' names Zeus *Xenios*, god of hospitality or of guest rights and responsibilities. As an

[9] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Eduard Fraenkel (ed.). Vol. II, p. 26 ff.; Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Denniston and Page (eds.), p. xx ff.; Hammond. "Personal Freedom"; Lloyd-Jones. *CR*, 66 (1952), pp. 132-135 and the same author's later essay, "Three Notes on Aeschylus' Agamemnon." *Rh Mus.*, 103 (1960), pp. 76-80.

omen of Zeus' concern with the punishment of Paris, who as a guest seduced away Helen, two eagles appeared, representing the Atrides, Agamemnon and Menelaus. But the eagles killed and ate a pregnant hare and the embryo, and in her anger over the killing of her ward, Artemis demanded the balancing death of Iphigenia. The chieftains clamored for this death; Agamemnon ordered it. Was it right? Was it necessary? These questions have made the parodos the most famous passage in the writings of Aeschylus. I will spend some time with some of the most able modern attempts at explicating the parodos in the belief that a successful response to those two rhetorical questions on right and necessity will go far to resolving the mystery of Aeschylus' moral viewpoint.

Thus far we have had plain sailing. It will be more difficult to interpret Artemis' ultimatum—sacrifice Iphigenia or else the fleet will not be allowed to sail for the punishment of Troy. It will help to deny right away that Aeschylus meant to imply that Artemis' ultimatum involved coercion. Lattimore's use of the term "forcing" was too strong for use in translating the choral prayer: "Healer Apollo, I pray you // let her not with cross winds // bind the ships of the Danaans // to time-long anchorage // *forcing a second sacrifice unholy*, untasted ..." (*Aga.* 146-51, my italics) I prefer Fraenkel's "... in her eagerness to bring about another sacrifice ..." Fraenkel's phrasing left the onus of decision with Agamemnon. That was where Aeschylus wished it to be. The playwright was not teaching the sovereignty of Zeus. Aeschylus was trying to persuade Greeks to adhere to a moral code. Nothing was to distract from that. Consonant with that objective, in the Artemis episode Aeschylus showed the audience that Agamemnon chose—under great pressure—an immoral course. The immorality of a decision that was impious, impure, and unholy was what Aeschylus wished known. This immoral decision contrasted in a spectacular fashion with the guiltlessness of Orestes.

The role Artemis plays in the parodos of the *Agamemnon* is the most subtle of any in that tragedy. I have said that Artemis is acting in her role of protectress of the pregnant female and the young. But Dawe wrote that Artemis also is the agent of Zeus who yoked Agamemnon.[10] This is not a small point that might be passed by for the sake of allotting space to Dawe's major conclusions. It is major, indicating as it did all of Aeschylus' moral view. Dawe assumes that Zeus intends to teach that he alone is sovereign and his will is to be done. In my discussion of the doctrine of *pathei mathos*,

[10] Dawe. "The Place," p. 9; Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Denniston and Page (eds.). p. xxiii ff.

I hope such a notion has been disposed of in favor of another, one detailed in Chapter II, "Moral lessons in Aeschylean Drama." What I wish to remark is an instance of Aeschylus' skill in the very realistic, life-like balancing of obligations. In the instance of Agamemnon at Aulis, the demands of the chiefs are added to by obligations, and Artemis' ultimatum. The ultimatum is inserted to add strength to the morally spurious persuasiveness of the chiefs' demands. Aeschylus has not blasphemed; the playwright has only showed how difficult morally righteous choice really is.[11]

What does Aeschylus intend for his audience to think of Agamemnon, who had made a decision that was *dyssebês*, *anagnon*, and *anieron*? In my opinion, *Aeschylus wished Agamemnon to be understood as out of his mind (parakopa, Aga.* 223) *out of control, mad and thus able to will what exceeded the Mean, the appropriate, what was right to do.* This is the convention in the tragedies of Aeschylus. Once again Aeschylus has made the decision of the hero his dramatic point d'appui. Once again Aeschylus presents a man whose deviation from what was morally right is in fact a verbal picture of a man gone mad.

The next step is to determine whether Aeschylus wished to have the audience think that Agamemnon had gone mad as a result of feeling compelled to sacrifice his daughter. Was Aeschylus indeed under "... the strap of compulsion's yoke ...?" (*Aga.* 217) There seemed to be the difference between determinacy and indeterminacy in the rendition of *anankê* in verse 217. Lattimore wrote: "... when necessity's yoke was put upon him // he changed, and from the heart the breath came bitter // and sacrilegious, utterly infidel ..." (*Aga.* 218-220) In seeming contrast to this lack of Agamemnon's freedom of will, Dawe accepted the rendition of Fraenkel: "... when he slipped his neck through the strap of compulsion's yoke, and the wind of his purpose veered about and blew impious, impure, unholy ..." I have chosen to accept Fraenkel's rendition because it allows us to focus on Agamemnon's decision. I say this without being affected by a judgment on what immediately precedes the lines on "compulsion's yoke." Lattimore has verses 218-220 in the *Agamemnon* preceded by the quotation of Agamemnon saying he did not feel that he could disappoint his allies. Dawe would have the same lines introduced by language which describes the conditions which led the allies to make the demand on Agamemnon to which the commander-in-chief has yielded. The sole difference between the Lattimore and Dawe views is Lattimore's decision that Agamemnon's words are immediately preceding. This made little difference to the audience,

[11] Hammond. "Personal Freedom," p. 42.

having had an opportunity to see that Aeschylus wished them to attend to the moral quality of Agamemnon's choice. Our preference for Fraenkel's wording has been dictated by Fraenkel making Agamemnon's election the more clear.

Fraenkel comes close to understanding that decision is a link in the moral chain of Aeschylean tragedy. Unfortunately he lost that understanding in sentiment. Fraenkel was victimized by the error of explaining the action of Aeschylus' tragedies in terms of the sentiments of actual people rather than characters in a play. But the values are those of characters in a play; they are Aeschylus' and no one else's. We have noted this aberration as a besetting obstacle in setting out the thought of Aeschylus. Attention has to be riveted to the thought of Aeschylus not to the psychological interpretation of human behavior. Agamemnon was not a person; he was a character. Aeschylus was not writing about Agamemnon the man; he was writing about Agamemnon the character in a morality play. Overlooking this, Fraenkel misses an opportunity of helping to understand the primacy of choosing. He writes of the man, Agamemnon: "it is a very delicate touch that Agamemnon should speak first of the groups and justification of his resolve and then of the result that he hopes will follow from it, and in between leaves out 'I am determined to sacrifice her.' He cannot bring himself to utter the fatal words."[12]

Treating the foregoing as a warning I can write about verses 205 through 216 in which Aeschylus[13] produces what was to be heard by the audience as a speech by Agamemnon giving as his reason for sacrificing Iphigenia the rightness of the demands[14] made by his allies. In agreement with

[12] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Fraenkel (ed.), Vol. II, p. 126.

[13] "The elder lord spoke aloud before them: // 'My fate is angry if I disobey these, // but angry if I slaughter // this child, the beauty of my house, // with maiden blood shed staining // these father's hands beside the altar. // What of these things goes now without disaster? // How shall I fail my ships // and lose my faith of battle? // For them to urge such sacrifice of innocent blood // angrily, for their wrath is great—it is right. May all be well yet.' " (*Aga.* 205-16)

[14] Dawe argued that Aeschylus intended the word *audai* rather than *orgai* (*Aga.* 216-17). The matter was discussed in Dawe ("The Place," p. 16 ff.) which had the line read: "Calchas says that it is right (*audai*) angrily to desire the blood of Iphigenia." The alternative, using *orgai*, had the chieftains urge the sacrifice "with very angry (*orgai*) anger." Dawe charged that those who preferred the use of *orgai* were "defying every law of critical and paleographic experience, and moreover by doing so are importing a grammatical peculiarity unique in the Greek language." (17) In accepting Dawe's argument, which was reinforced by Fraenkel and Denniston-Page against a variant *audai* for *orgai* (16 ff.), we wish to stress the meaning of "right angrily." The term "right"

Dawe,[15] I think this speech was meant to show the point at which Agamemnon had reached utter *amêchania*, the point at which the Greek hero feels that his choice is between two equally *disastrous* options.

At no time have I denied that Aeschylus wished his audiences to think either option disastrous. For the sake of emphasizing the significance Aeschylus attached to living up to his idea of the moral code, I grant that the playwright made the options very difficult. At the same time I have argued repeatedly that Aeschylus desired the audience to understand that only *one* of Agamemnon's options was morally defensible. Agamemnon was shown choosing the wrong way but describing that immoral stand as so justified that it was chosen even though it meant that the father would cut the throat of his own daughter. The impiety of the decision was intended by Aeschylus to be understood as parallel to the impious decision of Atreus to serve his brother that brother's children—when Atreus had very good reason to be enraged with Thyestes. Once again Aeschylus was implying that the weight of all the reasons in the world was not to be thought to weigh more heavily than opting for the righteous act.

Although I often have coupled righteousness and right, the idea that for Aeschylus the two went hand in hand seems excessively rigid and idealistic to people who pride themselves on facing each day's decision with an eye to what might work on that day. Commitments to long-term, even timeless principles, puts off such pragmatists. But Aeschylus was no pragmatist. He was rigid, his morality absolutely inflexible. And Greek contemporaries would not have found this stand at all odd.

What I mean is simple enough. The *aretai* praised by the Greeks as virtues

did not render *themis*. That is, the "right" used in this phrase was not intended to have a moral connotation. In effect what Calchas said was that the role of the warrior chiefs made it appropriate for them to demand that Artemis be appeased and the war against Troy begun. Again, the function of someone in the role of a warrior was to fight. That function accounted for the *audai*. The same explanation, incidentally, could be used for explaining *orgai*. With *orgai* one would have expected that the role-function of the warrior-chieftains led to demand "with very angry anger." All the very angry anger denoted was "justified by their role ..."; the warrior-chiefs were (justifiably) insistent.

For me the import of distinguishing between *audai* and *orgai* is that I was given one more opportunity to say that Aeschylus never could have put his seal of approval on the sacrifice of Iphigenia as *themis*. A sacrifice that was condemned as impious, impure, and unholy could not be so from the point of view of mortals and pious, pure, and holy from the point of view of immortals. I repeatedly have argued from examples out of the plays that Aeschylus used the immortals to affirm the moral law. I cannot agree that mortals would have been shown to be more moral than the immortals! That simply was not Aeschylus' view.

[15] Dawe. "Place," p. 9.

had seven that were cardinal, and the first of these was *phronêsis* or practical wisdom. For the Greeks, practical wisdom was the ability to do what was right and avoid doing what was wrong; in short, to make the morally right decisions. We know that so many of the Greek moralists taught fear and reverence of sacred and secular law that it would have been natural for Aeschylus to feature the transgression of dike in the first play of the trilogy. The playwright would wish to show that *phronêsis*, the ability to choose rightly, was akin to *dikaiosynê*, the virtue of a man just in thought and deed. Agamemnon did not exhibit *phronêsis*; neither did he have *dikaiosynê* and, it goes without saying, *sôphrosynê*.

Not being just, the chances were very good that a man wanting in *dikaiosynê* would not choose well. Such a man would be disordered—disoriented we say—would be out of control and *apeiron*, that is, given to excess or without limit or moderation. To a Greek moralist, I have been writing about the same thing in these several different ways. The one condition that held for them all was that being *apeiron* (or without *dikaiosynê* and not able to exhibit the *phronêsis* that was practical and moral decision making) did not mean that a man was coerced. The ability of virtue to be taught was tied with that of freedom of will. Because Aeschylus must have desired his plays to be instructive, he could not have freed his characters from the freedom to choose. Often the choice displayed the character's unlimited wish but always the principal actions turned on piety and impiety—they were just or unjust. Deeply unjust deeds were punished with death; their perpetrators would not live to become wise. But we would live, the audiences would live, and could decide action wisely.

We now are able to understand Aeschylus' thought when he had Agamemnon speak of what he believed was morally right and for which he slipped his neck through necessity's yoke. Aeschylus has given his audience the reason for Agamemnon's belief—the needs of the chiefs. In the play it was immediately after Agamemnon had stated that he looked upon the demands of the chiefs as morally right that there was reference to Zeus (accepting Dawe's reordering of the parodos) or (following the unreconstructed version) the reference to "necessity's yoke," understood as the sequence decision-transgression-punishment typical of Aeschylus' morality. The playwright would speak of this morality as Zeus' moral code or moral law, the time-honored morality of Athens.

I have taken decision as the starting point, but I earlier wrote of the (moral) fatal flaw, the *hamartia*. Now I propose that for Aeschylus the *hamartia* is identical with the decision. If one wishes to press the matter further and ask whether a person has revealed a personality that inclines him or

her to having a moral weakness, the answer given by Aeschylus' plays is that a man might be deceived (persuaded) by poor counsel. Xerxes was thus deceived by those who persuaded him to enlarge his empire beyond its proper bounds, a decision which led Xerxes to the rash act of trying to bind the sea.

If being persuaded, or deceived, to do what should not be done does not seem equivalent to *hamartia*, Aeschylus must be faulted. The playwright was not up to the psychological probing that became a commonplace in later drama.

ZEUS IN THE PARODOS HYMN TO ZEUS. The dramatic highpoint of the parodos is Agamemnon's decision, but the morality of that decision makes it all the more important to consider the Hymn to Zeus.

Even such a distinguished critic as Page considers Aeschylus theologically naive, however able as a playwright. Page writes of Aeschylus as "a great poet and a most powerful dramatist" but concluded that "the faculty of acute or profound thought is not among his gifts."[16] Since I disagree, it would be well to know how poor a thinker Page thought Aeschylus was. Even Golden terms Aeschylus "a backward and naive thinker"[17] in the field of theology.

In the same vein Page relates Aeschylus "a superstitious and naive thinker, who believes in a primitive and anthropomorphic Zeus."[18] The words in which Page summarizes his judgment of Aeschylus on Zeus are written as if the playwright shared in the most crude of local superstition. "Innumerable superstitions darkened and dominated the lives of men, even the most intelligent; and in this respect Aeschylus was certainly not in advance of his time. For him, the ministers of the divine will are a diverse and jealous brood, and Zeus appears indifferent to the conflict of their claims."[19]

I trust that what has been said on the *timai* of the immortals meets the final point of Denniston and Page on the "diverse and jealous brood." I am similarly optimistic that the indifference of Aeschylus' Zeus is to be understood as Zeus comprehending all the powers that were the specialties of the immortal patrons. As to Aeschylus lacking a systematic view and holding a simple-minded doctrine of *pathei mathos*, I can only say that although Aeschylus certainly was not the philosophic equal of Plato, his

[16] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon*. Denniston and Page (eds.). "Introduction," p. xv.

[17] Golden. "Zeus," p. 157.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[19] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon*. Denniston and Page (eds.). "Introduction," pp. xiv-xv.

morality was not simplistic. What I have written and what I will say in connection with the extant Aeschylean tragedies, together with the reconstruction of missing trilogies will be my answer.

In the Hymn, whose opening line is "Zeus: whatever he may be ..." Aeschylus states the most famous doctrine of his moral law, *pathei mathos* (*Aga.* 117-8), "wisdom // comes alone through suffering." With this reference to suffering, the Hymn appropriately enough ends: "From the gods who sit in grandeur grace comes somehow violent." The Hymn is only 23 lines long, but brevity makes the doctrine of *pathei mathos* stand out. The audience, ourselves included, is alerted to the principle that wisdom comes through suffering. We might not have known what the Greeks had been taught by poets from the time of Homer, that suffering was not accidental; it always came from moral trespass, as witness the transgression of Agamemnon.

Aeschylus intended his audience to generalize the punishment of Agamemnon into the inevitable punishment of all transgression. That was what the sovereign power[20] of Zeus meant. The sovereignty of Zeus was no more than a poetic way of saying that the moral law was the law that ruled the cosmos; mortals and immortals obeyed it, or suffered. The moral lesson is plain and only disguised by the poetic language of a play. Aeschylus did not say in so many words that Zeus embodies the moral law. Elliptical imagery is used; Zeus becomes a wrestler able to pin any challenger. Agamemnon is pinned. After all, Zeus is more mighty than anyone and one way for a Greek to understand this strength is to know that Zeus has everything to do with the power of language. The association of Zeus with words was another way of indicating his power.[21]

The relationship between the morality of a decision and Zeus impressed the Greeks. Naturally what we might call the anatomy of decision was involved. Before the Hippocratic corpus was put together, the Greeks had done some anatomical research. Whatever the shortcomings[22] of those early anatomy lessons, the Greeks were able to think in terms of the importance of air, of breathing, of the lungs (*phrenes*). Not only did the Greeks

[20] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Fraenkel (ed.). Vol. II, p. 113.

[21] John J. Peradotto, Jr. "Cledonomancy in the *Oresteia.*" *AJPh*, 90 (1969), pp. 1-21.

[22] One of the shortcomings was evident from the Greek misunderstanding of human reproduction. While there were such terms as *phallopia* and *phallos*, and a number of words for pregnancy, foetus and so forth (Jean Dumortier. *Le Vocabulaire Médical d'Eschyle et les Ecrits Hippocratiques.* Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1935), the Greeks of Aeschylus' day thought the uterus only a place for storing the developing foetus, which was growing from the sperm. The sperm, in turn, the Greeks thought stored in the testicles but generated in the head.

relate the lungs and air but they thought there was a connection between the degree that emotions controlled the quality of the air breathed out as words—the words used in argument, the words that were to be persuasive, that carried counsel, the words of speech, and of course, the words of decision. I have acknowledged that the *technai* of public speaking were directly touched by this attention to words. To explicate the relationship of emotions and words, the Greeks taught that the chest (either *sternon* or *stêthos*) was the seat of both the organs generating the emotions and those generating intelligence. At the very least the chest held the organs of consciousness.

The heart[23] (*kardia*) may have been described as the organ associated with *emotion* but we lack the same degree of knowledge that we have on the *phrenes* as the seat of intelligence. In the *Prometheus Bound* (v. 444) Prometheus was quoted: "I made them to have sense and be endowed with reason." The term "sense" translated *ennous*. "Reason" translated *phrenôn*, which, in this instance, was to be understood as an organ of the wits, in the sense of "good wits, intelligence."

Because the *phrenes* were remarkable, one key to unlocking the thrust

[23] In commenting on line 179 in the *Agamemnon* ("Still there drips in sleep against the heart (*kardias*) ...") it is difficult to know why Fraenkel (Aeschylus. *Agamemnon*. Fraenkel (ed.). Vol. I, p. 108) failed to distinguish between the *kardia* and *phrenes* (lungs). Line 179 hinted at the emotion of apprehension in which the Chorus was gripped, fear of *pathei mathos*, especially of the suffering. The line would suggest that the heart was thought by the Greeks, who may have been prompted by the experience of speeded rate of heart beat, as the seat of the emotions.

I do not wish to discuss the Latin *precordia*, simply because the Latin meaning of both mind and heart is connoted, and the Greeks located thinking in the lungs, which translates *phrenes* more accurately than diaphragm, for which the term *diaphragma* suffices.

In the understanding of what Aeschylus intended by Agamemnon's Iphigenia decision, it is well to recall that Onians, who has studied the use of Greek anatomical terms, gave ample evidence of the Greek preference for the *phrenes* as the seat of intelligence. (Onians. *European Thought*, p. 35 ff.) Lattimore rendered *phrenos*, genitive singular of *phrên*, as "heart" in Grene and Lattimore (eds.), *Agamemnon* (219-220): "... from the heart the breath came bitter // and sacrilegious, utterly infidel ..." I prefer to think of the *phrenes* as the lungs. In *PB.* 444 one reads: "I made them to have sense and be endowed with reason." The term "sense" translated *ennous*. "Reason" translated *phrenôn*, in this case to be understood as an organ of the wits, from *phrenes* in the sense of "good wits; intelligence." The running together of words, decision, breath, and intelligence makes sense. The possibility of coupling quick breathing and rapid heart beat with strong emotion could have led the Greeks to tie together heart and lungs but the conclusion is too speculative.

Thymos apparently was an eighth century term for the organ involved in "taking counsel"; at least we read that the son of Nestor took counsel (in) his *thymos*. (*Od.* XV, 201) I would translate *thymos* as heart.

of Aeschylean drama is to understand the nature of persuasion, a contest of words. Out of necessity I must come back to this topic. The simple introduction of it calls attention to the curing of the *phrenes* or to healing in general, the medical aid to ailing *phrenes* being prime for such a moralist as Aeschylus. When I return to the healing of the sick *phrenes*, I will be better able to cope with the role of Apollo, with his *timê* and *geras* as healer and prophet. So, too, it will be easier to understand Athena, being wise in persuasion, in the use of words that counsel. But I must not take abrupt leave of Zeus.

Zeus is very much in the picture because as the Sky god, he is associated with the winds and therefore, with all forms of air. In natural progression of tie between immortals and mortals, Zeus is to be thought associated with breath and with words. It is but one more exercise in professional wizardry to have the winds stilled, stalling the fleet at Aulis. Although the playwright strengthened the story by adding Artemis' ultimatum, the association between the winds and Zeus did not have to be pointed out to Greeks. Does not this thought of wind and breath prompt the thought of Agamemnon at Aulis?

It was the breath, i.e., the words, of Agamemnon that are said to be *dyssebês*, *anagnon*, and *anieron*. The words are the words of Agamemnon's decision.[24] Aeschylus is pointing to the decision and saying that it was impious, impure, and unholy. Aeschylus, as I have said, intends Agamemnon to be understood as ill. Agamemnon is suffering of *parakopa*.[25] (*Aga.* 223) Agamemnon had not been born with sick *phrenes*; he had changed. When the winds were stilled at Aulis, Agamemnon had changed: "On that day the elder king // of the Achaean ships ... turned with the crosswinds of fortune ..." (*Aga.* 183-184, 186) Again, Aeschylus pictured Agamemnon as altered (*Aga.* 219), uttering the impious, impure, and unholy words of his decision. It did not matter where one positions the Hymn to Zeus; Aeschylus has intended the audience to know that the impious word-decision came from sick lungs. They were bad counsel, immoral counsel, ruinous persuasion that uniformly led on to atê. The immorality of the words, of the decision, of the counsel, is represented by Zeus, often called Zeus of the Councils, not because he gave bad counsel but because wind,

[24] The notion of decision may be even more definitely linked with wind by having the image of "veering wind" (*tropaia*, *LB.* 75) where the idea is that the wind blows now from this quarter, now from that.

[25] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Denniston and Page (eds.). pp. xxvi, 11. In Lattimore's translation "the sickening in man's minds" came in line 222. Grene and Lattimore (eds.). *Agamemnon.*

breath, and words poetically equivalent to Zeus, were the same as talking about good counsel or justice. Surely the moral aspects of counseling were thought of when the *boulê* was named.

Because Zeus was presumed to be all-wise, the decision of Agamemnon is caught up with notions of righteousness and wisdom, another of Zeus' provinces. Righteousness and wisdom, knowledge of the man, the "in-between" (*Eum.* 529), were the combined faculties with which Aeschylus was most concerned in the *Oresteia.* And this concern with righteousness and wisdom, the foundations of justice, entailed Zeus, one of whose provinces we know to be justice. My analysis of the Agamemnon-Artemis scene begins with Zeus and with the province of justice. What-is-right-to-do (which is the long expression to use in defining justice but gives a better representation of what the Greeks mean) is thoroughly part of the Artemis scene in the *Agamemnon.*

Paris has transgressed what-was-right-to-do-when-a-guest. That transgression is to be punished; the law of retributive justice insures that. Zeus and Apollo are laced into the scene at this juncture, Zeus as guardian of the guest code and Apollo as having as one of his functions the overseeing of the *administration* of justice. While Apollo's province in the administration of justice is not relevant to the *Agamemnon* it is very relevant to the *Eumenides*, for this final play of the *Oresteia* is about the administration of justice. If the administration of justice is more definitely represented by the *Eumenides* than by the earlier plays of the *Oresteia*, another province of Apollo was entailed. The Chorus of the *Agamemnon* invoked him as "Healer Apollo" (*Aga.* 146). The chorus prays to Apollo asking him to intervene with Artemis. But, the Chorus explained, Apollo did not intervene. Apollo did not heal; he could not. The healing was asked prior to Agamemnon's sacrificial act. Certainly Apollo would not have been shown having cleansed Agamemnon of the pollution with which the commander of the Achaeans became stained in sacrificing Iphigenia. Certainly Zeus would not have had the sick *phrenes* made well until their sickness had been healed by suffering. As we know from the later portion of the play, the suffering of Agamemnon was fully lived only when Agamemnon ceased to live. No, neither Zeus nor his son, Apollo, would heal a transgressor before his transgression had been atoned. And that will help us to comprehend the acquittal of Orestes. Orestes had been cleansed of his pollution incurred in matricide. Reasoning back from that cleansing, we should know that Orestes could not have been guilty.

How different Orestes is from his father. The one can be cured because

righteous; the other must be purged by death before he can be thought of as the admirable man of *The Libation Bearers.*

In Greek thought on disease and pollution, only two things were incurable: death and transgression. The one was final; the other, transgression, had to be paid for in full. Men were to become wise, to restrain themselves, and to realize that they had limited time to live. Unhappily, to become wise, many men had to suffer and all had to learn from witnessing suffering. But there was a reward for this learning by suffering. If men learned, they would be healthy and prosper. In the counsel of the Chorus in the *Eumenides*: "Refuse the life of anarchy; // refuse the life devoted to // one master. // The in-between has the power // by God's grant always, though // his ordinances vary. // I will speak in defense // of reason: for the very child // of vanity is violence; // but out of health // in the heart issues the beloved // and longed-for prosperity." (*Eum.* 526-37)

The harsh morality symbolized by Zeus was all-powerful. Although De Romilly was writing of time rather than morality, the thought of the all-embracing quality of that time would exactly do to describe a moral code. "If it (time) is called 'great' (*makros*), the same interpretation is likely to be right. But what if it is called 'big' (*megas*)? And what if we see it, because one cannot escape its grip, receiving all the adjectives of sovereign power, all the epithets of Zeus? It becomes 'all-powerful' (*pantelēs*) in the Choephoroi (965), and 'all-mastering' (*pankratēs*) in the Coloneus (609)—both these adjectives being elsewhere used for Zeus."[26] In Greek tragic convention a hero-king, commander-in-chief has transgressed and he must fall when wrestling with the powerful justice of Zeus.

Agamemnon also had committed hybris: "... fresh cruelty brings daring." (*Aga.* 223) For that he must suffer. He endured: "He endured ... to sacrifice his daughter." (*Aga.* 223-4) Agamemnon had to endure; *drasanti pathein.* The Aeschylean Zeus morality was stern. Aeschylus admitted that. "From the gods who sit in grandeur // grace come somehow violent." (*Aga.* 182-3) Did this make Zeus into a figure of might and violence? Fraenkel saw Zeus as a "stern and violent overlord."[27] We must grant the "stern," but we have to be cautious about the use of the term, "violent." The punishment of transgression was violent, not painless. We always are to be mindful that we are thinking about morality. Aeschylus is teaching a moral way of life. If the plays are treated as vehicles, not as philosophical essays, then the message they carried was that the sacred law upheld and protected by the

[26] De Romilly. *Time*, p. 54.

[27] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Fraenkel (ed.). Vol. II, p. 111.

chief god was not to be transgressed without punishment. A violent Zeus would be an irrelevance.

The *pathei mathos* was a grace (*charis*), a favor and, in that special sense, a strength. Prima facie, it seems absurd to think of punishment as grace. Such experience may be instructive, in the same sort of negative way that a child learns to avoid touching a flame by being burnt. But a grace? In Aeschylus' eyes, bitter experience was a grace, not only something to be endured and put up with silently, but to be looked on as a tonic. Only when one feels that law and obedience to law, sacred and secular, gives protection to both men and city-states is the position of Aeschylus acceptable. The playwright pleads for that acceptance. His plea occupies most of the latter portion of the *Eumenides*, thus assigning itself a principal lesson of the *Oresteia*. Even the Erinyes, the retributive law of justice, are addressed by the actor playing Athena: "Strong guard of our city ..." (*Eum.* 949) The "terrors" men have, Athena terms "just terrors" (*Eum.* 700), fears of doing the unrighteous: "What // man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous?" (*Eum.* 698-9) So a court that is known to blend sacred and secular law by its jurisdiction being limited to premeditated homicide is 'given' to the people of Athens as "a sentry on the land." (*Eum.* 706)

This was the matrix in which the playwright set the Choral Ode to Zeus, whose conclusion begins with three lines that were paeans of praise for *pathei mathos* as a supreme teacher of mortals. If the Ode is divided into three parts, the first shows men pondering on life, asking after its key lesson. It is appropriate to have this question posed as the query to be addressed by the *Oresteia*. The second segment of the Ode is ambiguous. The overpowering strength of Zeus is acknowledged. Perhaps the audience is trapped by having this strength signaled as physical strength, the type of strength sung of in the *Iliad*, when Homer has Zeus order the Olympians to refrain from participating in the Trojan War. Aeschylus could have planned the trap which would have caught only those who failed to realize that characterizations in the play beginning a trilogy were due to be radically changed by the play closing the trilogy, the play in which all was set straight. "Sing Sorrow, Sorrow," chants the Chorus in the *Agamemnon* after the Ode to Zeus, "but good win out in the end." (*Aga.* 121) It was good that would win out, not brute strength, as the strength of Zeus in the eighth book of the *Iliad* or the strength of Zeus in the *Prometheus Bound*. The good that was to win out was moral good or justice.

This moral principle was not to change throughout the *Oresteia*. One could think that it did by the unhappy selection of "too strong" as a rendition of *ekratêse* in the speech Aeschylus gave Athena toward the end of the

last play in the *Oresteia.* Lattimore has "was too strong" (*Eum.* 973-4) which was correct enough but might leave the implication that hospitality was guarded by a person of such overpowering strength that this strong man commanded obedience. As I have mentioned, one name for Zeus was Zeus *Xenios*, god of hospitality, but, once again, it was hospitality which Aeschylus wished men to respect and calling that respect respect for, or fear of, Zeus was best to win favor. The phrase "was too strong" might be reworded "has won out," implying that that which Zeus represents has won out. With that minor shift in rendition, one of the last speeches of the *Oresteia*, a passage Aeschylus gave Athena, would read: "Zeus, who guides men's speech in councils was too // strong; and my ambition // for good wins out in the whole issue." (*Eum.* 973-5) This amounts to no more than implying that Athena's verdict in favor of Orestes was in accord with (Athena being identified with) wisdom, termed the wisdom of Zeus. *Pathei mathos* sought that wisdom of doing what was right-righteous to do and refraining from doing what was not to be done.

The crowning adornment of the parodos of the *Agamemnon* is this Hymn to Zeus. Therefore, the power of Zeus as Justice is the principal lesson. That is why Aeschylus called attention to the pivotal decision made by Agamemnon. But it seems to be a case of having one's cake and eating it, too, if Aeschylus wished to put in relief Agamemnon's choice and at the same time make the sovereignty of Zeus the principal lesson of the parodos. Do we have to choose what was uppermost in the playwright's mind, namely, the demonstration of "the sovereign power of Zeus," which was Fraenkel's opinion of the freely elected, though difficult, decision of Agamemnon? Of modern scholars who have attended to the *Agamemnon*, Fraenkel certainly was one of the most eminent. It is that eminence which makes Fraenkel's thought on the theology in the Hymn to Zeus required reading and which requires any later commentator to respond to it.

Aeschylus avoided the either-or dilemma by making both the power of Zeus and the decision of Agamemnon moral matters. Aeschylus did this by the convention of having the power of Zeus described as physical power, but Zeus' physical prowess meant the sovereignty of the moral code, including the law of retributive justice. What Fraenkel wrote on Aulis showed "the sovereign power of Zeus over men and the manner in which the god leads through suffering to wisdom."[28] The "and" was crucial. Aeschylus meant the power of Zeus to be obedience to the moral law together with belief that any transgression of it would both result in atê for the trans-

[28] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Fraenkel (ed.). Vol. II, pp. 112-113.

gressor and a lesson (wisdom) for the sufferer of atê and / or the spectator of that suffering.

The unique quality of what Aeschylus did was dramatized by having Agamemnon quoted *at the time when the general made his decision.* The morality of the decision, not the deed of sacrificing Iphigenia, was that upon which Aeschylus wished us to reflect. Prior to Aeschylus, at least in Homer and in Hesiod, it was an event, a deed that triggered the necessity—the inevitable succession of transgression and atê. Aeschylus drew attention to the decision which made the transgressing deed inevitable which, in its turn, "put on the yoke of necessity," instituted the *pathei mathos* in which atê paid off the transgression. The decision was the thing.

Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice Iphigenia is a great moment in the trilogy, but I suspect that to be a modern judgment—not Aeschylus'. The true pivot among the Oresteia's decisions was Orestes' decision to kill his mother. *The Libation Bearers*, as the second play in the trilogy led up to this act of matricide, preceding it with the affecting *agôn logôn* between Orestes and his mother. While *The Libation Bearers* will not tax a modern critic beset with his modern views, it was *the* tragedy of the *Oresteia.* Aeschylus had to make the matricide morally ambiguous. Carrying water on both shoulders is notoriously difficult. How well did he succeed?

Chapter V

CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND JUDGMENT

I

The portion of the *Agamemnon* which follows the parodos offers audiences and readers what surely must be one of the great portraits of a complete villain. Aegisthus, though he had some basis for a claim against Agamemnon as one of the Atreides, is evil enough for an audience to loathe. By introducing him as Clytemnestra's lover, Aeschylus makes Clytemnestra appear all the more wicked. It is the consummate wickedness of the Queen and her lover that keeps the Areopagus from adjudging Orestes guilty of matricide. The men who were both the judges and the jury in the *Eumenides* presented Athena with a tied decision, a decision that amounted to an acquittal.

Skill was required if the *Oresteia* was to present a wife who just had murdered her husband, who was about to be joined on stage by a despicable lover, and who could yet speak to the angry Chorus in a way that made that Chorus' confusion plausible: "My thoughts are swept away and I go bewildered," chanted the Chorus (*Aga.* 1530) after Clytemnestra's strophes: "No shame, I think, in the death given // this man. And did he not // first of all in this house wreak death // by treachery?[1] // The flower of this man's love and mine, // Iphigenia of the tears // he dealt with even as he has suffered. // Let his speech in death's house be not loud. // With the sword he struck, // with the sword he paid for his own act." (*Aga.* 1521-29) Was it not the fulfillment of the law, *drasanti pathein* ("who acts, shall endure") that Agamemnon should have died by the sword? Together with other passages in the final scenes of the *Agamemnon*, this one I have quoted

[1] One story had it that Iphigenia had been lured to Aulis with her mother being told that Iphigenia was to marry Achilles.

gave circumstantial evidence that favored the case of Clytemnestra. On the scale of justice, the horror of Clytemnestra's deeds seemed to be quite evenly balanced by the wrongs Agamemnon had done her.

Throughout *The Libation Bearers* and up to the very end of the *Eumenides*, Aeschylus' audience has watched the two pans of the balance being heaped: on one pan went those items that favored Clytemnestra: she has been without a husband and ruler of the state; her daughter had been killed by Agamemnon. On the other pan of the beam-balance a good deal was weighed against Clytemnestra: she has killed her husband, taken a lover, and apparently sold her son and neglected her daughter, Electra.

It is easier to judge Clytemnestra than Agamemnon. She obviously is guilty of premeditated crime and therefore acting with freedom of the will. For modern critics it seems absurdly easy; not even the Erinyes trouble the critics. The case is not as difficult to judge; the balance's scale is not as difficult to read. Clytemnestra had deviated radically from the Mean. Nevertheless a son, with premeditation, has killed his mother. In the either / or moral logic of Aeschylus, this appears to be a grave transgression.

Did Aeschylus forsake the judicial morality of retributive justice, the *drasanti pathein* announced by the Chorus in *The Libation Bearers* to be Zeus' law? Or were the Erinyes without a case and Orestes clean of guilt? Aeschylus answers the question in the *Eumenides* with what I think is a brilliant reconciliation between the chthonic powers, Night's daughters, who represent the law of retributive justice, and Apollo, who stands for the power of light and healing. In the reconciliation the Erinyes become Eumenides without any compromise of Zeus' justice. The Mean has been restored—the Mean which is righteousness and justice or is *homonoia* and *harmonia*, the necessary condition for health, freedom, and prosperity, and, most important of all, righteousness.

In the *Agamemnon*, Aeschylus begins to build the case that is finally to be adjudicated in the *Eumenides*. The motive for Agamemnon's decision and action at Aulis have been made a matter of record in the last chapter. This is how the trilogy ends but the way to that happy ending has a number of traps for the unwary. Clytemnestra's case and that of Aegisthus also have been recorded. Though he too had provocation, Aegisthus is readily perceived as a bad man. *The Libation Bearers* follows offering a third installment of punishment and sets matricide as the leading question before the areopagite jurors of the *Eumenides*. Was the matricide indeed murder, or was it a just punishment? To unravel the matter it helps to know some of what Aeschylus had to say about Clytemnestra. There are the obvious points; I have listed those. The more subtle characterization was that the Queen

had deviated from the Mean for a woman: Clytemnestra was manly.

At first glance a woman's womanliness or lack thereof[2] would seem to have very little to do with morality. But it did: a woman was expected to be a woman, with all the secular strengths and weaknesses the Greeks thought true of women. When a woman was womanly the Mean was attained, equilibrium achieved. Equilibrium in balance was morally good, QED. In practical affairs men and women each had their appropriate roles. One of the roles of the physically mature woman was to be a wife and mother. Clytemnestra failed to live up to the 'role expectations' of wife and mother. Aeschylus could have Orestes charge: "You bore me and threw me away, to a hard life" (*LB.* 913) or worse, "You sold me" (*LB.* 915). Electra had fared no better. A daughter's libations at her father's tomb were righteous, but Electra brought her libations to Agamemnon's tomb as a slave. "From our fathers' houses," Electra lamented, "they led us here, to take the lot of slaves." (*LB.* 77-8)

Today a woman of Clytemnestra's type would be admired by many men for her intelligence, her ability to manage a city-state, and her courage. But at this point we must pause. Was it not Clytemnestra whom Aeschylus had call for "an ax to kill a man?" (*LB.* 889) To the Greek it was inappropriate to use a man's weapon to kill. And the mischief was compounded by having the man one's husband. I can only think of Macbeth, sick of his murders but courageous, when Clytemnestra follows her call for a man-killing ax with an aside that recalls the husband she slew and the son she is ready to slay: "We shall see if we can beat him before we // go down—so far gone are we in this wretched fight." (*LB.* 890-1)

As the scene between Orestes and Clytemnestra opens, Orestes and Pylades have succeeded in tricking Aegisthus into entering the House of Atreus without a bodyguard. Aegisthus is slain by Orestes, who then disguises himself as someone who knows whereof he speaks and reports Aegisthus' death elliptically: "... he is alive and killing the dead." (*LB.* 886) To which the queen replied: "Ah, so. You speak in riddles, but I read the rhyme // We have been won with the treachery by which we slew." (*LB.*

[2] A womanly man, *mutatis mutandis*, was the same moral charge. In his discussion of the *Persians*, Richardson wrote of the use of *habros* and its compounds, thereby drawing attention to the insinuation that the Persians were effeminate. The charge of effeminacy leveled against fighting men I think was intended to indicate that the Persian soldiers were "not to be what they were supposed to be." Analogous reasoning can be used to explain the maleness Aeschylus ascribed to Clytemnestra and commented on by at least two of the leading scholars of Aeschylus, Golden (*In Praise*, pp. 63 ff. and 73 ff.) and Winnington-Ingram (R. P. Winnington-Ingram. "Clytemnestra and the Vote of Athena." *JHS*, 68 (1948), pp. 130-147.).

887-8) Such was the characterization Aeschylus drew for Clytemnestra. Having characterized Clytemnestra as an unnatural woman, Aeschylus managed to create a believable *agôn logôn* in which the effectiveness of Clytemnestra's persuasion relied on her womanliness and even on her motherhood. "Hold my son," Clytemnestra's series of speeches begins, "Oh, take pity, child, before this breast // where many a time, a drowsing baby, you would feed // and with soft gums sucked in the milk that made you strong." (*LB.* 896-8) The exchange between Clytemnestra and Orestes becomes an *agôn logôn* in the classic style. Clytemnestra has won her first debate, that with Agamemnon; he walked on the crimson cloth. Orestes now is reminded of Agamemnon's "vanities" (*LB.* 918) when the queen heaped on her pan of reasons why she should be spared. "I raised you when you were little. May I grow old with you?" (*LB.* 908) To this Aeschylus has Orestes respond: "You killed my father. Would you make your home with me?" (*LB.* 909)

There was no point of *amêchania* for Orestes in the *agôn logôn.* The righteousness of his punishing Clytemnestra had been given voice by the Chorus in the chant: "Right's anvil stands staunch on the ground // and the smith, Destiny, hammers out the sword. // Delayed in glory, pensive from // the murk, Vengeance brings home at last // a child, to wipe out the stain of blood shed long ago." (*LB.* 646-51) The point of *amêchania,* so far as there is one, had come just after Clytemnestra was quoted asking Orestes to "Take pity, child ..." It is then that Aeschylus has Orestes hesitate, asking his friend: "What shall I do, Pylades? Be shamed to kill my mother?" (*LB.* 899) Aeschylus has Pylades unhesitatingly tell the righteous way: "What then becomes thereafter of the oracles // declared by Loxias at Pytho? What of sworn oaths? // Count all men hateful to you rather than the gods." (*LB.* 900-2) This is interesting. Unlike Cassandra, whose punishment is said to be due to Apollo, Aeschylus has Pylades warn Orestes that, should he fail to slay his mother, he is doing that which is unrighteous. Quite apart from the offense to be given any immortal, doing what is not to be done or failing to do that which should be done can be condemned in and of itself.

Pylades won this *agôn logôn* embedded in the long *agôn logôn* between Clytemnestra and Orestes. Orestes granted the right and righteousness of Pylades' argument. "I judge that you win," Aeschylus had Orestes grant. "Your advice is good." (*LB.* 903) Aeschylus' thinking would not have been twisted had Orestes said: 'In your words of counsel, Zeus has won.'

To keep his moral code firmly in place, Aeschylus has Orestes triumph in his *agôn logôn* with Clytemnestra, concluding the debate with words

designed to remind the audience of *drasanti pathein*: "You killed, and it was wrong. Now suffer wrong." (*LB.* 930) But was it wrong to slay the slayer?

The problem disappears if we answer the question: How did Aeschylus provide for the evaluation of Clytemnestra's role as mother? That Clytemnestra was a thoroughly poor mother, thoroughly inadequate in that 'specialty,' was not revealed in the *Agamemnon.* Aeschylus baited the hook by not giving away too much in the first play of the trilogy. But in the second play, *The Libation Bearers*, Electra and Orestes give more than enough examples of Clytemnestra's shortcomings as a mother. As a climactic summing up of the charge against Clytemnestra, the queen is slain by her son. Vindication of Orestes on the charge of premeditated matricide will provide the climax of the final play in the Oresteian trilogy. Athena will cast her ballot for Orestes (*Eum.* 735) and in rendering the jury's decision say: "The man before us had escaped the charge of blood." (*Eum.* 752) Explaining her vote, Athena says that although she was not born of a woman and usually sided with the male cause, she is all for marriage: "So, in a case where the wife had killed her husband, lord // of the house, her death shall not mean most to me." (*Eum.* 739-40) Clytemnestra had been inadequate both in the role of mother and in the role of wife. Her combined inadequacies outweighed Orestes' sin.

We are not prepared for the line in *The Libation Bearers* which looks forward to the judgment scene in the *Eumenides.* Aeschylus packed a great deal into this single line. He gave to the actor playing Orestes the words which declare that there is about to be a bloody confrontation which will oppose two sets of 'rights'—right as seen from the viewpoint of Clytemnestra, and right as seen from the viewpoint of Orestes. On one side of the balance weigh the 'rights' of Clytemnestra—her claims—and on the other the rights of Orestes. Which one of these people is more in the right, whose pan will weigh more heavily? "Warstrength (*Ares*) shall collide with warstrength; right (dikê) with right." (*LB.* 461) That is the line. Orestes, his ally, Pylades, and his "silent partner," Electra, will oppose with arms the arms of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. It need hardly be said that the weapons are merely a way of referring to *righteousness* and evil.

The Libation Bearers triumphs in its convincing display of the rights both of Orestes and Electra on the one hand and of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus on the other. Aeschylus took the step of setting up for the *Eumenides* a persuasive case for holding righteousness—not rights—only on one side. Rights were in conflict, but only one party had righteousness in its claim of being *dikaios.* If Aeschylus once again seems to ignore the

grey in his distinguishing of black and white, his defense was that rights, understood as provocations, could weight both pans of a beam balance scale; it was righteousness that Aeschylus put in only one of the pans.

CLYTEMNESTRA AND THE "GRANDEURS OF DARKNESS." (*LB.* 399) From a modern man's point of view Aeschylus might have made a mistake in having the Erinyes appear as somehow tied to Clytemnestra. (*Eum.* 94-139) Aeschylus had the dead queen remind the Erinyes with the scolding words: "... I have given you much to lap up, outpourings // without wine, sober propitiations, sacrificed // in secrecy of night and on a hearth of fire // for you, at an hour given to no other god." (*Eum.* 106-9) These lines sound to us as if Clytemnestra has propitiated the Erinyes purely out of a desire to punish Agamemnon for the sacrifice of Iphigenia. But Aeschylus could count on his audience knowing that the original function of the avenging Erinyes was to punish those who had inflicted injury on a mother, not on a father.[3] But the function of punishment had grown indifferent to sex.

One's mind runs back to the lines in the *Agamemnon* when Clytemnestra persuaded Agamemnon to enter his house over blood-red robes. The memory of ruinous persuasion was enough to cause a shudder. It was at this point that Aeschylus had Clytemnestra call on Zeus. All Greeks knew the conventional idea of punishment for transgression, often delivered by, or in the name of, the Erinyes. It was in that sense that the audience heard the prayer of Clytemnestra: "Zeus, Zeus accomplisher, accomplish these my prayers. // Let your mind bring these things to pass. It is your will." (*Aga.* 973-4) Praying for the death of one who seriously transgressed was not immoral. But the audience knew that other factors were involved and these made the words impious. For example, Clytemnestra has told the Chorus that the thought of killing both Agamemnon and his mistress, Cassandra, "has given // a delicate excitement to my bed's delight." (*Aga.* 1446-7) This unnatural reference to marriage would have shocked the Greeks, not because of the licentiousness, but because of the violation of the institution of marriage. But in the opening scenes of the *Eumenides* this evil queen is apparently entitled to call on the Erinyes for her fatal punishment at the hands of her son, Orestes. "Let go // upon this man the storm-blasts of your bloodshot breath, // wither him in your wind, after him, hunt him down // once more, and shrivel him in your vitals; heat and flame." (*Eum.* 136-9)

To make unraveling this matter of Clytemnestra's rights truly difficult,

[3] Graves. *Greek Myths*, Vol. 1, 6.b.3.

the queen charges the Erinyes with being responsible for her dishonor among the dead. How was the audience to understand the lines with which Aeschylus had Clytemnestra's shade chastise the Erinyes? "It is because of you," Clytemnestra rages, "I go dishonored thus // among the rest of the dead. Because of those I killed // my bad name among the perished suffers no eclipse // but I am driven in disgrace. I say to you // that I am charged with guilt most grave by these. And yet // I suffered too, horribly, and from those most dear, // yet none among the powers is angered for my sake // that I was slaughtered, and by matricidal hands." (*Eum.* 95-102)

This is not the first time in the *Oresteia* that Clytemnestra has claimed provocation sufficient for the killing of Agamemnon. When the elders threatened the queen with ostracism, Aeschylus has Clytemnestra answer them with a reminder that they did not punish Agamemnon when he sacrificed Iphigenia.[4] I believe Aeschylus intended his audience to think Clytemnestra correct. The Argive elders had made a mistake in not judging the sacrifice of Iphigenia's murder. The indecisiveness of these same old men had been indicated just prior to Clytemnestra's rebuke of them. The elders had heard the cries of Agamemnon from inside his house. "Ah, I am struck a deadly blow and deep within!" (*Aga.* 1343) And again Aeschylus had Agamemnon cry out; there could be no mistake. "Ah me, again, they struck again, I am wounded twice." (*Aga.* 1345) And the Chorus responded: "How the king cried out aloud to us! I believe the thing is done. // Come let us put our heads together, try to find some safe way out." (*Aga.* 1346-7)

Aeschylus wished the audience to see that the Argives were not fit to judge difficult cases of homocide. The Argives' incompetence gave Aeschylus an excuse to flatter Athens by introducing the Areopagus. But it did not explain Clytemnestra's special relationship with the Erinyes. We should have another look at the lines; "I suffered too, horribly, and from those most dear, // yet none among the powers is angered for my sake // that I was slaughtered, and by matricidal hands." (*Eum.* 100-2) With these lines Aeschylus established what lawyers call "reasonable doubt." Perhaps Clytemnestra had a case. Perhaps that case should be adjudicated. After all, did not punishment, did not the Erinyes, have a legitimate function?

[4] "Now it is I you doom to be cast out from my city // with men's hate heaped and curses roaring in my ears. // Yet look upon this dead man; you would not cross him once // when with no thoughts more than as if a beast had died, // when his ranged pastures swarmed with the deep fleece of flocks, // he slaughtered like a victim his own child, my pain // grown into love, to charm away the winds of Thrace. // Were you not bound to hunt him then clear of this soil // for the guilt stained upon him? Yet you hear what I // have done, and lo, you are a stern judge." (*Aga.* 1412-21)

It is along these lines that Aeschylus is thinking as he moves towards calling the Areopagus into being. The dissatisfaction of Clytemnestra's shade with her lot as a guilty ghost, like the horrible appearance of the Erinyes, was so much dramatic fol-de-rol. There was no reason at all to think that Aeschylus took any of it seriously.

What Aeschylus did take seriously was the issue of the legitimate role of the chthonic powers. These powers were legitimate—necessary even—for the preservation of cosmic law and order. We know that in the *Eumenides* Aeschylus converted the Erinyes into the friendly spirits, the Eumenides. That metamorphosis eliminated the Erinyes, but to restate this most important point, during at least half of *The Libation Bearers* Aeschylus had acknowledged the rightfulness of the function that had been allotted the "grandeurs of Darkness," to quote Lattimore's magnificent rendition of Electra's phrase. Aeschylus saw a great motivation for righteous behavior in restraint based on fear—the fear of all punishment, the most severe being death. Only death could not be healed, not even by Apollo or by that most formidable of healers, Zeus. For "once // the dust has drained down all a man's blood, once the man // has died, there is no raising him up again. // This is a thing for which my father never made // curative spells. All other states, without effort // of hard breath, he can completely rearrange." (*Eum.* 646-51)

It was this fear of death, of the House of Hades and the "dim Tartarus," that Aeschylus came back to again and again in *The Libation Bearers.* To the queen of Hades, Persephone, Electra prayed: "Persephone, grant still the wonder of success." (*LB.* 490) There were those "most great," the "Kings of the under darkness." (*LB.* 358-9) Hades was the judge of the transgressor who has died.[5] In repeated pleas or prayers, Electra and Orestes took turns in calling for revenge or aid in revenging. Those prayers uniformly were addressed to: "the gods beneath us // ... you blessed ones under the ground." (*LB.* 475-6) These were Hades and Hermes, the "lordships of the world below." (*LB.* 405)

I have chiefly referred to the Eumenides and the Erinyes, but *The Libation Bearers* insisted much more strongly on the use and value of the chthonic powers. In the *Eumenides* Aeschylus was using the idea that the Erinyes[6]

[5] "Hades is great, Hades calls men to reckoning // there under the ground, // see all, and cuts it deep in his recording mind." (*Eum.* 273-5)

[6] "According to the most respected authorities, there were only three Erinyes: Tisiphone, Alecto, and Megara, who lived permanently in Erebus, not at Athens. They had dogs' heads, bats' wings, and serpents for hair ..." (Graves. *Greek Myths,* Vol. 2, p. 115, f.2.)

Aeschylus wished to associate the Erinyes with all the forces of vengeance and then to

were transformed into friendly patronesses of Athens. *The Libation Bearers*, a play primarily about punishment, would have been the proper source. Indeed, it was made evident to the audience that *The Libation Bearers* was to be about the punishment of Agamemnon, not only by its name but by its opening line in which Orestes called on "Hermes, lord of the dead ..." Hermes and Hades were the prime powers of the nether regions.

There was an exception to these appeals addressed earthward: Zeus. This meant that the justice of punishment, of vengeance, was to be thought Zeus' justice. This was not all of Zeus' justice. Apollo's healing, a type of justice too, was omitted from the prayers of Orestes and Electra. It had to be. Their prayers were for punishment, and Apollo was a healer. For that side of justice, the audience had to wait for the *Eumenides*. The justice of the Zeus of *The Libation Bearers* labeled it as the justice of *drasanti pathein*. "Almighty Destinies, by the will // of Zeus let these things // be done, in the turning of Justice. // For the word of hatred spoken, let hate // be a word fulfilled. The spirit of Right // cries out aloud and extracts atonement // due: blood stroke for the stroke of blood // shall be paid. Who acts, shall endure. So speaks // the voice of the age-old wisdom." (*LB.* 306-14)

Agamemnon had freely transgressed; Agamemnon endured. Orestes too must endure—the close of *The Libation Bearers* shows how he is to suffer. The insistent question is, was Orestes as free as his father? Reflection on this question turns us to the *Eumenides*. It was precisely the question many of the audience at *The Libation Bearers* must have discussed. We do not know what answer was favored but is it too much to expect that there was a good deal of anticipatory excitement?

CASSANDRA AND APOLLO. The audience knew that Orestes would be on trial in the *Eumenides* and might have guessed that his 'defense attorney' would be Apollo. The charge was to be matricide, a particularly heinous form of 'spilling kindred blood.' There must have been some doubts about Aeschylus' conception of Apollo—given the restraints on the playwright of mythological definitions of Apollo's *timai*. Among those powers of Apollo

reconcile Night or Darkness and the Light or Apollo. The *Theogony* had lumped these forces, written about as persons, of course, as children of Night. "And Night," Hesiod said, "bare hateful Doom and black Fate and Death, and she bare Sleep and the tribe of Dreams. And again the goddess murky Night, though she lay with none, bare Blame and painful Woe. ... Also she bare the Destinies and ruthless avenging Fates, Clotho and Lachesis and Atropos, who give men at their birth both evil and good to have, and they pursue the transgressions of men and of gods: and these goddesses never cease from their dread anger until they punish the sinner with a sore penalty." (Hesiod. *Hesiod.* Evelyn-White (trans.), p. 95.)

two would be outstanding, the power to heal and the power to foresee. And the power to prophesy could have been uppermost in the discussions. Fresh from *The Libation Bearers* the audience might have thought of the Cassandra scene, in which the prophetic power of Apollo was emphasized over his art of healing. I have said earlier that Cassandra was pitiable. I would like to revive that opinion and to push it a little further, because of the image of Apollo which the member of the audience could be expected to bring to the judgment scene of the *Eumenides*. The fact that Cassandra could foresee[7] her own death bears on the question of whether Orestes was compelled by Apollo to slay Clytemnestra: Apollo's 'coercion' of Orestes may be no more than a symbol of the fact that Clytemnestra had transgressed and inevitably had to be punished. And I think that the case.

The Cassandra scene runs from some 350 lines, almost a fifth of the play. Why did Aeschylus allocate so handsome a portion of the *Agamemnon* to this single episode? The most persuasive reason is that the Cassandra scene, coming close to the end of a play on transgression, permitted the playwright to achieve four things and then conclude the scene with a splendid bit of poetry that saluted the Greek ideal of "manly endurance" (*tlêmosynê*): "the moirai gave an enduring spirit to man."[8] Manliness was not intended here as a rebuke though it had been when applied to Clytemnestra.

Two of Aeschylus' objectives were undertaken for the sake of the dramatic *technê*. Cassandra reminded the audience of the *Agamemnon* that there was a curse on the House of Atreus. I think that the Greeks knew exactly what was intended, i.e., that wrong had been done. "I know by heart," Cassandra said, "the legend of ancient wickedness within this house." (*Aga.* 1196-7) This was the background, but Cassandra possesses prophetic powers. The audience is permitted to see in advance that she was to die with Agamemnon, both slain by Clytemnestra.[9]

[7] For an appreciation of what was meant by visionary prophecy we are indebted to Hammond. ("Personal," p. 44.) Cassandra's ability to see into the future in the *Oresteia* should not be taken as an example of cledonomancy, the causal power of a remark to help bring about the state of affairs being talked about or actually being predicted.

The analogue of Cassandra foreseeing her own death was Amphiaraus, also a seer of Apollo, foretelling his death in the *Seven Against Thebes*: "I foresee death but not dishonour." (*Seven.* 589)

[8] Arthur W. Adkins. *Merit and Responsibility*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960, p. 20.

[9] Aeschylus did not risk the audience forgetting that there would be righteous revenge and punishment for the misdeeds of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. In her last long speech Cassandra says: "We two (Cassandra and Agamemnon) // must die, yet not vengeless by the gods. For there // shall come one to avenge us also, born to slay // his mother, and to wreak death for his father's blood. // Outlaw and wanderer, driven far from his

The third view the prophecy gave the audience was of something even more remote, the crucial action of the succeeding *The Libation Bearers.* "Yet once more will I speak, and not this time my own // death's threnody. I call upon Sun in prayer // against that ultimate shining when the avengers strike // these monsters down in blood, that they avenge as well // one simple slave who died, a small thing, lightly killed." (*Aga.* 1322-26) Cassandra's final prayer links the revenge taken by Orestes on both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus with revenge of her murder as well as Agamemnon's.

Aeschylus' fourth objective was to impress on his audience an understanding of the principle, *pathei mathos.* This understanding permitted the audience to appreciate the "endurance" shown by Cassandra and warmly praised by the Chorus: "Woman, be sure your heart is brave; you can take much." (*Aga.* 1302) Cassandra replies, as mortals are wont to do out of bitterness for their lot: "None but the unhappy people ever hear such praise." (*Aga.* 1303) The Chorus did not rebuke Cassandra with a lecture on "manly endurance"—as contrasted with "womanly grief"—and Cassandra had been highly, if indirectly, praised by a male virtue being assigned her (just as Aegisthus was indirectly damned by being described as womanly). The Chorus concludes: "Yet there is a grace on mortals who so nobly die." (*Aga.* 1304)

I think Aeschylus would not wish his audience to think that nothing was more appropriate to the sadness of life than despair; the playwright was neither a romantic optimist nor a romantic pessimist. Aeschylus would not have agreed with what Greene called the "darker side of the 'Epicurean' creed,"[10] represented by Theognis and by almost all the surviving poetry of Mimnermus and Alcaeus. It would not make sense to attribute to Aeschylus: "Best of all for mortals were it never to have been born, nor to have seen the rays of the burning sun; but if once born, to pass as soon as may be the gates of Hades, and to lie under a goodly heap of earth."[11] Aeschylus' views lay closer to those of Archilochus and Solon—the latter whom Aeschylus probably admired—facing up to hardship with resolution fortified by Aeschylean morality and Greek *metrios,* Mean or, better, *sôphrosynê.* "Be not over-eager in any matter," wrote Theognis, "best is due measure in all human affairs; oft is a man eager in pursuit of gain, only to be misled into great loss ... by an eager spirit ... which easily maketh

own land, // he will come back to cope these stones of inward hate. // For this is a strong oath and sworn by the high gods, // that he shall cast men headlong for his father felled." (*Aga.* 1278-85)

[10] Greene. *Moira,* p. 42.

[11] Theog. 425-428 (after Greene. *Moira,* p. 42.)

what is evil seem to him good, and what is good seem evil."[12] This was not the pessimism of Semonides of Amorgus describing life as "short, of little account, and full of cares" or "ten thousand are the dooms of men and their woes and sorrows past reckoning."[13]

Accepting the idea and ideal of *sôphrosynê*, but speculating especially about the reason for enduring, for *tlêmosynê* Aeschylus adds the thought that men could learn wisdom from suffering. The audience has learned wisdom from Cassandra's suffering. Aeschylus asks that men see what a high price Cassandra paid for going back on her agreement to exchange sexual intercourse for the privilege of prophecy. Apollo had kept his part of the bargain. Her *pathei mathos* started with her prophecies not being believed, and in the moving Cassandra scene, the prophetess is shown suffering periodic pains; she is ill and she finally tears from her throat the signs of prophetic powers, the flowers a prophet or prophetess traditionally wore. With this gesture of renunciation, the playwright symbolized a great deal. The lungs, throat, lips, and mouth, all were part of a system that employed the counsel of Zeus. Their prophecies were to be truth; that is why they came to pass. If a prophetess has transgressed, and Cassandra has, what more logical punishment could there be than to cloud her prophecies so that no one would believe them?

As the story of Cassandra has come down to us, this daughter of Hecuba and Priam was not ill simply because her prophecies were not believed. In the *Agamemnon*, however, Cassandra is portrayed as sick, incoherent, subject to seizures. References to pain are common enough in the Cassandra scene. For example Cassandra likened the destruction of Troy to inflicted pain. "And I too, with brain ablaze in fever, shall go down." (*Aga.* 1172) Cassandra bought the "gift" of prophecy. She can prophesize, but it is painful. When Cassandra has visions of Thyestes' murdered children she cries: "Now once again the pain of grim, true prophecy // shivers my whirling brain in a storm of things foreseen." (*Aga.* 1215-6) Each time Cassandra sees the future, her prophecy is made in pain. Visions of her own death are the final causes of Cassandra's pain: "Oh, flame and pain that sweeps me once again!" (*Aga.* 1256) Aeschylus is telling the audience that Cassandra is foreseeing her own atê. Aeschylus has outdone himself. He has condensed so much in the characterization of this woman. Here is the ability to look forward and backward at the same time, a combination of Epimetheus and Prometheus all in one figure, an anticipation of the Roman minor deity,

[12] Theog. 401-406 (after Greene. *Moira*, p. 42.)
[13] Semon. Amorg. I (after Greene. *Moira*, p. 34.)

Janus of the two faces. In the same breath the facing is a moral vision; Cassandra sees the immorality of what the House of Atreus has represented and, at the same time, Clytemnestra's forthcoming immorality and the atê she herself has 'won' because of her own immoral behavior.

Aeschylus certainly meant to have the audience feel that Cassandra was sick. It was an expert touch to have Cassandra's sickness inflicted by the Healer and to involve the gift of prophecy, which was so close to counsel. It may be thought that the "pain" to which Cassandra referred was only the frenzy that normally accompanied the prophetic sayings of a sibyl. But recalling the performance of Calchas in the *Agamemnon*, neither Calchas nor Cassandra were to be thought the same as the priestess of Apollo, a chief one of whom Aeschylus introduced at the opening of *The Libation Bearers*. Cassandra was not a sibyl, not a priestess of Apollo, administering the rites associated with the temples of Apollo *Loxias*. Cassandra, like Calchas, supposedly has received the gift of foreseeing what is to come. Pronouncement of this vision normally is not frenzied.

There is another reason to applaud the characterization. Cassandra is one of the playwright's triumphs in the combining of what would seem antagonistic elements. So many of us prefer the simplistic differentiation into either and or, into plus or minus, black or white. Aeschylus shows us that such distinctions are oversimplifications and he has managed just that with Cassandra. Cassandra represents a person who can have done an immoral deed and, at the same time, be both pitiable and brave. Nor is that the full measure of what Aeschylus has done. Cassandra's atê is death but Aeschylus has managed to make that death both inevitable punishment and acceptable because delivered by a person, the Queen, who is to be judged evil on balance! The subtlety and complexity of this characterization is masterful.

Aeschylus intended Cassandra to be thought sick but, unlike Agamemnon or Prometheus, admirable nonetheless. Cassandra was admirable in the eyes of the Greek because, as we have said, she endured her fate, as the Greeks would have it, accepted it and approached her bloody death "serene." (*Aga.* 1297) And for that *tlêmosynê* the Chorus saluted Cassandra.

It is bewildering for a modern to think that Cassandra's serene acceptance of murder at the hands of Clytemnestra should have been admirable to the Greeks. But it was not simply Cassandra's resignation to fate that was admirable, although she certainly was resigned: She walked "to the altar like a driven ox of God." (*Aga.* 1298) To that Aeschylus had the prophetess reply: "Friends, there is no escape for any longer time ... The day is here and now; I can not win by flight." (*Aga.* 1299, 1301) Cassandra was a

sacrifice, a sacrifice to retributive justice. For the Greeks one meaning of sacrifice was an acknowledgment, that is, a reverence for, or fear of, the moral law. Cassandra accepted her fate, she lived and died in accordance with fate—therefore, in a seemly fashion. Dikê, said the Greeks, honors the man who lives within the bounds of his fate.

In all likelihood Aeschylus intended the audience to think Cassandra had learned wisdom at the end of her life. In fact the elders of Argos address Cassandra after a fashion that would justify that opinion. "O woman," the chant ran, "much enduring and so greatly wise ..." (*Aga.* 1295) The audience too had learned that wisdom comes through suffering and that it is wisdom to endure. The audience had endured; the *Eumenides* was to sum up and round out that instruction.

II

Although the *Oresteia* was the sole full trilogy that has survived from Aeschylus' playwriting, it was probably standard procedure for Aeschylus to end the trilogy happily or, as we see in the *Seven*, with the moral code satisfied. The *Eumenides* has such a happy ending, for Aeschylean happiness meant the restoration of equilibrium, balance or the Mean. Men were healthy, wealthy and wise. All was right with the world, with right being upright (*orthos*). The ship of state sailed upright and it held a true course. It is tempting to say that the sun shone at the end of the last play of the *Oresteia* and that under that sun all Athens was to enjoy peace, good health, and prosperity. But to say these things would be to forget that one of the purposes Aeschylus had in mind was the joining into a harmonious whole of both Night and Day. It was Aeschylean thinking that dark and light, male and the female, all seeming opposites, which were in fact as complementary as husband and wife, should be united. This was *homonoia* and *harmonia*. In the name of *homonoia* and *harmonia* Aeschylus meant that Athens would have prosperous days and restful, tranquil nights. The Erinyes would be understood as Eumenides; retributive and Apollonian justice would be wedded.

At the cost of being overly repetitious in order to cement the memory of how Aeschylus wished his audience to think, I believe that each of the Aeschylean trilogies or brace of plays, had an equally appropriate ending. The chief problem of the *Oresteia* was wrapping up a series of transgressions that dogged the sequence of crime and punishment. Where was the grand climax to fall? Does it not come with the slaying of Clytemnestra in *The Libation Bearers*? By the end of the *Eumenides* Orestes is found innocent of that climactic matricide. Earlier in that same tragedy Agamemnon's

son had been cleansed of his deed, purified by Apollo *Katharsios*. The purification of Orestes healed; Agamemnon's son had benefited from the power allotted Healer Apollo. Aeschylus signalled that the matricide was the climax by having its pollution taken so seriously that only the grand healer, Apollo, second in *that* power only to Zeus, do the purifying. And that purification is duly noted in the judgment scene, which is a sub-climax in the trilogy. The climax of the judgment episode is the vote on the charge of matricide. Orestes is given a quit-claim, a full acquittal by the Areopagus, with Athena showing by her vote that the acquittal is righteous. Orestes is made well again. Is this too strange a sense of being healed? For Aeschylus, purification took place in the name of Apollo the Healer. Was not being cleansed of one's deed being healed or made well? Consider the alternative *drasanti pathein*. Was the suffering, the *pathos*, not illness, sometimes a fatal illness?

The rank-and-file of the audience were sent home satisfied. Not only was there a happy ending to a lesson well taught, but the joyful lines of the *Eumenides* could not but have flattered Athenians. But there was a happier ending for the intellectuals in the audience. They could be satisfied that the playwright had proposed a formula that would hold for all cases warranting adjudication. For that group which preferred democracy Aeschylus did hold a realistic position. I mean that Aeschylus showed his confidence in persuasion rather than blind obedience—except, of course, obedience to the moral order. The *Eumenides* offered two strong bastions for the safekeeping of individuals and society: moral persuasion, a combination of the force of reason with good (moral) counsel; and *pathei mathos*, acceptance of both fear and the idea that understanding comes with suffering.

Persuasion by superior force of reason in combination with morality seems the very opposite of fear and cringing before the doctrine of *pathei mathos*. In the former, men seem to walk upright in the light while in the latter they cower in the darkness, afraid of vengeance, of punishment and of the jealous gods. If that is what seems to be, the appearance deceives. Aeschylus did not mean to praise the light and shrug hopelessly that life, though miserable, did reward the luckless with wisdom. Aeschylus welcomed persuasion, even though a person who is susceptible could also be persuaded to do wrong. The high point of the final play in the *Oresteia* is Athena proclaiming the triumph of her success, reason's success, in persuading the Erinyes. The Erinyes are persuaded, or tamed, or civilized. The Angry Ones (*Eum.* 499) become Eumenides, the Friendly Ones.[14]

[14] The conversion of the Erinyes, the Angry Ones, to Eumenides, the Friendly Ones,

But what was happiness for Aeschylus if it did not consist of being rid of fear? When the playwright first brings the immortals in epiphany before Orestes, he has Athena clearly state the rights of the suppliant (*Eum.* 748-55) and of the Angry Ones. "Yet these, too, have their work. We cannot brush them aside." (*Eum.* 476) Work translates *moira.* The Erinyes are *fated* to visit punishment on 'doers,' whether or not the 'doers' turned out to be transgressors of the moral code.

No doubt some of the audience saw that Aeschylus' principal problem now was precisely that of adjudication. The trial of Orestes was a dramatic cover for a more general and abstract problem. Stated boldly the dilemma was reconciling the inevitable, harsh reaction to any deed such as killing, with the possibility of the killing being justified and therefore innocent. Aeschylus solved this problem; the Erinyes became Eumenides without losing any of their work, their responsibility, which had been allotted to them. The solution Aeschylus offered was that punishment might be administered by someone who was himself or herself—in this instance the administration was by Clytemnestra—evil. This possibility invites careful adjudication in order that the transgression can be properly reviewed. In any case there must be punishment if there is a transgression. Erinyes do have their work to do but they may be satisfied after the judgment. The Erinyes may become Eumenides, if the judgment is that no transgression has been committed. The objective Aeschylus held was to inhibit transgression. Aeschylus trusted that fear[15] (of the Erinyes, of punishment,

was a good piece of theatre. The *Oresteia,* played in Athens' theatre of Dionysus, reminded Greeks that Dionysus was the child of Zeus and Semele, daughter of Cadmus and Harmonia at Thebes. Story had it that Hera was jealous and persuaded Semele to ask Zeus to appear to her in the same form that he appeared to Hera. Zeus had sworn to grant Semele her wish and appeared as god of thunder. Semele was consumed by the lightning, but Zeus saved her son, Dionysus who, when grown, led Semele from the underground to Olympus, where she was made immortal. There were held to be powers under the Athenian Acropolis, similar to the Eumenides invented by Aeschylus, who were attached to Semele. Aeschylus had simply changed the name of the powers protecting Athens and coupled them with obedience to, and reverence for, sacred-secular law and its institutions, the courts, the most venerable being the Areopagus.

[15] As I have said Aeschylus did not fear fear. Quite the opposite. The playwright had Athena warn Athenians: "I advise my citizens to govern and to grace, // and not to cast fear utterly from your city. What // man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous? ..." (*Eum.* 697-99) In what Aeschylus must have wished taken to heart, the Chorus of Erinyes chanted to Orestes and through him to the Athenians of Aeschylus' city: "There are times when fear is good. // It must keep its watchful place // at the heart's controls. There is // advantage // in the wisdom won from pain. // Should the city, should the man // rear a heart that nowhere goes // in fear, how shall a one // any more respect the right?" (*Eum.* 517-25)

automatic punishment) would do that but wished that the fear of reflexive punishment be combined with the ideal of judging. In this combination Aeschylus went beyond the limited conventional or Homeric philosophy. Retributive justice was joined with reasoned argument in the process of judicial assessment. Of course this was naive. Aeschylus would not have to be told that in the real world the guilty often got off free, that some judges were corrupt, and so on. As a teacher Aeschylus could not give up as easily as does the cynic. We are to keep in mind that a modern might say that the conscience of a transgressor punishes. The connotation of the Erinyes for Aeschylus would permit a torturing conscience to be swept into the meaning of inevitable punishment if, and only if, every transgressor's conscience did make him uneasy.

THE MISUNDERSTOOD "DAUGHTERS OF NIGHT."[16] Why did Aeschylus choose to have the Erinyes appear so horrible? The explanation seems to be that Aeschylus wished to frighten his audience as much as possible with the Erinyes. Along with many proponents of punishment as a preventative of crime, the playwright-educator thought that fear would inhibit immoral conduct. Aeschylus may have been in error but, I think, had hopes for fright. The playwright was not rejecting the law, *drasanti pathein*; Aeschylus accepted it. More than that, Aeschylus' surviving plays show only the instance of Orestes doing what might have been transgression but proving to be an innocent action. In all other instances the questionable deed was a transgression and the reaction actually a deserved punishment. It was just this which justifies calling action-reaction the law of the retributive justice.

One is forced to admit that the Erinyes sided with Clytemnestra and had not gone into action when Agamemnon was murdered. Aeschylus had Apollo accuse the Erinyes of exactly that. (*Eum.* 625 ff.) For a little

[16] The phrase "Daughters of Night" occurred at the end of the play but the Erinyes themselves claimed Night as their mother. (*Eum.* 745, 822, 876-7) Aeschylus was not following Hesiod whose *Theogony* had the Erinyes born of Earth, fertilized by the blood of Heaven (Uranus) who bled when Cronus cut off his testicles. (*Hesiod.* Evelyn-White, translator, p. 93.) Graves refers to the Erinyes as the "Triple-goddess" whose priestesses, during the king's sacrifice, designed to fructify the cornfields and orchards, wore menacing Gorgon masks to frighten away "profane visitors." (Graves. *Greek Myths*, Vol. I, 6.b.3.) As we said in the last chapter, Aeschylus intentionally had the Erinyes born of Night because he wished to have all the forces of vengeance and punishment closely associated. To repeat, in the *Theogony* Hesiod had the Destinies and Fates, *Moirai*, daughters of the Night. (*Hesiod*, p. 95) Aeschylus wished to have the Erinyes considered of the same family.

while Aeschylus permitted this view to be accepted. In so doing, the dramatist set the female against the male. Apollo did the same thing by championing the male, as Athenians could have expected. "Apollo ... whom the Athenians worshipped as paternal ... proclaims the sanctity of marriage and the precedence of the male."[17]

As I said earlier Athena was Apollo's example. "The mother is no parent of that which is called // her child," Apollo began, "but only nurse of the new-planted seed // that grows. The parent is he who mounts. A stranger she // preserves a stranger's seed, if no god interfere. // I will show you proof of what I have explained. There can // be a father without any mother. There she stands, // the living witness, daughter of Olympian Zeus, // she who was never fostered in the dark of the womb // yet such a child as no goddess could bring to birth." (*Eum.* 658-66)

What a splendid gesture to have Athena the example! Presumably many of the audience would have sided with what Aeschylus seems to make the stronger side. Not only was Athenian loyalty appealed to but the Greek view of the anatomy of reproduction was on the side of Apollo's argument that Orestes was not related to Clytemnestra by blood. Thus "no kindred blood" had been shed! As we know Greek knowledge of anatomy supported the Apollonian argument. It was natural, then, for Athena to cast her vote for Orestes, to hold him free of guilt. "There is no mother anywhere who gave me birth, // and, but for marriage, I am always for the male // with all my heart, and strongly on my father's side." (*Eum.* 736-38) Yes, the whole argument seems shaky but from the Greek point of view it was not.

We now are in a position to see that Athena, whom the Athenians believed had not been born of a woman or, at any rate, that a woman was not at least a full partner in giving birth, was admirably able to effect a reconciliation of the Erinyes. Athena already had granted the Erinyes their "work." Aeschylus had only to show Athena persuading the Erinyes to become Eumenides. Apollo's case for the male already had been won; actually it had been won in advance because the Greeks believed what Aeschylus had Apollo say. Aeschylus could afford Apollo's victory. Had he not prepared the way for Athenian realization that the Erinyes, for all Apollo's victory, were a necessary complement to Apollo's curative powers and of the mortal embodiment of Apollo's patronage of the administration of justice!

The problem is whether Aeschylus was finding a place for fear because he did not trust reason. We think that Aeschylus trusted reason but only

[17] Thomson. *Aeschylus and Athens*, p. 279.

reason turned into a knowledge of the limits to be imposed on one's wishes. For Aeschylus knew that *sôphrosynê* was guaranteed most firmly when one, or an entire audience, witnessed the suffering of transgressors, especially kings, queens and immortals. For Aeschylus most men were liable to hybris, whether in their recourse to violence in wreaking vengeance or claiming spoils (as Achilles in the *Iliad*). Only a minority were restrained because they knew their limits; these few had *sôphrosynê*. The majority of men had to live in fear of the consequences of transgressing. For if they transgressed, the law of retributive justice automatically responded; the Erinyes exacted the price.

If Aeschylus saw no incompatibility between fear and reason, he accepted freedom from coercion as the proper state for men. Not as slaves, not coerced and bearing the yoke of necessity (*anankê*), men were to choose freely. The happy state as described by the Erinyes was that of "the man who does right, free-willed, without constraint ..." (*Eum.* 550)

The question before the Areopagus was whether Orestes had transgressed and transgressed of his own free will. The question was all one. The tragedies of Aeschylus which have come down to us offer no case of coerced transgression. We do not think that the dramas which have not survived would manifest any instances of coerced wrongdoing. But let us ask the question anyway. Was Orestes free? Clytemnestra "is loathed as she deserved" (*LB.* 241), a "deadly viper," as Electra describes her (*LB.* 249), an unnatural two-footed "woman-lioness." (*Aga.* 1258) Did that mean that Orestes was free when he put his mother to death? When Aeschylus has Pylades recall to Orestes "the oracles // declared by Loxias at Pytho" could Orestes be thought free? Our quandary was not helped by the longer passage where Orestes was quoted on the guidance of Apollo.

"The big strength of Apollo's oracle will not forsake me. For he charged me to win through this hazard, with divination of much, and speech articulate, the winters of disaster under the warm heart were I to fail against my father's murderers; told me to cut them down in their own fashion, turn to the bull's fury in the loss of my estates. He said that else I must myself pay penalty with my own life, and suffer much sad punishment; spoke of the angers that come out of the ground from those beneath who turn against men; spoke of sicknesses, ulcers that ride upon the flesh, and cling, and with wild teeth eat away the natural tissue, how on this disease shall grow in turn a leprous fur. He spoke of other ways again by which the avengers might attack, brought to fulfillment from my father's blood. For the dark arrow of the dead men underground from those within my blood who fell and turn to call upon me; madness and empty terror in the night on one who sees clear and whose eyes move in the dark, must tear me loose and shake him until, with all his bulk degraded by the bronze-loaded lash, he lose his city. And such as he can have no share in the communal bowl allowed them, no

cup filled for friends to drink. The wrath of the father comes unseen on them to drive them back from altars. None can take them in nor shelter them. Dishonored and unloved by all the man must die at last, shrunken and wasted away in painful death." (*LB.* 269-96)

It might seem that Orestes was coerced. But Aeschylus intended him not to appear coerced, rather to have been guided to the right way, the morally righteous decision and action. Orestes is a young man, as Nestor's son or Telemachus. Young men stand in need of education or guidance. As with the Oceanids of the *Prometheus Bound*, Aeschylus is following the teaching of Hesiod by implying that Apollo was a guide to youth. According to Hesiod the Oceanids "have youth in their keeping";[18] so, Hesiod says, did Apollo. Apollo is not to be understood as commanding but as guiding with his oracles. Orestes has been told what was right to do and what would happen if the wrong decision and action are taken, that is, if he proves too much a coward to be the agent of Zeus' punishment of injustice.

Aeschylus has no characters similar to Hamlet. In his answer to Athena's question for a statement of his case, Orestes admitted his deed, adding: "Apollo shares responsibility for this. // He counterspurred my heart and told me of pains to come // if I should fail to act against the guilty ones." (*Eum.* 465-67) But more seemed to be implied than an oracular itemization of the ills that would be his should Orestes fail to kill Clytemnestra. Orestes had been persuaded, and we know that persuasion can be ruinous. "Who persuaded?" asked the Erinyes. Orestes identifies his counselor: "By order of this god, here. So he testifies." (*Eum.* 594) Aeschylus has Apollo testify to exactly that: "I come to testify. This man, by observed law, // came to me as suppliant, took his place by hearth and hall, // and it was I who cleaned him of the stain of blood. // I have also come to help him win his case. I bear // responsibility for his mother's murder." (*Eum.* 576-80)

At Apollo's side was that grandeur of Darkness, Hermes. Directed to Athens by Apollo who told him that "it was I who made you strike your mother down" (*Eum.* 84), Hermes went along as shepherd and guide. Significantly enough, Apollo addressed Hermes as "brother," "brother from a single sire." (*Eum.* 89) Aeschylus has made it plain that Apollo and Hermes were but two sides of the same justice, dark and light.

But what was implied by: "... it was I who made you strike your mother down"? Or what of Aeschylus' meaning in having Apollo answer the Erinyes' question: "You gave this outlander the word to kill his mother?" (*Eum.* 202) with the line: "The word to exact price for his father. What of

[18] Hesiod, *Hesiod.* Evelyn-White (trans.), p. 105.

that?" (*Eum.* 203) Only moments before Apollo had been directly accused by the Erinyes with direct responsibility for Clytemnestra's death. "Your own part in this is more than accessory. // You are the one who did it; all the guilt is yours." (*Eum.* 199-200) These were notable lines, coupling, as they did, the action of Orestes with Apollo, an allegiance which did not end; Aeschylus had Apollo and Orestes finally depart together. (*Eum.* 777) The audience knew that Apollo was not guilty and therefore, Orestes could not be guilty. If Orestes were not guilty, he was not coerced. As the Greeks saw it, a man was coerced only to do evil and incur atê. To do what was righteous a man might be persuaded by good counsel but he never was forced. The "god's urgency" (*LB.* 300) was the goal of righteousness which, as a magnet, was supposed to attract all men.

The mainstay of the dramatic action in the *Eumenides* is the change in the Erinyes, a dramatic change from frightening creatures to friendly powers whose sting has been drawn. The law of retributive justice has been accepted and, to help out in the enforcement of justice, a 'court' of mortals, the Areopagus, has been established. This was a coup de theatre. The manner in which Aeschylus reached his goal, and the way in which Aeschylus employed Athena to give the whole matter a sacred endorsement, was no less than a coup. Granted, the Erinyes were first-rate material with which to work. Aeschylus had made the Erinyes loathsome and the audience was prepared to reject them even as Aeschylus had Apollo reject them. The relevant passages found a précis in Golden. "The characterization of the Erinyes on the basis of their disgusting appearance and habits is continued in Apollo's angry address to them at 11.179-97. He demands that this awful body quit his temple for they might appropriately inhabit a lion's den, not the seat of his prophetic utterances. The picture he presents of the Erinyes vomiting forth clots of blood which they have sucked up from the slain (11.181-84) evokes, effectively, the feeling of loathing and disgust that we have already been asked to feel toward the fearful goddesses."[19] Golden continued filling in the picture of the disgusting Erinyes. "Apollo's attitude toward the Erinyes is further seen in his statement that they are not fit to enter his temple (207) and in the sarcasm with which he inquires into their 'noble privileges' as exactors of vengeance (209)."[20]

Why did Aeschylus have Athena say that the Erinyes had an indispensable place in the affairs of Athens? They became its Eumenides. The fear that once had been loathed was now the fear that was welcomed. What had

[19] Golden. *In Praise*, p. 90.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

become of that fear? It had been absorbed into the wills of the Athenians so that there was no longer a need to terrify them into conformity. To put the matter more metaphorically, fear had gone underground. The metaphor is not stretching the point. We know that the Erinyes were chthonic powers, daughters of Hades or, as in the *Theogony*, of Night, which could be understood as the darkness of the nether regions where the sun never reaches, where no dead man can be healed.

At three crucial spots the playwright had announcement of the establishment of a court or council of mortals:[21] at the beginning of a trial when the accused was to be regarded as a suppliant who had had ritual cleansing, again in the swearing in of jurors, and the third time, when judgment was pronounced.

The Council of the Areopagus having been constituted, was it Aeschylus' recommendation that the immortals withdraw to their favorite sanctuaries, there to be thought out of contact with the administration of justice? Of course not, but equally the responsibility of men was not to be diminished by automatically turning to the gods for succor. The Erinyes have become "guests of the state." (*Eum.* 1011) Athena, about to assemble the procession of women—the child bearers—who will escort the Eumenides to their honored place under the Acropolis from which they will symbolically uphold the law, provide the foundation of the law (of retributive justice), admonish the Athenians: "You, children of Cranaus, you who keep // the citadel, guide these guests of the state // For good things given, // your hearts' desire be for good to return." (*Eum.* 1010-13) To which the Eumenides respond "Farewell, and again farewell, words spoken twice over, // all who by this citadel, // mortal men, spirits divine, // hold the city of Pallas,

[21] The first was when Athena re-entered the scene guiding citizens chosen as jurors and attended by a herald and other Athenian citizens. Athena spoke: "Herald, make proclamation and hold in the host // assembled. Let the stabbing voice of the Etruscan // trumpet, blown to the full with moral wind, crash out // its high call to all the assembled populace. // For in the filling of this senatorial ground // it is best for all the city to be silent and learn // the measures I have laid down into the rest of time." (*Eum.* 566-72)

The second explicit reference the playwright had Athena make to the establishment of the Council of the Areopagus came with the announcement of Athena's judgment. "If it please you, men of Attica, hear my decree // now, on this first case of bloodletting I have judged. // For Aegeus' population, this forevermore // shall be the ground where justices deliberate. // Here is the Hill of Ares, here the Amazons // encamped and built their shelters when they came in arms // for spite of Theseus, here they piled their rival towers // to rise, new city, and dare his city long ago, // and slew their beasts for Ares. So this rock is named // from then the Hill of Ares. Here the reverence // of citizens, their fear and kindred do-no-wrong // shall hold my day and in the blessing of night alike ..." (*Eum.* 681-92)

grace // this my guestship in your land. // Life will give you no regrets." (*Eum.* 1014-20)

It was farewell; the Eumenides were never again to appear on earth but the Athenians were to be mindful of them as the very foundation of the law. The Council of the Areopagus, a court of mortals, henceforth was to administer secular law that was laced into sacred law, the law of the immortals both above the earth and under it. This administration by jurors sworn to honest jurisprudence was to take place above the chambers reserved for the Erinyes-Eumenides beneath the Hill of Ares, the Areopagus.

As the jurors of the first Areopagus cast their votes, Apollo charges them: "Respect in your hearts the oath that you have sworn." (*Eum.* 680) And in the speech of Athena that followed, the jurors of the Council of the Areopagus are warned: "Here the reverence // of citizens, their fear and kindred do-no-wrong // shall hold by day and in the blessing of night alike // all while the people do not muddy their own laws // with foul infusions. But if bright water you stain // with mud, you nevermore will find it fit to drink." (*Eum.* 690-5)

THE MEANING OF EUMENIDES 752-3. The acquittal of Orestes was announced by Athena reporting that she cast her vote for Orestes and that made the votes for acquittal exactly equal to the Areopagites' votes that Orestes is guilty. "The man before us has escaped the charge of blood. // The ballots are in equal number for each side." (*Eum.* 752-3) This may seem to be one more instance of an equally balanced scale, six of one and half-dozen of the other. But Aeschylus had not intended the case of Orestes to appear grey with no black and no white, no wrong and no right. Aeschylus' meaning was that there was need for *retributive* justice represented by the Erinyes, the Apollonian style of defending just suppliants who had been cleansed of pollution, and mortal councils sitting as courts. In short, Athens needed law and law-abiding inhabitants.

The play closed with the Chorus being made up of the women of Athens. The significance of this change comes with reflection on the constituents of the Chorus in the *Eumenides* and what the successive alternations signified. For most of the play the Chorus is made up of Erinyes. The Erinyes become Eumenides, well-wishers of the City. Then the Eumenides are displaced by the citizens of Athens. It is as though the playwright had said that the citizens of Athens had internalized the law, which was understood as a happy thing for the City.

It is crucial to my position that Aeschylus be understood as a humanist, but one respectful of the Olympians, Zeus above all. Athens' triumph of

persuasion did involve words, and attributing her success to Zeus, not only was a proper deference to the supreme immortal, but a way of saying that Zeus' power could be guessed by his being the most potent of mortals or immortals in the use of words. I already have acknowledged Peradotto's observation on the Greek belief in the power of language.[22] But men shared in the use of this power. Aeschylus did not demean men but only asked for humility.

[22] Peradotto. "Cledonomancy," p. 6.

Part Three

THE RHYTHM OF MORALITY

CHAPTER VI

PROMETHEUS BOUND[1]

The response to the Prometheus symbol by playwrights, essayists, poets, painters, and sculptors has been both so frequent and so serious that it seems reasonable to explore the *Prometheus Bound* in depth. This chapter will do so. Because the prevailing view of the play is that Prometheus represents mankind in a struggle against the tyranny of absolute power and absolutist dogma, I do ask for a new look at the *Prometheus Bound* and its possible setting in a trilogy. Prometheus has been acclaimed as a teacher par excellence. Most critics have accepted on face value, the Titan's statement (*PB.* 506) that he taught mankind all arts, which included what we think of as fine and applied art, as well as technology and basic science. Anyone deeply concerned with the record of Western educational thought should become attentive.

PROMETHEUS BOUND

Dramatis Personae

Chorus of the Daughters of Oceanus
Force, Agent of Zeus
Hephaestus, the God of Fire
Hermes, Messenger of Zeus
Io, a Priestess of Argos
Might, Agent of Zeus
Oceanus, God of the Sea
Prometheus, a Titan

[1] Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* translated by David Grene in *Greek Tragedies* (edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore), volume 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1960. Copyright 1942 by the University of Chicago.

Might and Force drag in Prometheus. Zeus has ordered Hephaestus to bind Prometheus to a rock in a desolate gorge in Scythia for giving fire to mankind. Hephaestus is reluctant to bind his relative and friend, pities him, but fears disobeying Zeus. Hephaestus shackles the silent Prometheus to the rock. Left alone, Prometheus bewails his lot, with mingled pain, apprehension and defiance.

The Chorus of compassionate Oceanids enters, expresses sympathy for his sufferings, and distress at Zeus' tyranny. Prometheus hints at a secret he alone knows which endangers Zeus' rule. He defiantly refuses to reveal the secret until Zeus relents and removes his bonds.

At the bidding of the Chorus, Prometheus tells how he aided Zeus against the Titans, Zeus who became tyrannical once he assumed power, and who would have destroyed mankind had it not been for Prometheus. Prometheus claims that it was he who gave men fire and was punished by Zeus for that philanthropy. Oceanus enters on a winged horse-like creature. He expresses friendship for Prometheus; counsels him to submit to the new tyrant, to cease his defiance, and to take thought for his own welfare. He offers to intercede with Zeus to secure the Titan's release and pleads with Prometheus to restrain his anger. Oceanus, rebuked, leaves.

The Chorus bewails the sufferings of Prometheus in the East and of his brother Atlas in the West.

Prometheus recounts the advance of human civilization and the varied inventions and discoveries he bestowed upon mankind. He declares that Fate has ordained that he will ultimately be released, and he hints again at his secret.

The Chorus pities Prometheus, but expresses reverence for Zeus, emphasizes the limitations of man, and counsels moderation.

Io, transformed into a heifer, enters, pursued by the ghost of Argus in the form of a stinging insect. She tells of her sufferings because of Zeus' love. When she hears of Prometheus' suffering at Zeus' hands, she relates the story of her sorrows, which began when Zeus fell in love with her, a love which led to her being driven out to wander by her father. Io's story continues with a recitation of how she was turned into a heifer, pursued, first by the one-hundred-eyed Argus, the creation of Hera, and after the slaying of Argus by Hermes, by a stinging gadfly urged on by Argus' ghost. Prometheus then prophesies her future wanderings over Europe, Asia, and Africa. He tells her, too, that she will finally find rest and be turned into a woman in Egypt and that a descendant of Io (Heracles) will release him. He hints again at his secret. Io leaves in a frenzy to continue her wandering.

As Prometheus utters renewed defiance and predicts the overthrow

of Zeus, Hermes arrives demanding to know the secret affecting Zeus. Prometheus insults Hermes as Zeus' lackey, and refuses to divulge the secret. Hermes warns him of new punishments, especially of the eagle of Zeus, who will devour Prometheus' liver daily. As Prometheus utters a final defiance, a furious storm breaks, the rock is struck by lightning, and earth opens and Prometheus, with the Oceanids, sink from sight.

INTRODUCTION. Of the two trilogies written by Aeschylus at the end of his career the *Oresteia* has survived to give us an example of how Aeschylus built his moral philosophy into a trilogy. I think that the *Prometheia* would have been somewhat less representative of life's moral trial but eminently able to represent the trilogy formula of transgression, punishment, judgment, and *homonoia-harmonia*. We have only one play of the *Prometheia*; I think it probably is the second of three, and thus it is dominated by punishment. A lack of the first and third tragedies of the *Prometheia* forces me into the hazard of reconstruction. On a guess I suggest that the transgression of the first play involved stealing fire, Hephaestus' power, his specialty. The third play I think judges the hybristic Prometheus wrong, and sees the Titan persuaded of his error and of what would be righteous to do. This conversion wins another symbolic action, the reconciliation of Zeus and Prometheus. This reconciliation would be the high-point of the *Prometheus Unbound*, but would be followed by a good many other things included in the *harmonia-homonoia* of that tragedy.

There is no best way to go about analysis of a trilogy, whose middle play is the only one that has survived. We must make the best of the fact and begin with what we have, the *Prometheus Bound*. The first section of this chapter has as its target the analysis of that play, while the second section brings up leading interpretations of Prometheus as he has been viewed by selected modern critics and as he was seen by the friendly and not-so-friendly characters in the *Prometheus Bound*.

This single and very old play has had appeal that cuts through centuries of time. "A man for all seasons" can be said of Prometheus. The Titan has held attention, be the respondents rebels against nineteenth century supernaturalism or twentieth century liberals. All have been certain that Prometheus was right in his protest and that Aeschylus intended to have Zeus evolve from a brutal, self-indulgent despot into a democratic leader with fatherly concerns.

In his excellent study, "Zeus in Aeschylus," Lloyd-Jones put the historical reaction of romanticism in this way: "To the romantic poets of the revolutionary era, the Titan tortured by Zeus for his services to mankind appeared

as a symbol of the human spirit in its struggle to throw off the chains which priests and kings had forged." But then Lloyd-Jones continues by writing that scholars have found this an overly simple view. "But to the distinguished Hellenists who after the fall of Napoleon laid the foundation of the great century of German scholarship no such naive and one-sided view of the Prometheus seems tolerable."[2]

Most of what has been written has been one-sided in its praise of the rebel Titan and its damning of Zeus. But some have seen that Aeschylus meant Prometheus to be ill,[3] and Shelley did strike the right note, even though he exaggerated after the fashion of a romantic poet, in interpreting the *Prometheus Unbound* as a paean of love. I only wish that Shelley had not thought that so much of the *Prometheus Bound* was given over to a loving reconciliation with Zeus. After all, Aeschylus would only have meant Prometheus' conversion to a loving Titan as his acceptance of the moral code, of Zeus' justice. That hardly was love in Shelley's sense. Nor does Shelley's view allow for the judgment scene that I think was in the *Prometheus Unbound*, to say nothing of the persuasion and all the reconciliation of the *harmonia* and *homonoia* of that play.

The *Prometheia* is clouded with unanswered questions. Even the date of the *Prometheus Bound* has remained indeterminate[4] but lines 365-71 appear to refer to the eruption of Mount Aetna in about 475 B.C. Although this mountain was not named specifically, the assumption that it was Aetna is a fair one. Aeschylus had visited Sicily, probably twice, was acquainted with Hieron of Syracuse, and would have been aware that the eruption of

[2] H. Lloyd-Jones. "Zeus in Aeschylus." *JHS*, 76 (1956), p. 55.

[3] Eirik Vandvik. "The Prometheus of Hesiod and Aeschylus," *Norske Videnskaps-Akademi.* Oslo II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse, 1942, No. 2. (Oslo, 1943). The illness of Prometheus was spelled out by Barbara H. Fowler, "The Imagery of the *Prometheus Bound.*" (*AJPh*, 78 (1957), pp. 173-84) and more fully in her doctoral dissertation, "The Dramatic Use of Imagery in Aeschylus" (Bryn Mawr College, 1954).

[4] McKay reviewed the literature on authorship and date, concluding that Aeschylus indeed was the author of the *Prometheia* but that there were "no obvious grounds for dating the play, but the affinity of theme (Io) with the *Suppliants* (463 B.C.), the philosophic content, the simplicity of style, the simpler metric and the choral addiction to iambic quatrains, even at the expense of poetic quality ... the frequency of the rhetorical questions, Sicilian usages and outright allusion, combine to favor a late date." (McKay. "Aeschylean Studies," p. 47.)

An excellent review of recent literature on the meaning of the *Prometheus Bound* is provided by Alfred Burns ("The Meaning of the *Prometheus Vinctus.*" *C & M*, 27 (1966), pp. 65-78). Herington, in *The Author of the* Prometheus Bound, goes a long way to confirming the later date for the *Prometheia*, but one cannot say definitely whether the *Prometheia* or *Oresteia* came first.

Aetna was well-known in Athens and that it was an attention-getter in Sicily. Assuming the play to have been written after 475 B.C., the *Prometheus Bound* would have been among the last group of Aeschylus' tragedies. Indeed, I think that the *Prometheus Bound* has a good deal in common with the manner in which the *Oresteia* handled the themes of illness and crime, suffering and punishment, cure and freedom, wisdom, and all good things. But then, with so few of Aeschylus' plays having survived, other Aeschylean tragedies might have shown a similar pattern. If there is doubt shrouding the date when Aeschylus wrote the *Prometheia*, or first produced it, the authenticity of the play should not be in question. Ancient scholarship is overwhelmingly in favor of designating the author. Herington's conclusion is unequivocal: "... I conclude that no ancient scholar of any eminence hesitated in attributing the *Prometheus* to Aeschylus."[5] For Herington this consensus of the ancients is "authoritative external testimony. If it is to be rejected, the grounds for rejection must be overwhelmingly strong."[6] So much for the external evidence. The internal evidence is much more subjective than the testimony that lives in the ancient records. The playwright's "artistic personality"—by which Herington intends "the sum of characteristics that can be sensed from the poet's extant *œuvre*—is too indeterminate for grounding an opinion."[7]

The *Prometheia* rested on a good deal of mythology: some of it was Attic, and therefore familiar to Athenians; but some of it was the Boeotian mythology on which Hesiod drew. I do not wish to exaggerate the wall between the two; if there was a wall, many Greeks vaulted it by knowing both. But the two were separate, and no one has written on the topic in its reference to Prometheus other than Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, who claimed that there were two Prometheuses, one belonging to the Boeotian mythology and the other Prometheus belonging to the Attic.[8] Wilamowitz thought that one Prometheus was the immortal venerated in the Attic festival, the Prometheia. This Prometheus would have originated the uses of fire in such crafts as those of the potter and worker in metals. Prometheus in the Attic myths would have been the one whom legend had delivered Athena from the forehead of Zeus, using as his instrument of delivery an axe with which the Titan was said to have split open the head of Zeus. This same Prometheus was said by the Ionic-Attic tradition to have fathered

[5] Herington. *The Author*, p. 20.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[8] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. *Aischylos: Interpretationen*; Louis Séchan. *Le Mythe de Prométhée*, p. 13 ff.

Deucalion, who with his wife, Pyrrha, was progenitor of the human race.[9] I think the playwright only made use of this benevolent casting of the Titan indirectly. Prometheus had a good reputation in Athens and I believe Aeschylus knew and took advantage of that repute.

Certainly it is plausible that this way of perceiving Prometheus—I shall call it the picture of a benign Prometheus—was dominant, not in the first play of the *Prometheia* and not in the second, but in the final tragedy, the *Prometheus Unbound.* I realize, too, that such a proposal cannot be argued without considering the *Prometheia* as a whole. Perhaps I have said enough in alleging the mood of the *Prometheus Unbound* to have been a happy one of prosperity promised by the assiduous pursuit of the crafts.

While on the subject of mythology the benign view of Prometheus also could have been taken from the Boeotian, Hesiodic legend, but the leitmotiv there was of a mere crafty, deceptive, and thieving Prometheus. The portion of the legend that served a happy ending for the Hesiodic Prometheus story was the Titan's handing over fire to mankind. Presumably the idea was that men have used fire for their prosperity through the ceramic arts and the crafts of metal-work.

The Boeotian (and Locrian) legends of Prometheus were known to those who had listened to Hesiodic recitations. I will cite the best known, that which comes from the *Theogony*, but there were other legends on the journey of Prometheus from the smithy of Hephaestus to the Titan's handing mortals the narthex stem or fennel-stalk with its concealed fiery ember, of which Hesiod spoke in *Works and Days.* These laid the ground for the torch-races initiated in the final play of the *Prometheia.* The torches were the giant fennel stalks and the race symbolized Prometheus bringing the stolen fire to men. The Greeks commemorated Hephaestus and Prometheus in those colorful *lampades.*

If I am correct, Aeschylus reconciled the two strains of legend, the basically Attic (though also Ionic) and the basically Boeotian in the first and last plays. The story-line of *Prometheus and Firebringer* I believe taken largely from Hesiod. Hesiod also provided the story of fire hidden in the fennel-stalk and this was ready at hand for use in the final play, the *Prometheus Unbound.* As for the contribution of the Attic legend, it established the reputation of Prometheus as helpful to man and closely associated with Athens' chief patron, Pallas Athena.

[9] In the Deucalion-Pyrrha legend, Deucalion's father was Prometheus and his mother was Clymene. In another legend Prometheus married Athena, or was one of her lovers. This latter legend would seem to be a natural outcome of the belief that both Athena and Prometheus were patrons of the crafts of potters and metal workers.

The reconciliation of the two lines of myth, Attic and Boeotian, in the *Prometheia* helps one to understand an essential point in the way Aeschylus desired Prometheus to be understood: the playwright intended to show the Titan guilty of a moral transgression in stealing Hephaestus' fire. In *Prometheus the Firebringer* this was a crime to be punished. Aeschylus could use Boeotian mythology; Attic myth had only a minor role. In the *Prometheus Bound* the Titan suffered. *Pathei mathos* was in the play, but Prometheus was hybristic. He suffered just because of that hybris. Of course Prometheus was ill; that was no excuse. The thought is similar to our own lodged in the expression, "ignorance of the law is no excuse." Again mythology was at hand. In the opening of the *Prometheus Unbound* there was a continuation of the *pathei mathos.* An eagle ate Prometheus' liver.

Now the Attic mythology, which had a minor role in *Prometheus the Firebringer* and in the *Prometheus Bound,* takes on a major one in the *Prometheus Unbound.* What has been minor becomes major, what has been major becomes minor. But the major and the minor have been kept together. The reversal permitted Aeschylus to indulge his favorite notion: that wisdom comes after suffering caused by transgression of the moral code; that cure follows disease; that peace and prosperity can succeed strife and dire poverty —that all good things come at last if the individual or the community abides by the sacred and secular law.

The pivotal ideal that so easily can be missed is that Aeschylus often thought a crime or transgression or *hamartia* a form of, an accompaniment to, illness or disease. There was disease and the cure brought a restoration of equilibrium. In terms of knowledge, bodily-moral illness was the intellectual-moral equivalent of lack of knowledge and cure was the equivalent of wisdom.

A STORY OF PUNISHMENT. *The Prometheus Bound* story-line is typical of the middle play in Aeschylus' trilogies; punishment is its major theme. The transgression, dominant in the opening drama, and the presentation of the right thing to do, the dominant theme of the final tragedy, are minor themes in the second play. This arrangement of major and minor themes in the *Prometheus Bound* permits the audience to review the original transgression, which had been the stealing of fire, the upset of equilibrium in the realm of the immortals because of Prometheus' invasion of the responsibility of Hephaestus for the use of fire, and upsetting Zeus' plans for the destruction and replacement of the primeval race of men. In the *Prometheus Bound* the audience is challenged to attend to the idea of *pathei mathos*

by such clever distractions as making the charges of Prometheus seem to reveal genuine characteristics of Zeus. For example, Aeschylus has Prometheus claim that Zeus is a tyrant both cruel and faithless to his one-time ally in the battle against the Titans. An Athenian audience would have been prone to lose objectivity when someone, even Zeus, was persuasively described as a tyrant! It was as though Aeschylus gave himself a handicap and bet that he could throw the audience off the trail and thus win his *agôn logôn*. Even the hybris of Prometheus telling of all that he had given mankind could have been mistaken by the unwary for genuine gifts! It is as though Aeschylus warned that "not all that glistens is gold." Time and time again Aeschylus has Prometheus rail at Zeus. Yet the audience is told that the antagonists will be reconciled. Will Prometheus divulge the Thetis secret or will something else be the basis of the détente?

While the *Prometheus Bound* attends less to the reconciliation of Zeus with Prometheus than to Prometheus' transgression, this reconciliation is suggested. In the very instance of the transgression the playwright attempts to trick his audience: the father of gods and men was being talked of by the actor playing Prometheus, but only the keenest of the audience could have realized that the description was not objective. From the view of the egotistical Titan, it was Zeus who should be softened, it was Zeus who should give in.

Prometheus continued on his madcap and immoral course by showing hatred for Zeus, by adding hybris to the transgression of stealing, and a hope of unseating Zeus by use of the Thetis secret. The transgressor was truly ill, really a deviate from the moral norm.

Aeschylean tragedy is capable of showing a patient completely cured; Prometheus is one of those. Sometimes, as is true of Agamemnon, the atê of a transgressor is death. Either a transgressor dies (and that before the final play) or is wholly cured. A trilogy ends with the morally ill being restored to moral health. As though to show the delights of that sound mind, others shared in the morally good life. Conversely, the transgressor sometimes misled others: an example of this is the decision of the Oceanids to attend Prometheus in his plunge into Tartarus. The Oceanids, accepting the pronouncements of Prometheus uncritically, are made to say of the rules laid down by Zeus that they are "customs (*nomoi*) that have no law to them" (*PB.* 150), *athetoi*, which was the same as saying that the rulings of Zeus were unrighteous. If Zeus was not in violation of the moral code Aeschylus endorsed, the playwright must have meant Prometheus to seem ill. I think that Aeschylus intended the Titan to appear deluded, but that is too crucial a point to leave with just a simple affirmation.

THE ILLNESS OF PROMETHEUS. Prometheus suffered. But was it Aeschylus' intention that the Titan be thought to have learned? "Men learn wisdom by suffering." Did *pathei mathos* apply to the action of immortals? I already have said that Zeus accepted the rule of Fate. The analogue of my reasoning in the instance of Fate leads to affirming that Prometheus indeed lived under the rule, *pathei mathos*. This can be extended to include the opinion that Aeschylus intended the law of retributive justice to hold for immortals as well as mortals. I also will argue from a second assumption, that the cosmic order embraced another postulate, best known as the Mean, the notion that well-being in the world could only be had when polar opposites were in harmony, in balance or in equilibrium. I am not alone in this opinion. Fowler, who also sees Prometheus as ill, described the *Prometheus Bound* as "a drama of disproportions," using, among other illustrations of the deviations from the Mean, Prometheus' excessive rebelliousness.[10] Perhaps it would have been more advisable to write of Prometheus' excessive anger, likening him to Achilles and the old tale of Meleagros, than of excessive rebelliousness. Better still, we can settle on the insight of Fowler that Prometheus suffered from excessive hatred, the hatred the Titan has for the gods who punish him.[11]

The Greeks took the ideal of a Mean so seriously that the robbing of fire from Hephaestus was a much more serious crime than it would be even for a modern American anxious to preserve property rights. Indeed, the issue was not the preservation of property rights but the preservation of a cosmic balance of responsibilities. It is instructive to read Wolf on the subject of Greek thoughts on justice [12] and Wolf's specific reference to "justly" in *Prometheus Bound.* (v. 64) "No one, save Prometheus can justly blame me," Aeschylus has Hephaestus say of chaining and impaling the Titan. The line means that the judgment of Zeus is morally correct (justified) and

[10] B. Hughes Fowler. "The Imagery of the *Prometheus Bound*," *AJPh*, 78 (1957), p. 173.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 174. Fowler noted the Homeric background of the illness from which Prometheus suffered, recalling that it was "the plague that Apollo sends upon the Achaean host. (*Il.* I, 10) It is the sickness from which Euchenor would have died had he stayed at home instead of going to war with the Greeks (*Il.* XIII, 667, 670). In the beginning then the word seems to have meant a physical ailment, a disease or an illness ... Because the Greeks thought of the mind or soul as though it were a physical thing, as though it were the center of life itself as well as thought or emotion (a concept nearly equivalent to our 'brain'), they never made a complete distinction between disorders of mind and of body." (p. 174 ff.)

[12] Erik Wolf. *Griechisches Rechtsdenken: Vorsokratiker und Frühe Dichter*. Frankfort am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950, p. 376.

only Prometheus, who will suffer and think his punishment unjust, can criticize Hephaestus. Prometheus, however good his cause, has strayed beyond his due bounds and, as Wolf has documented, the Presocratics joined the rank-and-file of Greeks in hearty rejection.

Joined firmly with this ideal of staying within the Means was that of abiding by one's allotted fate. To stray was an act of hybris and always punished, always followed by atê. Nilsson, after spelling out this doctrine, wrote that the *Prometheus Bound* was the leading dramatic representation of the principle.[13] While I do not disagree with Nilsson, and certainly not with Wolf, I would suggest that Aeschylus intended the *Persians* to clearly dramatize the danger of hybristically straying from one's allotment. In the *Prometheus Bound* I think the thought was that invading the lot of another (an example of going beyond one's allotment) could result from—or result in—an illness of mind.

Applied to a person, the Greeks thought that disequilibrium was disease. A man out of balance was ill. The audience at the *Prometheus Bound* views an immortal who is ill. It is his uncle who tells Prometheus of his illness. Disguising truth by making Oceanus a slightly ridiculous figure, the audience hears the familiar Apollonian bit of wisdom, "know yourself," when Oceanus abjured Prometheus to "reform your ways to new ways ..." (*PB.* 309) If Prometheus knew himself, he would know that he suffered from a "sick temper" which, Oceanus said, *could be cured by words.* Zeus is the breath of life itself.

Achilles rejected the counsel of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Aias, who attempted to cure Achilles with words. (*Il.* IX)[14] Achilles was exceedingly angry at his commander-in-chief, Agamemnon, just as Prometheus was angry with Zeus. Phoenix failed to be a successful healer. Oceanus failed. Throughout the *Prometheus Bound,* the Titan remains inordinately angry. Yet, as Phoenix lectured Achilles, "The very immortals // can be moved; their virtue and honour and strength are greater than ours are, // and yet with sacrifices and offerings for endearment, // with libations and with

[13] Martin P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion.* I. *Bis zur Griechischen Weltherrschaft.* München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1941, p. 709.

[14] Vellacott was accurate when he rendered *orgês nosousês* (*PB.* 377) as "anger's a disease." Benardete saw that Aeschylus had Prometheus promise far too much in the *technai.* It was in divination that Benardete finds that Aeschylus planted his cue. The Titan says that he has given men "blind hopes"—hope for immortality? Benardete singles out this gift as "the only outright falsehood in his speech ..." Prometheus cannot cure death. The Titan 'truly suffered' hybris. (S. Benardete. "The Crimes and Arts of Prometheus." *RhM,* 107 (1964), p. 133).

savour men turn back even the immortals // in supplication, when any man does wrong and transgresses." (*Il*, IX. 497-501)

A Greek would worry about anyone whose illness took the form of extreme anger. And he would worry for the same reason that he would have been anxious about a man or woman who was drugged or under the influence of alcohol. These were Presocratic times, that is, before the dominant philosophy celebrated the mind. It was Plato whom the Western tradition remembered as having established the mind as the ideal governor of conduct. Aeschylus wrote with the earlier, Pre-socratic concern for the speech and conduct of men and women vis-à-vis the sacred and secular law, the Mean, and such like. Aeschylus wrote of those who disobeyed as ill, not as people who were "out of control" because their reason was not in control.

For all his rationalism Aeschylus is not disdainful of a friendly view of the gods, Zeus included. In a moment I will have to take up the subject of Zeus, because he is the one against whom the actor playing Prometheus rails. As preface to that reflection on the role of Zeus in the *Prometheus Bound* there is reason to think the cautious optimism of Aeschylus was supplemented by a philanthropic estimate of the Olympians. Zeus, for example, not only symbolizes justice in Aeschylean tragedy; Zeus also is a chief patron of mankind. This is why I think it would be justified to think of Aeschylus as within a tradition where formulation of the relationship between mortals and immortals emphasized cooperativeness rather than hostility.

PHILANTHRÔPIA AND EUNOIA OR PHILOTIMIA AND PHILONIKIA. When Havelock reviews Greek and later thought on historical development, he perceives two opposing tendencies, that of affection (*philanthrôpia* and *eunoia*) contrasted with competition (*philotimia* and *philonikia*).[15] Havelock feels men to

[15] While the term *philanthrôpia* did not appear in Aeschylean tragedy, *philanthrôpos* did (e.g., *PB.* 11, 28).

Havelock's *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* described Hesiod's theory of history as a "morally cynical" theory, which saw man "at best a fallen creature; at worst a costly mistake." (54) Homer had men "living and dying like the leaves of the trees, the recipient of good and evil in mixed portion or of evil unrelieved by good ..." (54) "But," Havelock wrote of Aeschylus' theory of history, "in the Promethean drama the values are reversed. Man is worth preserving and worth loving: he is somehow gaining in stature: a challenge is being offered to age-old tradition, one which will deeply affront it, as the outline of man's progress under the aegis of philanthropy is next spelled out." (54) Although I think Aeschylus a good deal less of a radical progressive and Hesiod more hopeful,

have grown in their preference for affection. Whether Havelock is or is not supported in his thesis that *philanthrôpia* and *eunoia* have become steadily more attractive than *philotimia* and *philonikia*, Aeschylus certainly wrote in favor of *philanthrôpia* with at least four references to the love of mankind made in the single play, *Prometheus Bound* (8-11, 28, 122-3, 445-6).[16] It was not strange that this was so; *philanthrôpia* would seem to have been much more appealing to Greek audiences than either *philotimia* or *philonikia*. Aeschylus capitalizes on this. And that is all the more intriguing in a playwright whose blend of a stern but hopeful view of change contrasted the possibility of progress with Homeric resignation and Hesiodic pessimism.

The example of *philanthrôpia* that Havelock refers to is the varied technology "taught" man (or acquired by mankind in its development) by Prometheus. "I am the huntsman of the mystery, // the great resource that taught technology ..." is Havelock's translation of line 109 in the *Prometheus Bound*. This passage can be read with the words of the Oceanids: "You regarded mortal men too high, Prometheus." A more literal translation would be: "You pay too much reverence to mortals." Excessive reverence is inappropriate both because it is excessive and because reverence is more appropriately paid immortals by mortals than the other way around. (*PB.* 545-6) Very early in the *Prometheus Bound* the character, Might, brings his speech to a close, categorically stating that Prometheus was to "quit his man-loving disposition." (*PB.* 11)

It might seem as though Aeschylus is siding with the notion that the immortals should not help men to any great extent but keep them wretched and in a state of dependence on the gods. In my opinion that would be a faulty reading. Aeschylus' intention can be stated as twofold. One intent is that men would have to work out their own destinies without the expectation of the immortals' continual help. Following my earlier thought, these godly patrons are not patrons who give everything to man but, rather, they are to be acknowledged as sources of the technology used by men. That recognition is made by ritualistic observance. Prometheus is being cautioned against trying to intervene directly in the lives of men with the consequence of making them dependent, and less morally responsible as well as less apt to work hard.

The other intent is that Prometheus be understood as having taken upon

Havelock was correct in rating Aeschylus a good deal more optimistic than Homer and more hopeful than Hesiod.

[16] Havelock. *The Liberal Temper*, p. 32.

himself to say that mortals are not to revere the several gods, whose special powers or provinces are those famous gifts. Prometheus has lumped together too many things which should be understood distinct in their several provinces. In a sense Prometheus has substituted himself for Zeus, for only Zeus could be thought of as having his cake after having eaten it, that is to say, of retaining all the provinces after parceling them among the gods. Moreover, from the Greek point of view, Prometheus claims far too much beneficence. His vaunted claim simply amounts to hybris.

It becomes crucial to understand "gifts," as Prometheus is made to describe the many *technai* of men. A first step is to think of these gifts as inventions of men and not as something given to men. The relationship of Prometheus to man and man to Prometheus was not one of giver and receiver. True, there were lines 445-6 which Havelock rendered: "I speak the human race not to condemn // but to explain my kindnesses in what I gave to them."[17] But Aeschylus could not have meant the giving literally. It made better sense to think of these lines as a rather graceful, poetic way of saying that what we mortals have achieved in technology is owing, as Homer has taught, to the immortals who have helped us.

The long and short of the reciprocity of men and gods demanded a bridge between them. The world of men and that of the gods were as distinct as Pindar had them in the sixth Nemean Ode. "There is one // race of men, one race of gods; both have breath // of life from a single mother. But sundered power ... holds us divided. So that one side is nothing, while on the // other the brazen sky is established // a sure citadel forever."[18] The single source for immortals and mortals was Gaia, Earth Mother, mother of *Prometheus Unbound.* In that play that ended the *Prometheia* our guess is that Gaia was the one who persuaded Prometheus to bear in mind what I have described as the preservation of the Mean in the Olympian pantheon. In the absence of such *harmonia,* there will be stasis but this angriness is reserved for the relations between the immortals and has nothing to do with the manner in which mortals relate to immortals.

From Aeschylus' point of view, the gods were not "angry" or "jealous" gods, *if* men knew their mortal limits and refrained. Neither Aeschylus' philosophy nor conventional attitudes would have judged it hybristic to learn from experience, to develop a technology slowly in the sweat of one's brow. Only the boast of technical achievement would have been considered

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[18] Pindar. *The Odes of Pindar.* Owen Lattimore (trans.), p. 111. The sixth Nemean Ode was cited by Kerényi in a brief, instructive section, "The World View of Greek Mythology." Kerényi. *Prometheus,* p. 22 ff.

hybris. If men respected sacred law and had *sôphrosynê*, that is, realized that they were mortal and were restrained in their wishes, the attitude of the immortals would be amiable. That would not have meant an absence of struggle, or misfortune. I know of no Greek literature that has said all could be well always. On balance, was Aeschylus' treatment of *philanthrôpia* the sign of optimism rather than pessimism on a change in the human condition? I think that it was hopeful. It has not been cause of despondence to affirm that progress was not inevitable, that advance to greater peace, prosperity, and so forth, was conditional. For Aeschylus a conditional was all-important. Aeschylean tragedy always was rooted in an if-then thesis: if men are righteous, then there will be freedom or yet other things judged good.

THE IMAGE OF ZEUS IN THE PROMETHEUS BOUND.[19] Critics have found the chief mystery of the *Prometheus Bound* the character Aeschylus intended for Zeus. The conventional explanation was to look to what Prometheus had to say. Basing opinion on the fact that the mood changes from grim in the first play to happy in the final drama of the *Oresteia*, it was assumed that in the course of the *Prometheia* Zeus would evolve from what Prometheus fumed against to a civilized, benign god, of the polis. I have rejected this view on the grounds that Aeschylus gave no indication that he felt that Zeus evolved from an angry to a benign god. The playwright's religious views would make it likely that he never intended Zeus to be held a monster.

The role of Zeus in the *Prometheus Bound* is intriguing partly because the god seems so radically different from the Zeus of other Aeschylean tragedies. Zeus appears to be an angry, vindictive god of overwhelming power. In the other dramas, the playwright has described Zeus as the champion of all that is dikê. This departure from the traditional typing of Zeus should have prompted suspicion. Perhaps the Zeus of the *Prometheus Bound* was not what he seemed to be. But I have identified as the most persistent error one of the earliest, then as now owing its popularity to the romantic notion of revolutionaries that the Titan was tortured by Zeus "for his services to mankind."

To continue the argument, I have said that Prometheus is to be thought ill. If the Titan's state should be understood as one of feverish delusion,

[19] One of the most able analyses of the manner in which Aeschylus treats the accusatory words of Prometheus describing Zeus has been written by Anthony J. Podlecki in his "Reciprocity in *Prometheus Bound*." *GRBS*, 10 (Winter, 1969), pp. 287-92. I think Podlecki correct in writing that Prometheus was intended to appear guilty of the same faults and excesses of which he accuses Zeus.

and Zeus not a cruel despot, we are left with that difficult phrase, "For only Zeus is free." (*PB.* 50) Did the phrase mean that Zeus stands outside of, and unrestrained by, the cosmic laws? If Zeus is free in this sense, why did Aeschylus venerate him? Aeschylus could preach fear of Zeus and obedience to him, but he could not preach the imitation of Zeus in man's conduct. But I think that he did. In the line under review Aeschylus emphasizes the actor playing Might. The line followed a stichomythia between Might and Hephaestus in which the audience was reminded that fire, and the *technê* associated with it, was allotted to the smithy of the gods. Hephaestus had said: "... would another had had this craft allotted to him." (*PB.* 48) Might answered: "There is nothing without discomfort except the overlordship of the Gods. // For only Zeus is free."[20] (*PB.* 49-50) The "free" (*eleutheros*) of this passage has been thought of as freedom from suffering or fear. It is possible to understand the passage as meaning that Zeus is so just that he did not have to fear suffering—as Prometheus suffered for his misdeed. I have elected an alternative interpretation that seems to be suggested by the context.

"Only Zeus is free" is in response to Hephaestus' exclamation: "Yet would another had had this craft allotted to him." (*PB.* 48) The craft had been allotted Hephaestus not because Prometheus had stolen Hephaestus' fire but because Hephaestus' *technai* were all the crafts of metalwork. In writing of the *Oresteia* I said that the meaning of "For only Zeus is free" was that only Zeus was free of any special responsibility save one, responsibility for maintaining the cosmic balance, the Mean or justice. Hephaestus was always remembered as working at his forge, as when forging the wonderful shield for Achilles (*Il.* XVIII, 468-612) or chaining and impaling Prometheus. The other Olympians had their work, the provinces they oversaw, the powers which men used after supplicating the blessings of a god or goddess. A city had many gods and goddesses to remember with votive offerings, though one might be *the* patron of the city. The coppersmiths, ceramic workers, and so forth, singly or grouped in (guilds), related to an immortal.[21] People had to think of many gods, including the immortal who was patron of the City. But in one's work a special immortal was *the* one to whom the mortal worker sacrificed. The freedom of Zeus, we should remind ourselves, was a freedom from specialized labor; Zeus had parceled the work of the world to the immortals, and that act

[20] Lloyd-Jones. "Zeus," p. 55.

[21] Following the analogy of the guild is not misleading. Such an immortal as Hephaestus would be *the* master and mortals working at forges would be journeymen and apprentices.

symbolized an allotment of power and responsibility. I have said that the allotment did not lessen Zeus' power and responsibility. Zeus was left stronger than any other god or the sum of the Olympian 'parts' with his sole responsibility on Olympus having nothing to do with labor. That responsibility was maintenance of the specialties held by members of the Olympian family in order that there be a harmony, an equilibrium rather than the stasis of jurisdictional dispute. Prometheus had upset that Mean. The end of that road would be a war on Olympus and that would not do.

MISINTERPRETING CHARACTERS OTHER THAN PROMETHEUS. The *Prometheus Bound* has survived as the most ill understood of Aeschylus' tragedies. *Pari passu* the characters have suffered from misunderstanding, some more than others. Hephaestus has been understood best and the role of the Oceanids have not been badly distorted. I do not believe that Aeschylus meant the Oceanids to be thought heroic. When the daughters of Oceanus announced their intention, I think Aeschylus hoped the audience would agree with Hermes that the decision showed a "want of good sense" (*anoia*). (*PB.* 1077) Perhaps Aeschylus wished to suggest that the Oceanids shared Prometheus' misguided stand. This was not an anti-feminist stand but taken to be a matter-of-fact description. None of this needed to have been explicit in Aeschylus' thinking about the *Prometheus Bound* but I believe that Aeschylus' choice of the Oceanids for the Chorus rejected the educational function the *Theogony* had allotted the Oceanids.[22] In the *Theogony*, Hesiod told that the rivers were daughters of Oceanus and Tethys. There were other daughters, with educational tasks. Are these the daughters of Oceanus denoted by the Chorus of the *Prometheus Bound*? I think not. I believe that Aeschylus wished that Chorus to be thought Seagulls loyal but 'flighty.' "What is that?" Prometheus asks. "The ... wings ..." (*PB.* 124-6) The Chorus, presumably settled, answers: "Fear not: this is a company of friends // that comes to your mountain with swift // rivalry of wings." (*PB.* 128-30)

Critics have done less justice to the minor characters, *Kratos* (Force) and *Bia* (Might), both of whom appear in the first scene of the *Prometheus Bound.* They are said to be no more than representations of the cruel, unmerited punishment visited by Zeus. Of course, *Kratos* and *Bia* are fearsome. So are the Erinyes. Aeschylus believed in scaring potential trans-

[22] Hesiod. *Hesiod.* Evelyn-White (trans.), pp. 105, 107. The educational function was explicit in the *Theogony*: "Also she brought forth a holy company of daughters who with the Lord Apollo and the Rivers have youth in their keeping—to this charge Zeus appointed them ..." (*Ibid.*, p. 105)

gressors. In the *Prometheus Bound,* the Titan has transgressed and is to be punished severely. *Kratos* and *Bia* simply are symbols of this severe punishment. Nor was the punishment thought to be excessive. I have said ad nauseam that Aeschylus, like Homer, thought that the lesson taught by hearing about severe punishment would deter potential transgressors. The learning theory may have been erroneous but so far as we know the Greeks accepted it as sacred. We know that Aeschylus wrote: "From the gods who sit in grandeur // grace comes somehow violent." (*Aga.* 182-3) We know that these lines touched the root of Aeschylus' religious and moral philosophy. Pinpointing of the context in which grace was used in the *pathei mathos* passage of the *Agamemnon* proved indispensable for understanding the two most difficult roles to understand in all the surviving Aeschylean tragedy. Might and Violence appear, with Hephaestus, at the opening of the *Prometheus Bound.* It was a help to know that they did make their entrance at the very beginning of the play, for the opening of the second and third dramas of a trilogy allowed the playwright to sum the essence of the play and thought of the plays that have gone before.

Violence, who said nothing, was a symbol, not of Zeus, but of the administration of justice characterized by the phrase, "retributive justice." Although I have dealt with the concept of retributive justice at great length, why not remember that the idea was distilled in a choral passage in the second play of the *Oresteia, The Libation Bearers*? The play featured the punishment of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. As one might expect, the Chorus was chanting of the execution of justice. "The spirit of Right // cries out aloud and extracts atonement // due: blood stroke for the stroke of blood // shall be paid. Who acts, shall endure. So speaks // the voice of the age-old wisdom." (*LB.* 310-14) If one were literal in rendering "Who acts, shall endure," the translation might be: For the doer, suffering. Prometheus was the doer of a transgression; Prometheus must suffer. The law of retributive justice, Aeschylus was saying, held for the immortals as it did for the mortals. It was a cosmic law.

There was no need for *Bia* to speak; the Greeks knew that the 'doer' suffered and that "grace comes somehow violent." As for Might, he was the executioner of a judgment, an executioner who, as the Erinyes, set fear in men's hearts. The might that was represented by *Kratos* was nothing more than the idea that Right or Justice always would prevail. Beyond that there was the same idea of cushioning this notion by contrasting pitiless Right with friendly Right. In the *Prometheus Unbound* Zeus would have been described as the incarnation of justice but justice that was man's and gods' best friend. That is, if immortals, as mortals, lived in accordance

with the moral code, the Erinyes were Eumenides; *Kratos* and *Bia* also might metamorphose. There was no terror in law.

Hermes suffered from a like distortion. The messenger of the gods, whom the Odyssey had Zeus' "favorite son" (*Od.* V. 28), would not have been understood by Greeks as shabby a creature. On the contrary, Hermes brought good counsel: obey the will of Zeus, which is the moral code. Had not Homer had Hermes come to the hideaway of the nymph, Calypso who, even as Prometheus, resisted the will (words) of Zeus? Calypso did not wish Odysseus to leave her island as Zeus ordered. Hermes told Calypso to yield, and with good grace: "Show more grace // in your obedience or be chastised by Zeus." (*Od.* V, 146-7) Clearly Homer was underwriting the idea that it was proper for immortals to obey the father of the immortals. Would it be likely that Aeschylus rejected this slice of the great Homeric feast?

Aeschylus has been effectively blinding! How easy it is to identify with Prometheus, who hailed Hermes with a sneer, calling him "Zeus's footman, // this fetch-and-carry messenger ..." (*PB.* 941-42) We can assume that many of the audience would have recalled that Prometheus already had admitted his transgression (*PB.* 266) in answering the Oceanids' question: "Do you not // see how you have erred?" (*PB.* 259-60) Memory of Prometheus' admission made it easier for the audience to listen with understanding to the first words Hermes had when he visited Prometheus at the close of the *Prometheus Bound.*

Hermes' opening speech summarized the charge against Prometheus in a way consistent with the moral philosophy of Aeschylus. Beyond simply stating the charge of transgressing, Aeschylus had Hermes quickly go on to tell Prometheus that the Titan has been guilty of excess, of bitterness, of overstepping the bounds of the responsibilities allotted Prometheus. All this was packed into the charge stated by this messenger whose *timê* and *geras* was officially that of messenger of the immortals. More subtly, the idea of being the official messenger of a mortal or immortal king might have meant that a messenger stated the governing policy.

In the *Prometheus Bound* the message began as an accusation, the charge that must have been the reason for the punishment of Prometheus played out in *Prometheus the Firebringer.* In the *Prometheus Bound* the opening speech of Hermes is simple and strong. "You, subtle-spirit, you // bitterly over-bitter, you that sinned // against the immortals, giving honor to // the creatures of a day, you thief of fire ..." (*PB.* 944-47)

Hermes followed his speech with the final attempt in the *Prometheus Bound* to win the secret of the name of that woman who was to bear Zeus

a child destined to overthrow his father. If Prometheus was not to be thought still sick with anger, Aeschylus would have had the Titan relent. As Achilles would have left his tent and returned to the fight for Troy, Prometheus would have given over his extreme anger. Aeschylus' language is Homeric when Hermes responds to Prometheus' defiant words: "... you are not softened: // your purpose is not dented by my prayers." (*PB.* 1008-9) Presumably Aeschylus would have had Zeus judge that Prometheus had suffered enough in punishment for stealing fire. Giving Zeus the Thetis secret was no more than a way of determining whether Prometheus continued to be ill.

Hermes failed to get the Thetis secret; Prometheus continued to be ill. Prometheus tells the messenger: "You vex me by these senseless adjurations." (*PB.* 1001) In a slightly earlier response to Hermes, Aeschylus had Prometheus cry: "Your speech is pompous sounding, full of pride, // as fits the lackey of the Gods." (*PB.* 953-4) Prometheus now must suffer. Aeschylus had Hermes say to him: "First this rough crag // with thunder and the lightning bolt the Father // shall cleave asunder, and shall hide your body // wrapped in a rocky clasp within its depth; // a tedious length of time you must fulfill // before you see the light again, returning. // Then Zeus's winged hound, the eagle red, // shall tear great shreds of flesh from you, a feaster // coming unbidden, every day; your liver // bloodied to blackness will be his repast." (*PB.* 1017-25)

But for what must Prometheus' sufferings be prolonged? Because the Titan has been obstinate in not turning over to Zeus the Thetis secret? It might have seemed so, but the relevant lines lend themselves to more than that interpretation. Hermes has the lines; Prometheus is being addressed. The Titan has been likened to a colt. A colt is young, immature. "You are far too strong and confident // in your weak cleverness." (*PB.* 1011-12) Hermes speaks those telling words and then goes on with: "For obstinacy // standing alone is the weakest of all things // in one whose mind is not possessed by wisdom." (*PB.* 1012-14) It is not obstinacy as such that is being punished, but obstinacy prompted by ignorance or immaturity rather than by wisdom. The Thetis secret must be understood to be no more than a theatrical, dramatic device. The attainment of *sôphrosynê* was far more to the point. To have bridled at the thought of punishing moral ignorance would have been to misunderstand Aeschylus. Aeschylus was firm in the belief that men learn wisdom through suffering, which would invert to state that ignorant men must suffer before they become wise—if ever they do. That was a tough position, but it was Aeschylus' position. It would be this hard stand that will have to be brought up-to-date if there is to be a Promethean humanism faithful to the original.

THE HIDDEN TRUTH. There is a clue that Hermes' words are to be taken seriously. We recall the injunction given at the close of the *Agamemnon*: "The truth stands ever beside God's throne // eternal: he who has wrought shall pay; that is law." (*Aga.* 1563-64) Prometheus has "wrought" in stealing fire, and his punishment is inevitable in Aeschylean moral philosophy. This inevitability and propriety seem relevant to the gentle version Aeschylus had the Oceanids give the grim warning with which Hermes threatened Prometheus. The daughters of Oceanus plead with Prometheus to take heed, and are as futile as Andromache when she beseeches Hector not to go back into open battle. (*Il.* VI. 406 ff.) The loyalty and friendship of the Oceanids have been assured; they will stay with Prometheus, even sharing his plunge into black Tartarus with which the play ends. Such devotion was honored by the Greeks. It was as though Aeschylus funneled the same ideas both through an unfriendly critic and a set of warm friends. The words of the plea made by the daughters of Oceanus carried the same freight as did the meaning borne by the harsh language of Hermes. Aeschylus insured this comparability by having the Oceanids endorse the thought of Hermes. The chief difference was that the Choreutae urged as friends while the unfriendly Hermes carried a command. Aeschylus may have attempted to etch the equivalence by having the Chorus speak approvingly of the messenger's injunction. "Hermes seems to us // to speak not altogether out of season. // He bids you leave your obstinacy and seek // a wise and good counsel. Hearken to him. Shame // it were for one so wise to fall in error." (*PB.* 1035-39)

Should Prometheus have yielded? It is a tribute to Aeschylus' skill as a playwright that he seems to have succeeded in masking important charges against Prometheus. Unpleasant characters in opposition to the noble, Robin Hood figure of Prometheus have distracted centuries of readers, viewers, and commentators. The pomposity and opportunism clinging about the manner and substance of Oceanus' speech have been as effective in hiding the thought as any smoke screen. The unpleasantness of Hermes has been a successful red herring drawing attention away from the worth of his argument. Violence has been thought as unspeakable as speechless. Might has been described little better than a thug, which was how one critic characterized him. These deceits are tribute to Aeschylean art. Had some critics not been governed by feeling, Might could have been understood as stating a charge that was just. Prometheus did steal; Prometheus must pay a penalty, and he must learn endurance.

Similarly, Oceanus and Hermes are saying something that Aeschylus would have wished to have taken seriously. This was not to deny that

Aeschylus decried harsh, exploitative, demanding rule. But Zeus' rule was none of these, at least not in Aeschylus' opinion. Nor can it be forgotten that the loss of most of Aeschylus' plays has made it easier to remain untouched by notions well concealed in the *Prometheus Bound.* If that be so, Aeschylus succeeded in persuading. His art succeeded in persuasion just as did the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon early in the *Iliad.*

I think this is what has happened. The contemporaries of Aeschylus would have awarded him points for that success, even if Plato, writing more than half a century after Aeschylus died, would have denied it ever proper to congratulate deception and deceiver. In an earlier time than Plato's, men were thought responsible. A responsible man had to be thoughtful, wary. Plato trusted more in censorship.

Consistent with opinion, the *Prometheus Unbound* summed the ideas for which the *Prometheia* made propaganda. In this final play of the trilogy I think the ideas came clear that had been obscured by the seeming opportunism and timidity in the words of Oceanus, by the arrogance of Hermes, or by the cruelty and want of compassion in the caricature of Might.

In brief, of what have Oceanus and Hermes tried to persuade Prometheus and the audience? Oceanus reminded Prometheus, whom he advised "Know yourself" (*PB.* 309), of danger in the overwise mind. (*PB.* 328) In the next line Oceanus described the speech of Prometheus as idle or vain and recalled that the words spoken by a "vain tongue" were punishable. We have been reminded of Agamemnon's impious words formed from his breath by his tongue. We know that Aeschylus would have his audience think that Zeus was very much involved, breath—a species of wind—being part of this representative of righteousness.

Reminding ourselves of this feeling will add force to Grene's rendering of Oceanus' charge (*PB.* 318): "that tongue of yours which talked so high and haughty." Aeschylus had Oceanus attempt to cure Prometheus so that he, uncle of Prometheus, could report to Zeus that the Titan was a changed being. Was it likely that Aeschylus felt otherwise? Would Aeschylus not have shared Oceanus' urging of Prometheus, once freed, "not (to) talk so much?" (*PB.* 327) To respond with "of course" would be easy. In *The Suppliants* Aeschylus repeated his position using King Pelasgus as his mouthpiece. We know that the Greek mode of speech in the early fifth century was to be brief. In this fashion King Pelasgus advised the suppliant maidens that the Argives did not enjoy lengthy speeches. "Argos dislikes long speech." (*Supp.* 272)

Chapter VII

THE DANAID TRILOGY

Introductory Remarks

Part Three has to do with three plays of the first half of Aeschylus' career. We can expect them to be less polished than the later plays, but we will find that their construction fits the same mold as was used for the *Prometheia* or *Oresteia.* All I mean by this is that the rhythm is the same. A great moral transgression highlights the first tragedy. Archaic Greek morality dictated that such transgression invites nemesis, the hatred of the gods. Atê almost always succeeds nemesis. Inevitably the second play is about the punishment of the transgressor. When the trilogy ended the gloom has lifted, but before it is overcome by the sunlight there is a judgment, then a persuasion to reconcile, reconciliation, and, finally, *homonoia* and *harmonia.*

Two of the three plays Part Three[1] discusses were second plays, or so I will argue. The *Suppliants* began the Danaid trilogy and I shall begin with it. My reconstruction of the Danaid trilogy will be more elaborate than the parallel reconstruction of the brace of plays of which I think the *Persians* was one. The other true trilogy is the *Laius,* which has *Seven Against Thebes* as its second play. Although the data we have seems to point to *Laius* as the first play, *Oedipus* as the second, and *Seven Against Thebes* as the third and last, I will argue against that conclusion with some confidence.

I am not really certain about the *Persians.* I cannot be certain either that it stood alone or was the first of two plays or the second of a trilogy. All that I wish to suggest is that it *could* have been a second play; it has all the earmarks of a play about punishment. But that does not preclude adding the element of transgression. My conclusion is that Aeschylus combined what he later elaborated in a first and second play in a single tragedy.

[1] For the *Suppliants, Seven Against Thebes,* and *Persians* I will follow Aeschylus: *Prometheus Bound and Other Plays.* Philip Vellacott (trans.). Penguin Classics 1961. Copyright © Philip Vellacott, 1961. Reprinted here by permission of Penguin Books Ltd.

If I am persuasive, the *Persians* combined a first and second play and was succeeded by a tragedy with the conventional Aeschylean melding of judgment and *harmonia-homonoia*.

I admit that the *Persians* might have stood alone with crime, punishment, judgment and harmony all being parts of one play. Broadhead, who has done such thorough research on the *Persians*, believes that it did stand alone, not bracketed by two plays with legends out of mythology. "Indeed," Broadhead writes on the point, "any connection between an 'historical' play and two based on mythical themes would appear *a priori* very improbable."[2] To Broadhead, the *Persians* "seems to have been a complete unity in itself."[3] While Broadhead does not deny that there might have been a "Europe vs. Asia motif,"[4] that "it might be allowed that the three tragedies represented various phases of the struggle between Europe and Asia ... on the available evidence, we must regard such speculations ... as resting on a very flimsy basis. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the tetralogy was a connected one or not ..."[5] But the placing of a historical play based on real events between two mythological plays may be nothing more than an inconsistency, at worst a bit of clumsiness. If indeed Aeschylus was clumsy, the charge is softened by the fact that this was one of his earliest plays. He had not had much opportunity to practice. But I am unwilling to grant the clumsiness, even though gaucherie seems to me not to be an important flaw for a participant in the birth of drama. Why should it be considered clumsy to put a historical play about the Persian wars between two mythological plays? Nothing was more important to the political or military history of Athens at the time than the invasion of Persia; it would have been strange if Aeschylus had not capitalized on the successful repulse of Xerxes' enormous sea force. And being a moralist, Aeschylus might well have felt that the natural way to capitalize was to show the expedition of Xerxes to be not only an unrighteous act of hybris, but also a repudiation of oracular wisdom. Many Athenians were theists in their belief that the gods actively participated in human affairs. What we call their "mythology" was not fantasy to them. Even Herodotus did not think it at all strange to locate history in a mythological context.

This should not be the sticking point at any rate. Is little or no weight to be given the fact that with no great modification, what I suggest for the

[2] H. D. Broadhead. *The* Persae *of Aeschylus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. lv.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. lx.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. lvi.

trilogy formula can be applied to the *Persians*? I will gloss over the *Phineus* or *Glaucus* tragedies which some scholars couple with the *Persians* in making up a trilogy. The didascalic records are not always sufficiently reliable. It is the logic of flow which dictated my decision to think that the *Persians* did not stand alone. And if I am wrong, the exercise of applying a modified trilogy formula may still not be wasted; it does yield a little more insight into the moral philosophy of Aeschylus.

The tragedies which have survived from Aeschylus' writing span no more than fourteen years of production. This assumes that the *Persians* was shown in 472 B.C. and the *Prometheia* was the last of the tragedies being produced between 458 and Aeschylus' death in 456/5 B.C. In my opinion, that would have been too brief a period to allow critics to find a "new art form" in the *Suppliants* tetralogy, the *Oresteia*, and the *Prometheus*, which Herington grouped as tragedies of "the last phase."[6] This is not to deny that Aeschylus used one more actor in his last tragedies than he had in the earlier ones, nor that the playwright's use of language altered. All I would argue is that the religious-moral assumptions in the *Oresteia* and the *Prometheus Bound* were not essentially different from those found in the *Persians* (472 B.C.) or in the *Seven Against Thebes*,[7] which I would date 463 B.C. I have stated what I think were Aeschylus' basic moral assumptions. I have illustrated these assumptions with the *Oresteia* and *Prometheus Bound*. I will repeat the exercise with the *Persians*, the *Seven*, and the *Suppliants*.

The special relevance of the *Suppliants* lies in the date of its production. Dating the production of the *Suppliants*-tetralogy, as Herington refers to it,[8] or the Danaid trilogy, another favorite title, from 463 B.C., the *Suppliants* came about midway in the tragedies we have from those produced by Aeschylus. We cannot say that this represents the full period of the playwright's production. But we can say that it fell at the midpoint of the dramas left us and therefore to be compared with the earliest surviving tragedy, the *Persians*, or such late tragedies as the *Oresteia*. The chances are good that any tragedies Aeschylus may have produced earlier than the *Persians* would not have departed substantially from its moral lessons or its format. Which is not to say that either the earliest tragedies or the *Oresteia* and

[6] The specific dating Herington assigned production was between 466-463 B.C. for the *Suppliants*, the Spring of 458 B.C. for the *Oresteia*, and the *Prometheia* between 458 and Aeschylus' death in 456/5 B.C. I will be more specifically guided by Garvie's dating of the *Suppliants*.

[7] Hereafter the *Seven Against Thebes* will be referred to as the *Seven*.

[8] Herington. "Last," p. 386.

Prometheia needed to have been about the narrow range of events; the topics varied, some were rooted in recorded events, others in mythology. But there was a basic similarity inasmuch as Aeschylus adopted the moral code that had become familiar throughout Hellas and the Greek colonies. Athens was no exception.

The Suppliants

Dramatis Personae

Danaus, King who is a descendant of Zeus and Io
First Chorus of the fifty daughters of Danaus
Herald of the fifty Aegyptii
Pelasgus, King of Argos
Second Chorus of Maids attending the Danaids
Soldiers and others

The Chorus of Danaus' daughters explains that they have fled Egypt to escape "impious" marriage with their cousins, the sons of Aegyptus. The father, Danaus, who accompanies them, was author of the plan to seek refuge in Argos, home of their ancestress Io. The girls appeal as suppliants for protection. If the gods above will not heed, they will seek the gods below; they threaten to commit suicide. As a force of the Aegyptii approaches, the Danaids take refuge at altars of the gods, whom the people of Argos hope will protect their city. At this sanctuary the suppliants explain to King Pelasgus of Argos that they are of Argive descent, in spite of their non-Greek appearance. The king of Argos, Pelasgus, respects the Danaids as suppliants, but, as he knows to his anguish, to protect them will imperil his state. The King has a terrifying choice to make. Pelasgus chooses the risk of war and leaves the sacred grove to persuade the citizens of Argos to protect the suppliants. He succeeds. Followers of the sons of Aegyptus arrive, led by a herald. They propose to drag the suppliants away, but are stopped by the arrival of Pelasgus and the Argive forces. Threatening war, the attackers depart. As Danaus begins to conduct his daughters to the shelter prepared for them by the Argive people, the girls sing praises of the rescuing land. Their handmaidens, who now become a separate chorus, counsel respect for Aphrodite, and warn that Zeus may not grant all their desires.

THE DANAID STORY. There no longer is reasonable doubt that the *Suppliants*

belongs to a trilogy, the other two tragedies of which were the *Aegyptii*[9] and *Danaides*.[10] The trilogy as a whole may have been known by the name of its final play.[11] As was customary, the trilogy was followed by a satyr-play, *Amymone*. Details of the trilogy's story are many[12] and varied but there are four points on which all agree: the first is that the trilogy involves two brothers, Danaus and Aegyptus, descendants of Io, the former with fifty daughters, the latter with fifty sons. The second is that Danaus and Aegyptus quarrel. There also is agreement that the Aegyptii marry the Danaids, who kill them on their wedding night. The stories say that Danaus commanded this. The fourth point that is common has it that one of the Danaids, Hypermestra, spared her husband, Lynceus. Beyond this consensus there has been disagreement. If Aeschylus felt constrained to follow guidelines, there were only these four points of general agreement. But we know from the other extant plays that Aeschylus felt free in his adaptation of stories and myth. On the other hand the dramatist knew that the more well-known elements that he could weave into a trilogy the greater was the likelihood of his winning a prize. Now Aeschylus lived from his playwriting, but he also was a teacher of moral lessons. That meant that Aeschylus had to select and dress up facets of a familiar story in the way he calculated to help make his moral point(s). This would suggest that Aeschylus did not feel constrained to follow someone else's story but freely adapted the more familiar elements of all the legends. Aeschylus omitted even some well-known parts of the Danaid story. In the *Suppliants*, for example, there is no mention of Danaus and Pelasgus quarreling.[13]

[9] With proper caution Garvie is unwilling to go further than saying that naming the second play of the trilogy *Aegyptii* cannot be "banished altogether." But, as Garvie proceeds to show, objections have not held water. (Garvie. *Aeschylus*' Supplices, p. 188 ff.)

[10] To quote Garvie: "... its place in the Danaid trilogy has now been confirmed by Ox. Pap. 2256 No. 3." (*Ibid.*, p. 186.).

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] "The details of the story are given by ps.-Apollodorus ii. I. 4 ff.; Hyginus, *Fab.* 168 and 170; Pausanias ii. 15. 5; 16.1; 19.3 ff.; 20.7; 21.1; 24.2; 25.4; 37.1; and 2; 38.2 and 4; iii. 12.2; vii. 21.13; x. 10.5: by the scholiast at Homer, *Iliad A* 42 (quoting genuine Apollodorus) and Δ171: by Euripides, *Orestes* 871-3, and frs. 228 and 846 N^2; and the scholiast at Aeschylus, *P.V.* 853, Euripides, *Hecuba* 886, *Orestes* 857, 871, and 932: by Pindar and the scholia at Nemeans x. 6 (10) and Pythians ix. 112 (195) ff.: by Ovid., *Heroides* xiv and Horace, *Odes* iii. 11: by the scholiast at Statius, *Theb.* ii. 222 and vi. 269: and by Servius on *Aeneid* x. 497. In addition there are scattered references to other authors." (*Ibid.*, p. 163 ff.)

[13] There were a number of references to this quarrel in the literature. For some the reader is referred to: Garvie. *Aeschylus*' Supplices, p. 164 ff.; Emily A. Wolff. "The Date

DATING THE TRILOGY. I must take seriously several question marks in the Danaid trilogy, such difficult problems as the membership of the Choruses in the *Aegyptii* and *Danaides*, the reason for Hypermestra sparing the life of Lynceus, the consequences of the decision, and the judgment of the third play. But the speculation on each of these problems is of lesser moment than the dating of the trilogy: Do the 490's fit better than the 460's? Why or why not? What criteria should be used? I shall opt for the 460's and first use political events as criterion, then follow with literary references to style and structure.

A date for the *Suppliants* in the 460's is more likely than in the 490's, but I will gamble on a more exact date, 463 B.C. during the archonship of Archedemides. I base this decision on the deduction of Garvie as set out in the opening chapter of his excellent study, *Aeschylus'* Supplices: *Play and Trilogy*. A dating during the 490's had been the customary scholarly opinion until the discovery in the Egyptian town of Oxyrhynchus of a papyrus fragment. (*Oxyp.* XX (1952) 2256, fr. 3) (The fragment is given and interpreted by Garvie on p. 5 ff.) The fragment, one of 89 certainly from plays of Aeschylus, was a didascalia of seven lines telling of Aeschylus' triumph over Sophocles with four plays, the two last being the *Danaides* and *Amymone*. Since the date of 467 B.C. is firm for the *Seven Against Thebes*, 466 is the first date when the Danaid trilogy could have been played. But if the restoration of the name Archedemides is correct—and I think Garvie's acceptance valid—a production date of 463 for the first playing of the Danaid trilogy is most probable.

While I agree with Garvie that dating events of the 460's is most difficult,[14] there seems to be sufficient knowledge of Cimon's expedition to assist Sparta in the helot uprising in Ithome during 462. Cimon was dismissed by the Athenians and this must have been the reason for the breach between Athens and Sparta. If the *Suppliants* was played at the City Dionysia of 463, these events had not yet taken place but there was an anti-Spartan group, those with whom Ephialtes was associated. Ephialtes and his followers were opposed to Cimon. The strong endorsement given the Aeropagus in the *Eumenides* should give pause to anyone who sees Aeschylus unqualifiedly a supporter of Ephialtes and the democrats. While Aeschylus' desire for *homonoia* and reconciliation hardly would make it likely that the playwright was a partisan of the Democrat party, it is safe enough to think of

of Aeschylus' Danaid Tetralogy." *Eranos*, 56 (1958), Nos. 3-4, pp. 119-139; 57 (1959), Nos. 1-2, pp. 6-34.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 145 ff.

Aeschylus as sympathetic with the Democrats, especially with a pro-Argos position in the sixties. Assuming that Aeschylus did have his reservations, it makes more sense to think him a friend of pro-Argos policy than pro-Spartan. Although I cannot document a case for Athens being able to dominate Argos but not Sparta, such an Athenian patriot as Aeschylus would have wished for just that. How much the Argive subjugation of Mycenae and Tiryns was seen by Aeschylus as a threat to Athenians' trade or naval strength we do not know but it is certain that Sparta both refused the Athenian Cimon's aid in the uprising of the helots in Ithome during 462 and the secret pledge of Sparta to hold Thasos in her revolt against Athens, a pledge that would have been honored except for an earthquake in 464. All this increases the probability that Aeschylus—whether or not a member of Ephialtes' political party—was more inclined toward an alliance with Argos than an alliance with Sparta favored by Cimon and the Aristocrat party. By the time the *Eumenides* was played, Aeschylus definitely favored the Argive alliance.

This argues for dating the *Suppliants* during the 460's and not acceding to Diamantopoulos'[15] insistence that the play be thought to have been written in the 490's. Rejection of Diamantopoulos' claim of the earlier date of authorship would not entail the idea that Aeschylus was out of sympathy with Argos in the nineties. It is only that we do not know enough about the political situation at the turn of the century.[16] Among what we do know is the nature and degree of political ties between Athens and Argos in the 490's, a point Diamantopoulos grants, as Garvie has observed.[17]

We have no information about the clarity with which Persian intentions were guessed by Athenians. Without that knowledge there are two indispensable pieces of information which we lack. Hipparchus was elected Archon in 496/5. Does this indicate that there was more support among Athenian voters for a pro-Sparta policy? What of the fact that it was likely that the resentment of Spartan interferences (by Cleomenes) about a decade earlier might not have been forgotten or forgiven? On the other hand, how strong did the political tide run in favor of a pro-Argos policy in the 490's? The one fact we have tells nothing. The fact is that twenty ships were sent by Athens to help the Ionians when they revolted against Persia; but the ships were withdrawn. It would appear that those in Athens who took the anti-

[15] A. Diamantopoulos. "The Danaid Tetralogy of Aeschylus." *JHS*, 77 (Part 2) (1957), pp. 220-229.

[16] There are excellent bibliographical entries on the subject in Garvie, *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 147, fn. 2.

[17] Diamantopoulos. "The Danaid," p. 226; Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 147.

Persian political line were uncertain on the most effective course to pursue. Were Themistocles anti-Persian, would the Democratic Party have urged alliance with Argos or with Sparta?[18] It is obvious that in the battle of Sepeia (494 B.C.) Sparta would have been the more effective ally against Persia, *if* the fear of Persia were the main element in the Athenian political situation. While I cannot cope with this if, in a definite way, it is likely that Persian imperial ambitions did appear increasingly menacing. In the sixth book of Herodotus we read in 491 Athens appealed to Sparta in heading off Persian influence in Aegina. And we know from Herodotus' account of the Persians' campaigns that Athens and Sparta were partners in resisting Persia. Since the dating of the *Suppliants* is the only thing of concern to me at the moment, I go along with Garvie's conclusion: "It would be hard to find a time less suitable for the production of a play advocating an alliance with Argos."[19]

Unfortunately Garvie did not separate the issue of dating the *Suppliants* from another point made by Diamantopoulos. The *Danaides* showed a sympathy for Argos, but that need not have led Aeschylus to unrealistically championing a military alliance with militarily impotent Argos. Balancing that mistake Diamantopoulos correctly saw in the *Suppliants* Aeschylus' adroit association of Argos with the first appearance of the demos. Everyone has agreed that the Greeks argued that what they favored was approved as patriotic in the good old days. The *Eumenides* was to do this for the Areopagus; the *Suppliants* honored Argos as cradle for the demos. Anyone in Athens from Argos and seeing the *Suppliants* would have been pleased with this. (I do not believe that it was Aeschylus' intention to appear anti-Sparta by implying, as Diamantopoulos maintains, that the *Suppliants* implied the Argive royal line to be of older vintage than that of Sparta. There is nothing in the *Suppliants* which makes this deduction likely.) The trump card Aeschylus could play was flattering Argos while placing Athens in a more leading position. Our clue to how Aeschylus realized this end is the *Eumenides*. The spokesman of Zeus in that play is Athena, who I think is in a slightly different role in the *Danaides*.[20] One story has

[18] Reference to bibliography bearing on Sepeia and the possibility of Athenian and Spartan *rapprochement* before Marathon is available in Garvie, *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 148, fns. 1 and 2.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 148 ff.

[20] The appearance of Athena in the *Danaides* need not have entailed an alliance of Argos with Athens, as explicitly called for in the *Eumenides*. As Garvie says (*Ibid.*, p. 144), no one who has read the *Seven Against Thebes* thought that the play was any proof of special friendship between Athens and Thebes, in 467 B.C.

it that Zeus sent Athena (and Hermes) to Argos with instructions to cleanse the 49 Danaids from pollution. I think that Aeschylus adapted that story, had Athena cast in a role which can be described as the persuasive spokesman of Zeus, *amica curiae*, the same as being chief adjudicator. We see the demos of Argos playing that role in the *Danaides*.

We need not go along with Diamantopoulos' thought that Aeschylus also wished his audience to think Argos senior to Sparta and therefore more to be regarded. To follow Diamantopoulos along that line would lead back to understanding the *Suppliants* as primarily political sloganeering which I, like Garvie, think it was not. Not even the defeat of the vast Persian force would have excused considerable patriotism assuming that Aeschylus did propagandize. Although writing of the *Persians* and not the *Suppliants*, Garvie, in a single, blunt sentence said: "The *Persae* is not a political slogan."[21] Neither was the *Suppliants* political propaganda. Again and again I wish to identify Aeschylus as a dramatist whose lessons were moral—not political.

The demos allows Aeschylus to place responsibility for moral city-state policy squarely on all those who made up the demos. This was not a political maneuver that shows favor for the democratic party. It was a moral maneuver, if that term is not out of place. Aeschylus could have assumed that the Democratic party (despite the election of Hipparchus, which showed the faction of the tyrants still commanding a strong following) was the party of the future, the party to which to be allied. I do not believe that this was the way Aeschylus thought. However someone interested in getting people to live by a moral code might have thought that the rank and file who made up the Democratic faction was more in need of moral instruction than those who had had the Homeric moral lessons drilled into them, and the Aristocrats had had that moral drill.

DATING THE SUPPLIANTS ON THE BASIS OF STYLE. Settling on a date in which the *Suppliants* might have been first produced involves style and structure. Was the *Suppliants* stylistically similar to an early play of Aeschylus, perhaps the earliest, or was it more like the tragedies of his later years, plays that bore the traces of a more practiced craftsman? Earp's classic study[22] is the major one to be considered, and Garvie's responses seem to be conclusive. Earp favors dating the *Suppliants* in the 490's; Garvie thought that the Danaid trilogy was produced in the 460's. Earp's challenge was to more

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 147, fn. 1.

[22] F. R. Earp. *The Style of Aeschylus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

than details of interpretation, for he thought scientific study of style and structure for the purpose of describing technical dramatic development was threatened. "Scholars," he admonished, "Have hitherto regarded the *Supplices* as the earliest extant play of Aeschylus; if we now consent to put it late it makes all attempts to study literature futile."[23] Fortunately for literary study, Garvie has been as thorough and rigorous as one could wish.

The dated plays cover a period of 14 years with three fixed points for secure dates: 472 for the *Persians*, 467 for the *Seven Against Thebes*, and 458 for the three plays of *Oresteia*.[24] This chronological sequence, Garvie hastened to assure his readers, cannot be assumed to suggest the steady development of a dramatist's style. How reasonable is Garvie's observation that a man can return to a technique he used earlier or to a feature of his earlier style? There is bound to be irregularity rather than a logical progression of style and structure following along with the chronological sequence of production. After all, the dramatic requirements of a play may suggest that this or that technique, some developed quite early in the playwright's career are appropriate. Finally, Garvie writes of the 'straight-line' theory. The 'straight-line' theory would be acceptable for Aeschylus only if we had a large number of his plays, written in all periods of his life, and even then a completely consistent development would be surprising.[25]

One straightforward means of determining how a play compares with others, and whether a straight-line seems to characterize the use of technique, is to compare versification among a dramatist's productions. The iambic trimeter of Aeschylus is an example of such versification. Was iambic trimeter more or less used in the *Suppliants* as over against plays whose dates we know?[26] Taking into account proper names, Garvie found that the *Persians*, an 'early' play, had 429 trimeters and 47 resolved feet.[27] The *Eumenides*, a 'late' play, had 640 iambic trimeters, 32 resolved feet for a percentage of 5.0 % as over against a percentage of 11.0 for the *Persians*. The figures for the *Suppliants* were 475; 40 and 8.4 %. It would seem that the *Suppliants* lay further along in the direction of development "from freedom to restraint."[28]

[23] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 29.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 32 ff.

[27] A Dactyl in the third foot is a favorite form of resolution for Aeschylus. If a decrease in the use of iambic trimeter and resolved feet is an index to a later play, the *Prometheus Bound* is a later play with the figures of 773, 37 and 4.8%.

[28] Garvie's research shows "A steadily increasing restraint in the use of resolved

Statistics dealing with the proportion of spondaic to pure iambic feet are even more revealing.[29] Whereas the *Seven Against Thebes* has the lowest percentage, 5.1 %, the *Suppliants* has 5.9 % and the *Eumenides* 10.2 %. Shifting to enjambement, we find that the *Suppliants* has a percentage of 8.52 % whereas the *Prometheus Bound* has 9.67 % and the *Eumenides* 4.89 %. One can only conclude that there was no straight-line of development. "The general conclusion from this is that Aeschylus' treatment of the iambic trimeter is largely stichic."[30]

One can become lost in statistics and forget that we are measuring versification of a dramatist. I think that because Aeschylus was a dramatist, dramatic differences between plays were served by differences in style.[31] Verse in the *Suppliants* need not be handled in the same way as in the *Agamemnon*. What in the *Suppliants* would be a complete strophe would, in the *Agamemnon* be "a mere period, a single element in a much larger composition."[32]

To narrow the focus to a single character, Aeschylus will be sparing and straightforward in his speech or will be grandiloquent, even bombastic if the characterization of subject matter calls for it.[33] The usage will not be a function of the play's place in Aeschylus' career.

The straight-line theory holds no better for structure than it does for style. Again, as with style varying with dramatic demand, such a structural element as the large or small place given the Chorus in a tragedy would depend on the dramatic need. Assigning the *Suppliants* too early in Aeschylus' career on the basis of finding the Chorus more important than the actor is useless. The Chorus dominated in the *Suppliants* because the suppliant

feet" (*Ibid.*, p. 33.) with the *Suppliants* more restrained than either the *Persians* or the *Seven*. Garvie did not find that the *Suppliants* lacked a variety of versification, which might have been true of an early play by an unpracticed dramatist. (34 ff.) Garvie has counted the resolutions and finds that "the next highest percentage is displayed by the *Septem* not the *Persae*, while the difference between *Supplices* and *Septem* is not much greater than that between *Choephori* and *Agamemnon*, and much less than that between *Septem* and *Persae*." (35)

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 35 ff.

[30] All seven plays with their percentages of trimeters used for enjambement are *Prometheus Bound* 9.7% ;*Suppliants*, 8.52%; *Persians*, 7.69%; *Agamemnon*, 7.31%; *Libation Bearers*, 6.58%; *Eumenides*, 4.89%; *Seven Against* Thebes, 4.60%. (*Ibid.*, p. 37.)

[31] In Garvie's words: "The long, reflective odes of the *Agamemnon* serve a very different purpose from those of the *Supplices* in which the Chorus is itself the Protagonist, and it is only natural that they should differ also in compass." (*Ibid.*, p. 45.)

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 44 ff.

[33] Garvie treats the subject well and extensively. (*Ibid.*, p. 57 ff.)

maidens were the Chorus.[34] Surely the Chorus of the *Eumenides*, definitely a late play, cannot be said to have a small part by comparison with the actors Orestes, Apollo, and Athena. In the *Eumenides* the leader of the Chorus was a Fury, an actor in the same sense of dramatic usage as the Danaid choral leader in the *Suppliants*.

THEME. The difficulty of dating the Danaid trilogy is not matched in establishing a major theme for the three tragedies. The theme of the trilogy can be given in a true but overly simple fashion as the "resistance and submission of woman to the 'fate of marriage.' "[35] Indeed marriage looms as *the* institution about which the Danaid trilogy appears to have been written. Certainly the Danaids, with the eventual exception of Hypermestra, suffer from the disease *phyxanoria*,[36] hatred of men. Doubtless they were cured of the disease and reconciled to the idea of marriage. We can go further and say that the cure of *phyxanoria* was the major healing of the trilogy, its great act of *harmonia*. But *harmonia* is not quite the same as *homonoia*. If the Danaids suffered from the disease of *phyxanoria*, the disease could be cured without their having such a change of mind and heart that one could say *homonoia* existed between the Danaids and the married state. Given the pattern Aeschylus seems to have thought in, this *homonoia* would have to be won by persuasion.

It does not strain the imagination to suppose that the chief representation of *homonoia* in the *Danaides* was the persuasion of the Danaids to accept, even desire husbands.[37] This insight into Aeschylus' concern for marriage is not enough. It is not sufficiently fundamental. We have stopped with an institution when we should have gone on to think of an institution that includes marriage—the family. From what is known of the importance of the family for the Greeks, I should have guessed that the Danaid trilogy looked at the family first of all and then at marriage.

But not even the family is the all-in-all of the trilogy. As a moralist Aeschylus had something to say about such abstractions as hybris, supplication, hospitality and cosmic *harmonia* and *homonoia*. If these grand abstrac-

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[35] Diamantopoulos. "The Danaid," p. 222. The centrality of women accepting the idea of marriage is also acknowledged by that most able commentator on the *Suppliants*, Winnington-Ingram. (R. P. Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy of Aeschylus." *JHS*, 81 (1961), p. 134 and fn. 14.)

[36] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 221.

[37] I think that Winnington-Ingram is quite right for attending to persuasion in the *Danaides*. (Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 151 ff.)

tions were at one end of the pole, concrete issues were at the other. Most of them clustered under the heading of family matters, such as the role of the father in safeguarding maidenly virginity, the appropriate time for turning over a father's protection to the husband and the function of consent in marriage.

We should not be surprised to find consent in marriage attracting the attention of Aeschylus. After all consent was part and parcel of the whole idea of freedom. Persuasion in the form of courtship,[38] marriage based on love, the approval of the parent—in this instance perhaps only of the bride—were outcroppings of the favorite Greek condition, freedom. In light of this, Diamantopoulos substituted the term "acceptance" for "submission" when he discussed the fate of marriage.[39] The point may seem small, but unless one takes it seriously it is possible to think Aeschylus intended that freedom of will for making decisions should apply only to men.

THE FIRST PLAY : THE SUPPLIANTS. Having laid out the bare bones of what I think was thematic in the Danaid trilogy let us turn to the only play we have, the *Suppliants*. The action was played : "*Near the coast of the Peloponnese : a meadow with a grassy mound on which stand a number of altars and images of gods, including Zeus, Apollo, Poseidon, and Hermes. In the distant background the walls and towers of Argos can be seen. The daughters of Danaus are grouped near the images.*" [40]

The Danaids are the Chorus of the *Suppliants*. We do not know who made up the choruses of the second and third plays, but in this play the Danaids chant of "our hope of escape from lust of men, // From abhorred and impious union with Aegyptus' sons." (*Suppl.* 9-10) King Danaus came with his fifty daughters, but it was the girls who asked for sanctuary in the face of "the male pride of the violent sons of Aegyptus." (*Suppl.* 30)

Aeschylus was busy with assuring the audience that what might be thought a normal desire was a "perverse desire" (*Suppl.* 106) held by young men whose resolve was "crazed." The suppliants call on Zeus : "... let Zeus look on human arrogance, and mark // How lusting for our flesh makes an old stock grow young, // Bloom with perverse desire, // While crazed resolve goads without respite, // And mischief pursuing illusion is pursued by pain." (*Suppl.* 104-8)[41]

[38] The author is indebted to Winnington-Ingram for calling attention to courtship as a form of persuasion. (*Ibid.*, p. 151.)

[39] A. Diamantopoulos. "The Danaid," p. 222.

[40] Aeschylus. *Prometheus Bound.* Philip Vellacott (trans.), p. 54.

[41] The lining is uncertain.

The long choral chant that opened the *Suppliants* approaches its close with the girls telling that they would hang themselves if they are not received as suppliants. This introductory passage is a supplication of immortals, what followed is the supplication of mortals. No other tragedy Aeschylus left us has so clear an instance of the same moral law (in this instance that of receiving the petition of the suppliant) being binding on immortals as well as on mortals. In passing I would add the remark that Aeschylus included along with the line, "we will hang and die by the noose" (*Suppl.* 160), a neat way of suggesting that any refusal of Olympians to obey Zeus' law of hearing the suppliant would drive the suppliant to supplication of the nether Zeus, Hades: "To Zeus of the lower earth, lord of the dead, // Who welcomes guests without number, // We will come with our suppliant branches:// For we will hang and die by the noose, // If the gods of Olympus refuse to hear us." (*Suppl.* 156-61) I cannot think of another set of lines in a play of Aeschylus which so clearly yokes mortals and immortals with the same moral code. With this aside I will return to a précis of the play.

King Danaus enters from the shore and instructs his daughters to petition the gods, whose statues show them chosen patrons of Argos, and the Argives. The Argive king, Pelasgus, has come on stage and the Chorus of Danaids address him as suppliants. In a sense the dialogue between the suppliant maidens and King Pelasgus is an *agôn logôn*, in which the maidens attempt the persuasion of the King.

The Danaids first introduce themselves as descendants of Io's son by Zeus, Epaphos. This subtle linkage with Zeus is intended to reinforce two of Zeus's laws, that of hearing the suppliant combined with another granting hospitality to the stranger. The maidens continue by telling King Pelasgus that they have come to Argos, "bound to us by ancient ties of blood"—another reason for the King to receive them—"driven by loathing of unholy rape in Egypt." (*Suppl.* 330-1)

The response of King Pelasgus centers on a war that would result from his protecting the girls and taking their part against the sons of Aegyptus. A good deal has been made of the notion that Aeschylus showed his favor of democracy over rule by a single man in rejecting the idea that Pelasgus could act as a single righteous man rather than taking the *agôn logôn* on himself as a persuasive appealing to the people of Argos, the assembled demos of Argos. "It is not *my* house at whose hearth you sit, and if // The Argive State stands liable to guilt herein, // The people of Argos must together work its cure. // Therefore I'll undertake no pledge till I have shared // This issue in full council with my citizens." (*Suppl.* 365-69) This was little more than a play on words. The Greeks did believe that a king and 'his

people' were members of a type of family. I am not prepared to say more of this; I wish only to emphasize the familial quality of Argos, with Pelasgus a kind father of his people. It was this same paternalism that led to Zeus being called the "father of gods and men."

Golden has written an interesting variation on the standard commentary, which has the lines reveal a preference for Athenian democracy over tyranny. Golden has incorporated that idea along with another, the contrast of the rule of law with irresponsible tyranny. What Golden actually writes is: "The action of the Argive king in consulting his people, symbolic of democratic action such as Athens boasted, is sharply contrasted with the brute physical violence of the Egyptians. Thus there is a tension in this play between the rule of law, deriving one sanction from the will of the people and a higher one from an appeal to religious and moral considerations, and the arrogant and defiant assertion of personal will and desire as the crowning principle of human action."[42]

I accept one portion of Golden's argument, but I reject another. Because my case rests on the decision of King Pelasgus being crucial in Aeschylus' opinion, I will defer the matter for fear that it would too seriously interfere with reciting the essence of the story. The latter can be done with dispatch, if I bypass the decision of King Pelasgus by simply saying that the King yields to a cluster of arguments. The 'straw that broke the camel's back' was the threat of the Danaids to hang themselves. Aeschylus has shown King Pelasgus to be sensitive to the moral code—and to accept it. The king cannot bear the extreme pollution that would result from the girls hanging themselves with their waistbands on the statues of the immortals.

Accepting the role of championing the Danaid cause, the two Kings go off to Argos, Pelasgus to plead for the girls, Danaus to observe and report the news to his daughters. "The Argives have decided—and without dispute, // With one clear voice that made my old heart young again; // Why, the air was thick with the right hands of the whole city— // And this was their decision: we are to live in Argos // As free, inviolate guest, promised security // From mortal malice. Neither Argive nor foreigner // Can touch us. Should our enemies use force, the man // Who being a citizen, does not come to our help // Will suffer loss of civic rights and banishment. // So eloquently King Pelasgus spoke for us, // Warning his people thus: 'Do not in future time // Feed full the vengeance of the god of suppliants. // Here is a two-fold claim, of guests and citizens; // If we reject them, there will rise to threaten us // Two-fold pollution, like a fiend insatiable // Gorg-

[42] Golden. *In Praise of Prometheus*, p. 43.

ing on ruin.' At this, impatient of delay, // The Argives raised their hands and voted as I have said. // The king used every subtle and persuasive turn // Of the orator's art: Zeus brought the issue to success." (*Suppl.* 605-24)

The hymn of *homonoia* follows, and then the ship arrives bearing the lustful sons of Aegyptus. In the confrontation of "the Egyptian herald," accompanied by armed men, with the Danaids and King Pelasgus, Pelasgus defies the Egyptians, who withdraw to prepare their assault.

The maids of the daughters of Danaus gather on the stage preparatory for moving off with the Danaids. The handmaidens of the suppliants are left on stage with their mistresses, the handmaidens chanting: "... Aphrodite in our ritual song // Is honoured, not forgotten ... The purpose of Zeus // Is a strong frontier which none can overstep. // This marriage might well achieve its end // In happiness greater than women have yet known." (*Suppl.* 1034-5, 1049-52)

The play ends with the maids urging the maidens not to take an uncompromising stand on marriage—"towards the gods—never be uncompromising." (*Suppl.* 1062) The suppliant maidens end the drama compromising at last, asking only that they be saved "from cruel subjection to a man I hate." At last the audience sees that the "women's cause" asks only that a daughter be spared forcible marriage to someone she hates though she is willing to marry someone she does not positively love. The final lines of the *Suppliants* ask only that. Calling on Zeus, the Danaids pray: "May he grant victory to the women's cause: // I accept the better part of evil; // Content, if the good outweighs the bad, // If through my prayers means of deliverance be found, // And judgement side with justice // By the will of Heaven." (*Suppl.* 1067-73)

At the play's end Aeschylus hinted that the Danaids indeed would marry the Aegyptii. We remember the choral chant of the *Agamemnon*, "... sing sorrow, sorrow: but good win out in the end." *Pathei mathos* was grim. As a dramatist with a whole trilogy in which to teach his lesson, Aeschylus intended to sustain suspense for both his second and third play. There was no better way to do this, believing as he did in the Zeus religion, than to have the servant maids talk about the inscrutability of Zeus. The latter was a dramatic tour de force—not, as one scholar thought,[43] a theological commentary. Although Fraenkel's thesis on the inscrutability of Zeus, a variant of that Christian doctrine of the inscrutability of divine will does not apply to the *Agamemnon*, it fits the lines at the close of the *Suppliants*

[43] Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Eduard Fraenkel (ed.). Vol. II, pp. 112-4.

in which the servant girls answered their mistresses' despairing question on why the sons of Aegyptus had such fair wind in their pursuit—their cause being unjust. "What will be, will be. The purpose of Zeus // Is a strong frontier which none can overstep." (*Suppl.* 1049-50) It was the effort of dramatic suspense that looked forward to, and beyond, the killing of the Aegyptii, who had succeeded in making themselves the husbands of the Danaids. That was back of the concluding lines in the cryptic chant of the maids: "This marriage might well achieve its end // In happiness greater than women have yet known." (*Suppl.* 1051-2)

THE CRUCIAL DECISION. The story of the *Suppliants* now is before us. I have deferred the crucial episode of the play, which is a decision. This decision, the only one in the extant plays where the decision was themis, is the hinge on which the action turns. The decision of Pelasgus was to advocate to the demos of Argos that a favorable hearing be given the supplication of the maidens. The moral code symbolized by Zeus *Hikesios* is satisfied. It is because of this continuous coupling of Zeus with the morally good that Lattimore is sound when writing of King Pelasgus as "Zeus' representative on earth."[44] Pelasgus did the righteous thing in offering sanctuary to the suppliant maidens. In doing that god-fearing thing Pelasgus indeed is the mortal representative of Zeus *Hikesios*; this was a way of saying that Pelasgus behaved as men ought to behave.

This course of interpretation has led me to agree with Lattimore's conclusion that "The decisive turn of the action, that is, the acceptance of the Danaids by Argos, comes on the heels of their (the suppliants) highest exaltation of Zeus (595-99) ..."[45] Although I accept Lattimore's conclusion, I do not accept the idea that the maidens were asking for an "absolute oriental monarch."[46] It is more likely that the acceptance of the suppliants was a sign that king and people had been persuaded to do what was right to do. In that sense only Zeus prevailed. Zeus, embodying righteousness, was like a triumphant wrestler.

In stressing the strength of the moral code dramatically represented by the strength of Zeus I have missed an opportunity to emphasize something in which Aeschylus believed. It is not only in the *Eumenides* that Aeschylus attested to the restraining force of fear. When King Pelasgus finally gives in to the suppliant maidens, choosing what is righteous to do, Aeschylus

[44] Lattimore. *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy*, p. 19.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

has him say that, although the election of the righteous way may mean war, his fear of moral wrongdoing outweighs his fear of war. King Pelasgus weighs the possible war and pollution against hospitality extended the suppliant. The King is persuaded to choose righteously: "... Zeus protects the suppliant, and I must fear // His anger, which of all things most is to be feared." (*Suppl.* 478-9)

This fear of doing the morally wrong, and the promise that doing what is morally right would win out in the end, Aeschylus hoped to be powerfully persuasive. But, as a playwright, Aeschylus was far too successful to have put the matter so blandly. In the *Suppliants* the scales are richly heaped in favor of the righteousness of the suppliant claims. On the one hand the Danaids claimed kinship with the Argives. "Is there a story told that here in Argos once // Io was the keeper of the keys of Hera's temples?" (*Suppl.* 291-2) The answer of Pelasgus was "yes." Aeschylus took pains to have the Danaids time after time claim relationship with Zeus through descent from Io.

On both pans of the balance was the admission of the girls that their claim not to be forced into marriage was not based on law but on the fact of their hate of being tyrannized. "What girl would buy a master of her own family?" (*Suppl.* 336) Evidently Aeschylus felt that this loathing rather than loving was more ignorant than the legal rights of the Aegyptii. Only the fear of war was on the other pan as a weight to balance the claims of righteousness. Righteousness won out.

The story-line of the *Suppliants* was in keeping with the moral lesson Aeschylus wished to teach. The lesson could be put as a question: was it proper to give shelter and protection to the suppliant daughters of Danaus when so doing would deny the desire of the sons of Aegyptus who were prepared to make war on Argos to win the maidens as wives. The familiar scales weighing righteousness would have been loaded with arguments of the girls. King Pelasgus had to make the crucial decision of whether to plead the case of the girls before the demos of Argos collected in an Assembly. On the one hand there was the right of the suppliant; on the other there was the threat of war.

THE SECOND PLAY: THE AEGYPTII. Hybris yielded place to no term in the lexicon of Greek morality. Usually translated "overweening pride," the idea of hybris really meant no more than grossly exceeding the Mean. Excess in anything could be hybris. In the *Suppliants* Lattimore understood hybris as "simple lust."[47] To quote Lattimore's interesting argument:

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

"The word *hybris* is used throughout *The Suppliant Maidens* to describe the sons of Aegyptus. This does, of course, not mean that they are overproud and aspire to more than human stature. On the contrary, what they want is perfectly obvious and completely human. The sons of Aegyptus desire the daughters of Danaus."[48]

Lattimore's explanation stops short. The hybris of the Aegyptii was lust; that much is correct but the lust is joined with the threat of (a form of boast) violence, both to the maidens and to Argos. But lust is not love joined with desire. Rape may be fired by lust, but love would not be. The Aegyptii have been overcome with the disease of lust and are not cured. In the *Danaides*, the maidens, whom the Greeks would have judged morally correct in their flight from the lust-crazed sons of Aegyptus, are urged to marry men they love. Hypermestra loves Lynceus, because he does not rape her. Rape is a most flagrant form of coercion. It enslaves. To add to the transgression, the enslavement of the city-state is threatened. We know the Greeks had the most acute antipathy to any form of enslavement. *Pari passu*, love freely given and resulting in a fruitful marriage, the Greeks held to be the Mean for men and women in their sexual relations. It was this Mean that all the Aegyptii but Lynceus overstepped, and in so doing they were hybristic. A parallel argument could be made about the threat of the Aegyptii against Argos. How Aeschylus, or the Athenians would feel about that is demonstrated in the *Seven Against Thebes*.

Beyond the reason for the Aegyptii being punished the comments on the Aegyptii are far from helpful, although Garvie provides the relevant sources.[49] There is disagreement on matters ranging from the less important question of who made up the Chorus to the much more important question of what the playwright intended to do with Hypermestra and Lynceus.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 188 ff. One of the best known summary statements is that of Apollodorus. By the middle of the second century B.C. the judgment of Hypermestra had been resolved by not discussing motives. Apollodorus in *The Library* told how King Danaus reluctantly consented to the marriage of his daughters with the sons of Aegyptus but gave the girls daggers with instructions to slay their husbands while the latter slept. "All obeyed but Hypermestra for she saved Lynceus because he had respected her virginity, whereas Danaus shut her up and kept her under ward. But the rest of the daughters of Danaus buried the heads of their bridegrooms in Lerna and paid funeral honours to their bodies in front of the city; and Athena and Hermes purified them at the command of Zeus. Danaus afterwards united Hypermestra to Lynceus; and bestowed his other daughters on the victors in an athletic contest." (Apollodorus. *The Library*. Translated by Sir James G. Frazer. New York: G. P. Putman, 1921. Vol. II, 1, 5.)

Everyone agrees that forty-nine of the Aegyptii were killed. But what were the conditions under which Hypermestra spared Lynceus? There is such a lack of clarity on the substance of the play that we would be well advised to begin a modest attempt at reconstruction by remembering the purpose of the second play in a trilogy. If the point of the second play of Aeschylus is punishment, and the form of the punishment often appears a transgression, the *Suppliants* does not pose a very difficult problem in interpretation. Aeschylus could count on a substantial portion of the audience being so lost in the action, so identified with the actor or actors, that it was dramatically genuine to say that it is difficult to determine what is righteous. The punishment is lost from sight.[50] It is this that made it seem as though a tragic Chorus of Aeschylus was "notoriously slow to understand," at least after the transgression has been punished and before the judgment-trial has approached its end. Specifically the Chorus seems bewildered during the last of the second play and the first of the third. In that way, Aeschylus set up the judgment-trial of the third play.

The *Aegyptii* was a near-perfect opportunity for confounding the audience. That is the cue. If we think of how Aeschylus might have roiled the water, we will have made some progress. At the same time we know that the judgment-trial of the third play will be followed by reconciliation and certainly by *homonoia* and *harmonia*. The reconciliation is the next cue. In the punishment there must be stasis, a tension of opposing forces. What helps us is that the stories Aeschylus had on hand told that Danaus ordered each of his daughters to murder her husband. One daughter, Hypermestra disobeys. That is exactly what Aeschylus needs for the judgment scene that begins his final play of the trilogy.

I think these reasonable conjectures were written after Aeschylus had had many years in which to hammer out his formula for the form of a trilogy. I think that they will prove helpful, though I would not claim that utility proves authenticity. I have chosen to begin the composition of the Chorus, and I think my footing will be firm if I select the handmaidens for the Chorus. Reference was made to them at the end of the *Suppliants* and they could have performed what I think was necessary for the Chorus of the *Aegyptii*. I shall dismiss almost without comment the suggestions that have been made for subsidiary choruses in the *Aegyptii*.[51] There is no need for them. A Chorus, or demi-Chorus of *Aegyptii* would have had Aeschylus

[50] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 197.

[51] The issues raised by supplementary Choruses have been discussed by Garvie. (*Ibid.*, pp. 190 ff., 207 ff.)

directing that the members of a Chorus be put to death, a most unlikely direction! And the Aegyptii were guilty. It is not, as Garvie writes, that the audience only has the "biased account of their cousins."[52] Not to have held the Aegyptii guilty would have meant certain condemnation of the Danaids who killed them. Aeschylus' morality is quite clear on such a point. The moral lessons Aeschylus wished to teach would not have been served by having Aeschylus pose the problem of the appearances of evil being deceptive. We have every right to think Aeschylus intended his audience to believe the Danaids' view of their cousins a reasonably accurate character sketch, though heightened in intensity by their emotion.

To come directly to the action of the *Aegyptii* how might the play have begun? I think the *Aegyptii* opened with the Chorus drawn up before the king's home. The war is over; the Aegyptii have won. Argos is under siege. King Pelasgus has died a patriotic death, and the Argive demos has elected Danaus to be king.[53] The terms proposed by the Aegyptii come down to this: they must have the Danaids as their brides.

Not even the papyrus fragments that may be bits of the *Aegyptii* are enough to make the above anything more than speculation. But none of this guessing is altogether out of order. We can go on with this opening scene by thinking of what might have been told the Chorus by a 'messenger.' Incidentally, it has been surprising how little attention critics have payed to messengers. The flashback was a typical device of Aeschylus, one of the most familiar being the messenger in the oldest extant play of Aeschylus, the *Persians*. I do not think there are any serious reasons for not having a messenger arrive near the beginning of the *Aegyptii*, answering some of the questions asked by the Chorus.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

[53] The author is indebted to Winnington-Ingram for the idea that the play opens with defeated Argos under siege, Pelasgus dead and Danaus king. (Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 145 ff.) The reader is also referred to Garvie for his dismissal of the wolf and bull scene as reported at the beginning of the play. (Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 203.) The death of Pelasgus has been read out of *Oxyrhynchus Papyrus* 2251, as interpreted by Miss Cunningham. (M. L. Cunningham. "A Fragment of Aeschylus' Aigyptioi?" *Rh. Mus.*, 96 (1953), p. 223 ff. and her "Second Thoughts on Oxyrhynchus Papyri, XX, 2251." *Rh. Mus.*, 105 (1962), p. 189 ff.) Miss Cunningham attributes the fragment (which calls on Zeus, god of hospitality, to look upon a man of hospitality) to the *Aegyptii*. I think the attribution stands but Garvie doubts that, writing "the evidence is just not strong enough, and we are not entitled to draw conclusions from it." Garvie does admit that there are experts who favor Miss Cunningham's attribution as well as there are those who doubt that the fragment belongs to the *Aegyptii* of Oxyrhynchus. (Garvie, p. 200 ff. and fn. 2, p. 202.)

Assuming that the Chorus was intended by Aeschylus to be thought informed about the death of Pelasgus and the election of Danaus, the defeat and siege of Argos, the information brought by the messenger could have said enough about both Lynceus and Hypermestra to distinguish the one from the Aegyptii and the other from the Danaids. Let us suppose that Winnington-Ingram was correct in thinking that Lynceus was the spokesman for his brother Aegyptii.[54] Let us suppose further that the messenger reported Hypermestra's reactions to the speaker. Let us presume further that Lynceus undertook the pronouncement of conditions as an *agôn logôn*. If Lynceus was persuasive, and it was his persuasiveness that Winnington-Ingram noted, Lynceus' persuasive argument could have been described by the messenger as having *sôphrosynê*. Continuing his report the messenger might have said that he thought Hypermestra reacted as though she had been overcome by *himeros*.

From the point of view of the trial and judgment in the *Danaides*, the messenger's report would have laid the groundwork for one bit of reconciliation. The immortal playing *amicus curiae* would have been able to point out that a 'whole marriage,' that is, complete and fully formed, calls for the self-restraint that Lynceus showed, without which tender or courtly persuasion gives place to the cruel self-indulgence of rape. It also calls for the passion of eros, the strong feeling that possessed Hypermestra.

The ploy would have been first-rate. Aeschylus would have had the *amicus curiae* turn the tables, as it were. The strong emotion that inappropriately had overcome the reason and self-restraint of the Aegyptii has been converted into a more appropriate passion of the bride but a strong emotion that required the balance of the groom's *sôphrosynê*.

I think that this treatment of Lynceus and Hypermestra is plausible. Certainly one must say more of Hypermestra whom we have left overcome by a strong emotion. Is this the young woman whom Ovid described as possessed by "timor et pietas,"[55] which would have made Hypermestra the blushing bride? The answer is yes. I think that in the *Danaides* the *amicus curiae* would have said that it was appropriate for a maiden, still

[54] "There was one way at least in which Lynceus could have been introduced with plausibility. The entry of the Egyptians must have been prepared by negotiations. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that Lynceus, as negotiator, was a character in the play. If he had a speaking part, it would have given him an opportunity to show a degree of *sophrosyne* which merited salvation and a persuasiveness in his protestations of desire which awoke *himeros* in his destined bride." (Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 147.)

[55] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 165.

in her father's family, to show filial piety and also to preserve her virginity with her father's counsel and aid. The *amicus curiae* then would have said that the strong, overpowering emotion of *himeros* also could not be denied but marriage has been instituted to allow for *himeros* because a husband with *sôphrosynê* will take the father's place. But, before Lynceus could step into the role of guardian, Hypermestra indeed lost her reason, was overcome by eros, and disobeyed her father.

CHARACTERIZATION. I do not think it useful, or even defensible, to go into greater detail on the first 'scene' in the *Aegyptii*. Nor do I wish to pass onto the second 'scene,' which I think was the preparation for the slaying of the Aegyptii, until more has been said of the character of Hypermestra and her father. More need not be written on Lynceus; he was far less important to the trilogy than Hypermestra. I do not write this because I think that trilogy took the woman's part, or made more of the female than of the male. Aeschylus thought too much of parts being parts of a whole for such tense relationship of male and female to have been Aeschylean. My decision to concentrate on the characterization of Hypermestra and Danaus is dictated by the importance to the *Aegyptii* and to the *Danaides* of the interaction of the father and daughter.

Perhaps we have enough of Hypermestra. She is no Electra. She is no Antigone either, though the Electra of Euripides and the Antigone of Sophocles were even more the forceful types we have in mind. Hypermestra was not cast as a violent, rebellious soul. I do not think there was any breast-beating in her disobedience. All the stories of the disobedience call it that rather than defiance.[56] I think that Aeschylus would have wished Hypermestra to seem pitiable, as Io and Cassandra were, 'more to be pitied than scorned' as the old song has it. Hypermestra is stripped of her reason, doubtless restored in the *Danaides*, but the transgression of disobedience was to cause the audience to commiserate with Hypermestra and not to write her off as another Clytemnestra. Had it been Aeschylus' intention to make Hypermestra morally outrageous he would have had her transgress in the first play and somehow be allied with the Aegyptii and join in their punishment.

[56] The sources for the story of Hypermestra's decision are given by Garvie. "In Σ *Hec.* 886, Σ *P.V.* 853 and Σ Pind, *Pyth.* ix 112 (195) she falls in love with Lynceus; ps.-Apollodorus, Σ *Iliad* Δ 171, and Σ Pind. *Nem.* x. 6 (10) give as motive that he has spared her virginity." (Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 165.) Other faults than disobedience were charged to Hypermestra, such as unchastity and perjury (*Ibid.*, p. 206) but I do not think that they need be taken seriously. As Garvie has it: "Only Hypermestra sins we are told, the others rightly obey their father." (p. 212 and fn. 3.)

Hypermestra cannot be disassociated from her father; any thought on her guilt at once turns one's mind towards Danaus. Hypermestra, for all her disobedience, is transparently innocent. Could it be that in this innocence she disobeyed what really was the unrighteous counsel of her father? Following this lead inevitably brings one to the decision that Danaus is something of a villain, not nearly as thoroughly evil as Iago but, as Winnington-Ingram described Danaus, a "dry, calculating, puritanical" man.[57] In reading Winnington-Ingram's otherwise helpful "The Danaid Trilogy of Aeschylus" one would think that Aeschylus had erred in not making Danaus, rather than the Aegyptii, the villain.

What makes Winnington-Ingram's essay so useful in understanding Aeschylus is the author's perception that persuasion was high in Aeschylus' list of the desirable. If Lynceus exemplifies the most worthy form of persuasion, the other side of the coin seems to show Danaus. Winnington-Ingram's Danaus was not very good at persuading, not nearly as good as Pelasgus. "Pelasgus knew how to speak persuasively to his citizens (615, 623 f., cf., 523), and he put the right words into the mouth of Danaus (519). But a time would come, when Danaus had to speak without the guidance of Pelasgus. Speak he will have done, full of confidence in his cleverness and in his eloquence." (775).[58]

The last is almost hybris and it seems a good deal to have been able to assign the Danaus Aeschylus wished to create. Would not it have been more in keeping with the judgment that was coming up in the third play to have Aeschylus wish the audience to think Danaus justified in his revenge-punishment of the Aegyptii but lacking in reason or understanding in his characterization of Hypermestra? It would have been possible for the *amicus curiae* to have persuaded the audience that Danaus could be reconciled not only with Hypermestra but even with Lynceus, who was going to be the guardian of Hypermestra's virtue.

Winnington-Ingram persisted in labeling Danaus the villain. Danaus, writes Winnington-Ingram, is shown to be "the planner, the calculator, the embodiment of worldly wisdom, the man who always knows best."[59] Inevitably Winnington-Ingram wishes his readers to think that Danaus persuaded his daughters to freely consent to "his plan, appealing at once to their hatred of wedlock and to the sense of filial piety; and they comply."[60] All but Hypermestra comply.

[57] Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 147.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 145.
[60] *Ibid.*

I do not object to the idea that Aeschylus had Danaus plan the slaying of the Aegyptii. In the conventional words of Aeschylus' time, Danaus was the instrument of the justice of Zeus *Hikesios*. But I vigorously object to the idea that Aeschylus would have Danaus thought a cynic, taking advantage of his daughters' illness, their *phyxanoria*, and exploiting their sense of filial piety. It was not necessary that Aeschylus have him do that.

I once again think of Ismene and Antigone. In their *agôn logôn* Antigone disobeys the commands of the regents of Thebes. This is wrong to do. But she wishes to bury her brother, even though what he did was wrong. Hypermestra has disobeyed her father; that was wrong to do. But Hypermestra loved her husband, and it was righteous for a wife to love her husband and spare him—not murder him, as Clytemnestra did in her hate for her husband. The end of this road for us is a decision that Danaus was shown in the judgment scene of the *Danaides* to be correct, for neither he nor his daughters had consented. The change of heart suffered by Hypermestra probably did not show itself in an out-and-out act of disobedience, a challenge of the plan formulated by Danaus and Hypermestra's sisters.

One final remark on Danaus—actually a question about the intentions of Aeschylus: Was there anything in the *Suppliants* that suggested that Danaus wished to keep his daughters from any and all marriage? I think not. There was nothing, even allowing for the corruption of lines, to suggest that Danaus was pictured in this fashion either in the *Suppliants* or in any of the stories about which we know.

SLAYING THE AEGYPTII. "There can be little doubt that the second play deals with the events leading up to the murder, if it does not include the murder itself."[61] It can hardly be surprising (in light of our opinion that the second play of an Aeschylean trilogy featured the punishment of the transgression played in the first tragedy) that I believe the slaying of the forty-nine Aegyptii by forty-nine of the Danaids took place in the second play. There is the fragment quoted by the scholiast at Pindar Pyth. iii. 19[62] which is from the *Danaides* and seems to us to be a snatch from the waking song[63] that

[61] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 197.

[62] Frg. 124 M, 43 N^2 discussed by Garvie. (*Ibid.*, p. 228 ff.)

[63] Whether it was the evening epithalamium or the morning waking-song has not been agreed upon nor has there been consensus that the fragment belongs to the third play. (*Ibid.*) As explained by Smyth "the fragment refers to the custom that, on the morning after the marriage, newly-wed couples were wakened by song (cp. Theocritus, *Idyll* xviii, 56)." (Aeschylus. *Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, Eumenides, Fragments.* Translated by Herbert W. Smyth, Vol. 2, 1929, II, p. 394.)

traditionally was sung by a group of friends of the bride and groom the morning after the marriage. The song might have been chanted by a Chorus split into two halves, one marriageable young Argive males and the other marriageable young female Argives, which would seem reasonable on two accounts. The trilogy was about marriage within the context of family and a *Danaides*' Chorus that contained an equal number of marriageable young female Argives, which would seem reasonable. The trilogy was about marriage within the context of family and a *Danaides*' Chorus that contained an equal number of marriageable men and women also was logical. Then too the fragment does make reference to boys and girls who may have been the members of the Chorus or, at least, those who sang the waking song.[64] It would have been wonderful theatre, however gruesome, to open the final play with a waking song. A proper parallel would have been to close the *Aegyptii* with the Chorus chanting the evening *hymenaeus*, voicing the wish that the marriage prove fruitful.

The matter has not been proved one way or another and may never be. More to be wished is some light on whether the audience heard Hypermestra object to the plan of killing. One plausible feeling, I think, is that Hypermestra's objections would have been a distraction. Another, which also argues against having Hypermestra declare her objections, is that this would give away the grounds for Hypermestra's decision and these must come out in the judgment-trial of the *Danaides*. Both arguments are supplementary. Hypermestra should neither distract nor give away the valid grounds for her decision. This could have been accomplished by Hypermestra asking if the slaying was themis. Hypermestra could have raised some doubts but these might have been rejected by her sisters, made unreasonable by their *phyxanoria*, and by Danaus, who simply asked for the obedience owed by a daughter.

My advocacy of the belief that Hypermestra simply raised questions about whether the plan was themis, partly is predicated on the thought that this anticipated what would become the major issue of *Danaides* trial-judgment; was the slaying themis? But there is another point. Either Hypermestra had to be absent from the planning of Danaus and the Danaids, with her sparing of Lynceus told in the opening scene of the *Danaides*, or Hypermestra was a sudden convert to her decision after going along with the plan of Danaus. We prefer to think that Aeschylus thought it was better theatre to anticipate the main argument of the trial-judgment that was about to be played as though before the demos of Argos.

[64] Garvie. *Aeschylus*' Supplices, p. 228 ff.

THE THIRD PLAY: DANAIDES.[65] In the absence of evidence we shall assume that *Danaides* opened with the demi-Choruses of young Argive men and women chanting a waking-song at the conclusion of which a messenger would rush onstage reporting that the Aegyptii were dead, or all but one, Lynceus. It does not seem unreasonable to have the messenger also report that Hypermestra said that she had spared Lynceus, although this meant being held a coward by her sisters and disobedient by her father. It would have been realistic for a messenger at the beginning of a second and third play of Aeschylus to tell the audience the essentials of the preceding play(s). Making use of this device the messenger would have been able to tell how the Aegyptii came in quest of the Danaids, driven by lust to the shores of Argos which had granted the supplication of the Danaids. Without being long-winded about it, the messenger could have passed along, perhaps in reporting the substance of what Hypermestra said, the plan of Danaus.

Who might the messenger have been? I think the messenger was one of the senior men of Argos who would have been able to say that the matter would have to be judged by the demos because the city was directly involved in the possibility of pollution and further war of revenge pressed by the father of the Aegyptii.

If the first scene of the *Danaides* took something of this form, it might have pivoted on the agonizing question: was the deed themis? In response to that question the second part of the judgment scene would be played as an adaptation of a meeting of the demos of Argos and those who were to be judged. The likelihood the Argives did judge the matter was known in the legend[66] and Aeschylus would have no good reason to find another set of 'jurors.' The term judgment and judged is emphasized in order to anticipate objection to the idea that there was a formal trial. With his usual respect for evidence Garvie only grants: "That Aeschylus dealt with the fate of Hypermestra is probable since she is one of the few elements common to all versions of the story ... Yet there are serious objections to any reconstruction that involves her trial. First, there is slight evidence for such a trial. There was precedent in the trilogy for appealing to the judgment of the *demos*, when the matter at hand is of grave concern to the city as a whole. It would only be necessary to present before the *demos* alternative persuasive argument. The *demos* then would vote, showing by its vote that the persuasion of the *amicus curiae* were excepted. The play

[65] Garvie has an excellent discussion of alternative conventions for reconstructing the *Danaides*. (*Ibid.*, p. 204 ff.) In essential ways our reconstruction differs from these conventions.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

would end happily, perhaps with the institution of the *Thesmophoria* honoring the dignity of women."[67]

No topic touching on the reconstruction of the *Danaides* is more confused in the account of the Danaid story than the consequences of the Aegyptii's murder. Some have Hypermestra imprisoned by Danaus for disobeying his command. Others have the sisters, except Hypermestra apparently, slain by an avenging Lynceus. Hygrinus and Servius wrote that they were punished in Hades. But there are any number of other stories[68] and the variations assure us that Aeschylus was free to do with the trial what he wishes. Essentially that is the conclusion to which Garvie comes. Having reviewed the sources, he writes: "Of Aeschylus' debt to these sources all that we can say with certainty is that he was not wholly dependent upon any one of them."[69]

One of the ways in which Aeschylus showed his independence was in pointing the process of judgment towards a proper conception of marriage. Interestingly enough the major fragment we have of the *Danaides* is the Aphrodite fragment.[70] Aphrodite praises the power and function of eros and we can be certain of no more than that it was spoken by Aphrodite.[71] But somehow the Aphrodite speech had to be related to the killing of the Aegyptii. It would have been tied in by saying that the 49 Danaids who killed their husbands had not been overwhelmed by eros: But that would have been a strange thing to have expected Aeschylus to have had Aphrodite say. If eros was to be associated with anyone we have reason to think of as principals in the judgment it was with Hypermestra. Aphrodite could have claimed that it was eros which Hypermestra felt when she listened to Lynceus declare the Aegyptii conditions and *himeros* which saved her from murder.

[67] Emily A. Wolff. "Date of Aeschylus' Danaid Trilogy." *Eranos*, 56 (1958) Nos. 3-4, p. 167, fn. 1 where Wolff wrote: "The suggestion was originally made by Tittler, "De Danaidum fabulae compositione." Z. *für die Alterthumswissenschaft*, V (1838), col. 875." Although we have but a fragment of the *Isthmiastai* (Pox 2162 as reported in R. Cantarella. *I nuovi frammenti eschilei di Ossirinco*. Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, n.d., p. 91ff.; commented on by Eduard Fraenkel. "Aeschylus: New Texts and Old Problems." *Proceedings of the British Academy*. London: Oxford University Press, 1942, p. 244 ff.) it is safe to assume that the inauguration of the Isthmia or Isthmian games was the event being used to provide a focus of attention.

[68] For references to this and a summary of their conclusions see Garvie. *Aeschylus* Supplices, p. 166 ff.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[70] Frg. 125 M (44 N^2) quoted by Athenaeus xiii, 600b, and discussed by Garvie (*Ibid.*, p. 204 ff.)

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

For the moment we do not have to consider what Hypermestra's plea was or even if Lynceus spoke at the judgment. The more urgent concern is with the play's lack of interest. At best Aphrodite will have provided Hypermestra with an extenuating circumstance for her disobedience and in effect will have said: *himeros* kept Hypermestra from murder. This could not have been the situation. Without thinking that the *Eumenides* must serve us as a model in every detail, that play can offer clues. I think that Aphrodite was Hypermestra's counselor somewhat as Apollo was Orestes'. I say "somewhat" because it would not have been necessary for Aeschylus to have Hypermestra claim to have been guided and cajoled by Aphrodite. Greek myth did not cast Aphrodite in those roles; Aphrodite was the gay deceiver who helped Hera overcome Zeus. If anything, Aphrodite probably was somewhat on the defensive in these proceedings. Thinking that an *agôn logôn* was typical of Aeschylus' dramatic devices, there would have been an *agôn logôn* between Aphrodite and someone else. That someone else I think was Artemis. There is more than one support for this belief, but I must confess, the dramatic possibilities are what attract me in the first place. Tension could have been built, if Artemis spoke first, which I think was Aeschylus' intent; she could have charged Aphrodite with violating the sacred quality of maidenly virtue, summed up in virginity. The chaste goddess could have increased the attack by saying that Hypermestra had transgressed in disobeying her father and that in transgression she had trampled on his sacred responsibility for guarding her chastity. The audience would have been more sympathetic had Artemis said that, although she honored chastity, the marriage of mortals was decreed by the gods. The virtuous maiden who had given herself to no man before marriage, was a more desirable creature than the harlot. None of this need have been directed by Hypermestra lest it arouse pity for Hypermestra as underdog. It could have been shouted at Aphrodite, and Aphrodite's answer might have yielded the famous fragment.

That Artemis was a likely ally of Danaus is not all to be based on the dramatic possibilities. A viable moral and practical position had been advanced above. Who could deny a father's responsibility or an unmarried daughter's? And when Aphrodite spoke of the power of eros and not too persuasively of its function—might not have Artemis seemed convincing if Aeschylus had her exhibit righteous indignation at having eros steal Hypermestra's reason and habits of obedience to her father?

It was fitting that Artemis be one of the principals at the scene of judgment, for Artemis was the "lover of chastity" whom the Danaids, Hypermestra included, had invoked in the *Suppliants* when they called on Artemis:

"... daughter of Zeus, lover of chastity, // Who foiled Orion's lust for Opis, // In mercy respect my chaste desires; // Let her come in all her strength, // A virgin to a virgin's rescue, // And foil this lust that pursues us, // That we, descendants of Io bride of Zeus, // May escape the embrace of man, // And keep our virginity unconquered." (*Suppl.* 145-54) Twice the Danaids petitioned: "And keep our virginity unconquered." (*Suppl.* 144, 154) And had the Danaids not spoken of eros as a compelling force? "Let chaste Artemis look with pity upon us, // And marriage come not by compulsion of Aphrodite ..." (*Suppl.* 1031-2)

The reestablishment of *homonoia* and *harmonia* was an even greater act of persuasion than that undertaken by Artemis and Aphrodite. If the *agôn logôn* was won by the *amicus curiae* that would have been the greatest triumph of the judgment scene. Of course it was won and Aeschylus, even if he were not a partriot, would have been wise to have it won by Athena acting as judge. The audience had tasted part of the triumphal persuasion of Athena. The handmaidens assigned the Danaids had moved the *Suppliants* near its close by chanting the honor of Aphrodite: "... various and subtle ... honoured only with most solemn rites // Where, joined with their dear mother, // Come first Desire, then soft Persuasion, // To whose enchantments nothing can be denied, // While Music, and the Loves who play in whispers, // Have their parts assigned them by Aphrodite." (*Suppl.* 1037-43) The play then ended with the Danaids singing: "May Zeus, who rules the world, // Save me from cruel subjection to a man I hate ..." (*Suppl.* 1063-4) Aeschylus had opened the door to a possible cure of the Danaid's *phyxanoria.* At the end of the *Suppliants* the maidens detested not all men but only those who did not woo, but forced them. "She who would not be forced is successfully wooed."[72]

PERSUASION. The part persuasion plays in reaching the meeting of minds, *homonoia,* is so readily grasped that the importance Greeks attached to persuasion easily can be missed. This is most likely because we have downgraded persuasive oratory and rhetoric, reducing it to the game of debate thought useful training for high school students and undergraduates. In debate young people are supposed to learn how to score points, a practice which Plato scorned long ago. To fully catch how seriously Plato took rhetorical sophistry, one must believe, as the Greeks did, that persuasion had overwhelming force. A defeated warrior might win his life; a dream might lead to disaster, as indeed the dream 'sent' by Zeus to Agamemnon

[72] Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 151.

did in the *Iliad*. Moreover the Greeks had no subtle explanations such as modern sociologists give for "socialization," or the "enculturation" of the cultural anthropologist. The Greeks did not write on the slow process whereby a child learns a system of values through the filtration of social class, neighborhood and family. The decisions that a man made were not the creatures of habit and there were no filters. That man acted *now* and persuasion could make all the difference in what action was taken. An immortal could hear a mortal's supplication or not; the warrior might be spared because of the success of his plea or not. Achilles might return to battling the Trojans on the basis of the rhetoric of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Aias or not. The response in every case was immediate: it was either yes or no. Persuasion made all the difference between one and the other.

There is only one thing left to be said on the importance of persuasion. Persuasion took many forms: Courtship was one; prayer was another; supplication was a third. The Greeks were urged to listen. Listening was called taking pity. He who did not pity was guilty of rage, of excessive anger, or he was violent and rapacious. Yet the Greeks knew that one might be persuaded to do what was not righteous. While it was well to listen, and take pity, one had to be on guard. The Greek moralist was not sentimental. He did not say that all prayers were to be answered or that all petitions were to be granted. Just as dreams deceived, some men lied. The wise men had to be on guard. The careful Odysseus was the model. And yet the man or woman who misled, as Clytemnestra misled Agamemnon, were not the majority of suppliants. While the wise man was on guard, most of the time it was well to be generous. On balance, Greek morality came down on the side of granting the supplication.

This preference for persuasion is not surprising. Although it may always have been said by some of those who feel frustrated in whatever reforms of society they have urged, "change only comes when there has been a fight," most people have preferred to win change by persuasion using data. The Greeks too preferred reason to violence. That is why Winnington-Ingram should be applauded for seeing the violence of the first play in a trilogy of Aeschylus given way to persuasion in the final play. Although I shall modify that thesis a good deal, certainly stripping it of the idea that the trilogy shows an evolution from the more barbaric use of violent coercion to win submission, Winnington-Ingram is justified in calling attention to the probability that each of the trilogies probably showed Zeus characterized by Kratos and Bia in the first play and by Peitho in the last. Although Winnington-Ingram sees persuasion as gentle, I am convinced that Aeschylus desired that men accept their fate and the moral code without having

to be coerced. There is reason to feel that gentleness appealed to him, but the morality in Aeschylus would have stressed an uncoerced acceptance above gentleness.

Greek myth had it that Athena was not born of woman. That might have helped the audience feel that Athena would have been sympathetic to chastity. Moreover, the self-restraint that chastity involved was not to be expected of a young woman; there she needed her father. (An older woman and wife, as Penelope, should be able to do without the shepherding.) That would have made it natural for Athena to have recognized the role of the father and the propriety of chastity. But Aeschylus easily could have had Athena turn to acknowledging the role of Aphrodite's *timê* and *geras* and function, which justified her power. In this way Athena would have successfully helped the audience to rationalize the propriety of strong emotion overpowering reason!

As for Lynceus, Athena could have said that all men knew that he had shown the *sôphrosynê* to be expected of an older man. The self-restraint of Lynceus is what would have allowed Athena to show how Danaus and Lynceus could be reconciled. Lynceus now would provide the marriage the guardianship which the fatherly wisdom of Danaus had provided. To that *sôphrosynê* Aphrodite had added attractiveness and the power of soft persuasion. As a final word Athena would have said that the Danaids really were not averse to marriage, but only to being raped. Lynceus had spared the virginity of his bride and that won him life and provided an example of a groom that the other Danaids could accept. I think Aeschylus had directed that there be a degree of tension in the relation of Hypermestra and her sisters. The degree of stasis might have been no more severe. In any case, all probably would have been forgiven and the Danaids will have been reconciled to each other as the 49 were reconciled to marriage. (It is unlikely that the marriage of the Danaids would have taken place at the close of the play. The ninth Pythian ode of Pindar tells how the Danaids were lined up at the finishing line of a course to be raced by forty-nine suitors, the Danaids being chosen in succession with the winner getting first choice. Aeschylus may not have had Danaus declare a footrace to be the way that he would award his daughters to prospective grooms. It would have been enough for Danaus to anticipate the future marriage and say something to that effect.)

At this point Aphrodite and Artemis would have finished speaking or being actors. If the legend of the blood-guilt had been used the pollution of the Danaids was purged.[73] Two other immortals could have appeared.

[73] Apollodorus. *The Library*, 2.1.4; Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 150.

The immortals who did the purging are known in the legend as Athena and Hermes. I think that in the *Danaides* Aeschylus had a different use for Athena, but did include the removal of pollution from the Danaids and Argos. I think that Hermes did arrive on stage and with him came that arch-doctor, Apollo. Hermes could have announced the will of Zeus, Zeus *Xenios*, god of hospitality. Winnington-Ingram points out that the Aegyptii entered Argos, not as *polemioi* but as guests, *xenoi*, and guests of the Argive king, Danaus, implicating the city in the pollution.[74] The actual purging would have been done by Apollo who then would have announced a second act of healing, the cure of *phyxanoria*.

A HAPPY ENDING. The natural order would have been restored,[75] and with it *homonoia* and *harmonia*. I think that the demos of Argos was asked to vote on the righteousness of the slaying and the action of Hypermestra both of which I believe the Argives approved, having been persuaded by the arguments of Athena, the message of Hermes and the curative action of Apollo. In my opinion it was not a trial of Hypermestra alone, of Danaus alone or of the Danaids alone. The image we have is of the balance scale. There were good arguments for all parties and all sides of the case. It was this which I think kept the judgment scene from having the same format as the trial in the *Eumenides*. All that remained was to have the joy of the occasion brought to a focus. While I agree with Garvie that not all of Aeschylus' tragedies had to end with the initiation of some activity, such as a ceremony or great day of games, placing the Thesmophoria[76] at the end of the *Danaides* is made the more probable by its being so fitting. Danaus could just have given his blessing to Hypermestra and Lynceus. At that point Athena might have predicted that indeed the marriage of Lynceus and Hypermestra would be fruitful. The patron goddess of Athena could have foreseen that from the union would come a line of Argive kings. Would it not seem appropriate for Athena to have announced the first ritual that she would have called the Thesmophoria? According to Herodotus (ii, 171) it was the Danaids who introduced the Pelasgian women to the Thesmophoria which they had brought from Egypt.[77] This would have helped to soothe the feelings of any Egyptian visitors of Aeschylus'[78] trilogy. A reconciliation of Athens and Egypt would be more plausible with Lynceus becoming a

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 145 ff.
[75] Garvie, *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 225.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 227 ff. and fn. 6, p. 227.
[78] *Ibid.*

progenitor of Argive kings—widen the sponsorship of Athena!—and with the inauguration of the Thesmophoria touted as an Egyptian institution which it may have been in the *Danaides*.

WOMEN AND PROPERTY. In thinking about the Thesmophoria it is well to be clear that in Athenian custom and law women were not thought of as property or chattel. True, a wife was deprived of the right to receive inheritance, and she did bring a dowry to her marriage, but she was still not property. Laws on inheritance did not deprive a married woman of freedom. A mother could transmit the right of succession to her property to her sons. The Attic system of succession even allowed the descendants of brotherless daughters and also of sisters to succeed. The family was considered, not as a sphere of almost unlimited power of the *pater familias*, but as a unit within the religious and political organization of the citizenry. Hence, "giving a woman in marriage" did not mean a transfer of power but a transfer of the woman to another family to bear children necessary for its maintenance.[79] A dowry is to be understood in this maintenance context. Greek law regarded the wife as holding the title to the dowry, the man having only a right to administer and utilize it. This was in line with the underlying principle of the marriage system that the married woman was in the legal power of her husband, while remaining a member of her original family. The dowry itself, usually a piece of real property—so many olive trees or vines—was a financial asset which went from the estate of the bride's family to that of the husband. Its purposes simply were to secure the maintenance of the woman given in marriage and to secure for her children a share in the estate of their maternal family.

The specific application of this to the *Suppliants* is to conclude that Aeschylus meant the audience to think the claim of the Aegyptii that the Danaids were their property (*Suppl.* 918) was spurious. Even if the Danaids had been married to the sons of Aegyptus the brides would not have been the property of their husbands or of the House of Aegyptus.

Seeing no impediment to a happy ending for the Danaid trilogy and the inauguration of the Thesmophoria, I am willing to think that Aeschylus had the 'curtain rung down' on a scene that would have won the 'applause' of Athenians, of Argive visitors to the Athenian theatre and those in Argos who saw the play which we believe was played in Argos after its Athenian opening.

[79] H. Wolff. "Marriage Law," pp. 43-95; Charles Seltman. "Status of Women," pp. 119-124.

THE PROMETHEUS BOUND. Does anything I have said conflict with what Aeschylus had Prometheus foretell to Io? I think that it does not. Nor would it matter whether the *Prometheia* was produced after the Danaid trilogy or before it. When Garvie wrote of the possibility of reconstructing the Danaid trilogy he carefully reviewed Aeschylus' own treatment of the story in the *Prometheus Bound.* (*PB.* 853 ff.) "There we are told," Garvie begins, "of the flight of the Danaids from Egypt to Argos to avoid a marriage with their cousins, of the murder of forty-nine of the husbands, of the sparing of one by his wife, and of the founding of the Argive royal line as a result of this marriage." Garvie goes on to say that this "is clearly a more reliable source for the Danaid trilogy than any account of the story in another author." Yet even here, Garvie writes in warning, "We must admit that Aeschylus may have altered details to suit the different purposes of the two trilogies. Thus the wanderings of Io are recounted in much greater detail in the *Prometheus* than in the *Supplices.* In the latter it is at Argos that Zeus commits adultery with Io, while in the *Prometheus* this does not take place until Io's wanderings have been completed in Egypt. In the *Prometheus* the father of Io is given as Inachus (663 and 705), while in the *Supplices* Inachus appears only as a river, and Io, the priestess of Hera (291), apparently has no connection with the royal family."[80] We would expect a much more full treatment of the Danaid story in the trilogy and should not demand more than that Aeschylus not contradict fundamentals in his two accounts. Garvie sees no difficulty in the fact that Aeschylus emphasized the descendants of Hypermestra to quite an extent in the *Prometheus Bound* and may not have in the *Danaides.* "Clearly," Garvie concludes, "Hypermestra's descendants are important in the *Prometheus,* as one of them is destined to rescue Prometheus."[81] Nothing is said about the disobedience of Hypermestra in the *Prometheus Bound.* The only statement made is that Hypermestra would rather be called coward than murderess. (*PB.* 867) But, then, nothing is said to the effect that Hypermestra was not to be thought disobedient in Prometheus' speech to Io. I am not surprised that the *Prometheus Bound* dwells more on the wanderings of Io than does the *Suppliants.* After all, the Io scene in the *Prometheus Bound* is a great display of geographical knowledge. Aeschylus must have thought that impressive.

THE SATYR-PLAY, AMYMONE. The ancient commentary we have on Aeschylus' dramatic prowess adds confidence in Winnington-Ingram's remark that

[80] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 180 ff.
[81] *Ibid.,* p. 227.

"Aeschylus was renowned as the best of all writers of satyr-plays."[82] Winnington-Ingram was writing of the *Amymone* and went on to say that while we know little about this play that little might be enough to see that the *Amymone* was on the theme of the Danaid trilogy, which Winnington-Ingram wrote of as acceptance by women of marriage that followed on courtship and has the consent of bride and parent. The *Amymone*, Winnington-Ingram continued, "Told how another of the daughters of Danaus was saved from the brutal lust of a satyr by the god Poseidon, whose lover she became. It can hardly be doubted that Aeschylus had taken up and translated into suitable satyric terms the theme of the contrast between rape and courtship which had already been developed in the trilogy."[83] One hardly could take issue with Winnington-Ingram's thought. Amymone indeed was persuaded to be Poseidon's lover—and from that union was born Nauplius, the founder of a distinguished line.[84] The substitution of seduction for courtship was only in the satyric style Aeschylus was emphasizing that persuasion was more righteous than rape.

[82] Winnington-Ingram. "The Danaid Trilogy," p. 147.

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] Garvie. *Aeschylus'* Supplices, p. 233.

Chapter VIII

PLAYS WITH ODD ENDINGS: *PERSIANS* AND *SEVEN AGAINST THEBES*

I. Synopsis of the Persians and conjecture on a trilogy

Dramatis Personae, the Persians

Chorus of Persian Elders
Atossa, mother of Xerxes, wife of Darius
A messenger
Ghost of Darius, father of Xerxes
Xerxes, King of Persia

A TRILOGY? Two of Aeschylus' plays strike me as closing in odd ways. In the *Persians* the hero, who is rather like an anti-hero of modern theatre, asks the Chorus to "weep and howl." Xerxes seems to be saying the line of Orestes: "I have been beaten and been taught." (*Eum.* 276) Indeed he has. He has suffered and the *pathei mathos* of Xerxes is exactly what we should expect from the second play of an Aeschylean trilogy. As for the ending of the *Seven Against Thebes*, that, too, is appropriate to a third play in the trilogy. But let us look at the earlier play and trilogy for Lattimore seems justified in writing that the *Persians* "is certainly the oldest extant Greek tragedy."[1]

The Didascalia, the official record of the performance of tragedies in Athens, tell that Aeschylus won first prize in the Great Dionysia of Spring, 472 B.C. Pericles was *choregus*, underwriting the expenses for a series of four plays: *Phineus*, *Persae* (*Persians*), as well as the *Glaucus*.[2] *Prometheus*

[1] Lattimore. *Poetry of Greek Tragedy*, p. 29, fn. 1.

[2] I am assuming that the full title of the final tragedy was *Glaucus Pontius*, although the single word *Glaucus* really is all that one is entitled to use. In this usage I am following R. P. Winnington-Ingram. ("The *Glaukos Pontios* of Aeschylus." *BICS*, 6 (1959), p. 58 ff.) and papyrus fragment Oxyp. xviii (No. 2159) reporting part of the speech that refers to the sight of an immortalized Glaukos riding a chariot over the sea into which he had leapt

the Firebringer probably may have been a satyr play. But that there were three or four plays does not prove that there was a trilogy or tetralogy. That might have been the case and I think Murray feels that it was. Following the lead of Murray, I think that this group of plays "form some sort of continuous story."[3] Murray goes a bit farther suggesting that Aeschylus, at least in his earlier days of producing plays, held them in trilogy form—the trilogy being followed by a satyr play. There are other thoughts, not only those of Murray, and some will be noted but there is no single view that is overwhelmingly convincing. For what it is worth I would suggest that the four plays did associate. Spectators at one would have been reminded of the others. That would not have militated against the idea that each tragedy stood on its own. I shall suggest that there could have been a coupling of the *Persians* and the *Glaucus* but this less formal tie between the four plays is perfectly possible.

The *Persians* has been called a historical play, recalling to its audience that the battle of Salamis had been fought in 480, Plataea the next year, followed, in 478, by the rebuilding of Athens. These three great years had been celebrated by the playwright, Phrynichus in his *Persians*—of which we have no record. Four or five years later, in 472, Aeschylus produced his own *Persians*, using the same subject and title. The Athenians did not tire of either. As Murray writes, the play was more of a national celebration than simply a historical drama. This celebration of a city-state was common strategy in Aeschylus' drama and it would not have occurred either to him or to his audience that symmetry was violated by having a historical account sandwiched between two tragedies whose substance was pure mythology. For the Greeks, who believed that the forebears of some families were the heroes of the *Iliad*, mythology was history—ancient history to be sure, but history none the less. Events that happened earlier than what could be recalled from the events recited by a man's grandparents was in the province of ancient history. There was a continuity between the mythology of ancient history and familiar events. It was quite likely that the audience of the *Persians* would have thought the Persian War was continuous with the mythical past and a guide to future success. Undoubtedly the *homonoia* in the *Glaucus* reassured Athenians on the future.

while mortal. The Medicean manuscript only lists *Glaucus*, later manuscripts adding *Pontius*. There are scholars who hold that *Glaucus Pontius* ended the trilogy (Broadhead. *The* Persae *of Aeschylus*, p. lvii) and the disagreement seems to justify the single term, *Glaucus*.

[3] Gilbert Murray. *Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 113.

The true problem is deciding whether the *Persians* in fact was one play of a trilogy. The reason for this being vexatious is that the *Persians* is so constructed that it could contain both *the* transgression and *the* punishment in a single play. I have decided that it does but the *Phineus* remains to haunt us. The legends with which I am familiar do not seem to fit the punishment that Xerxes is given. The story that is most promising for moralizing pivots on the legend that Phineus was a famous prophet who published a secret of the gods and for that indiscretion was blinded. Aeschylus was able to tailor the cloth of legend to fit his desire but I do not know how the Phineus legends could be transformed to serve in the *Persians*. There may have been other versions of the Phineus story that would have fitted but that is not the nettle. It is an absence that troubles. Nowhere in the *Persians* have I come on a reference to a transgression described at length in a tragedy that precedes the *Persians*. That I have not been able to see how Aeschylus could have used the stories of Phineus may be unconvincing. I think there was no need for a prior play.

"No clue can be obtained from the few fragments that are commonly assigned to this play, one of which (258) refers to the Harpies snatching away with ravenous jaws the meal that the blind seer was about to eat (from Athenaeus, 421 F). Phineus received prophetic powers from Apollo (Apoll. Rhod. II, 180), but was blinded by the gods (according to Apollodoros, I, 9, 21) for having communicated to mortals the counsels of Zeus concerning the future. It has been suggested that the oracles referred to by Darius (*Pers.* 739-40, 801) were revealed by Phineus to the Argonauts, whose expedition was regarded by the Persians as an invasion of Asia by Europe, to be repaid in course of time by the invasion of Europe by Asia under the Persians ..."[4] But there is absolutely no evidence that makes the latter suggestion persuasive unless we are to be led by our own wishful thinking.

THE PERSIANS. So much for what may have preceded the *Persians*. I shall assume that the *Persians* was part of a brace of two plays and that it was the first of the two. There are some who make an even leaner mixture. At least one commanding figure in Greek scholarship, Lattimore, is of the opinion that the *Persians* stood alone. Lattimore is specific: "... Aeschylus did not here follow the custom of composing a trilogy out of three interdependent tragedies. The lost plays which accompanied the *Persians* may have anticipated it in themes and moods and morals, but they certainly neither initiated nor continued the story. The *Persians* is an independent

[4] H. D. Broadhead. *The* Persae *of Aeschylus*, p. lv.

tragedy, like the surviving plays of Sophocles. Aeschylus further intensified the unity ... by making one single action in the campaign—the navy's defeat at Salamis—represent the one great defeat of Persia which destroyed all."

There is no way to prove or disprove Lattimore's thesis. Hoping to strengthen the case for the "independent play" by remembering Sophocles is not helpful. More to the point is that Aeschylus overlooked certain events. If indeed what Herodotus reported on the destruction of Sardis did happen why did Aeschylus fail to mention desecration of sacred places that invited retributive justice, exactly as they did in the *Agamemnon*? If Darius, and after him Xerxes, sacked the temples of Ionia, Eretria, and the Greek mainland, with those of Athens last of all, the doctrine of *drasanti pathein* should have seen the Persians get their atê. The Persians may have been responding to the prior sack by the Greeks of the Persian city of Sardis. Quincey has remarked this oversight but explains that Aeschylus wished to emphasize the hybris of Xerxes much more than he did the historical account.[5] That may be so but I think that Aeschylus could have vindicated the Greeks and still acknowledged the pillage of Sardis.

The *Phineus* and *Glaucus* may possibly have been self-contained but I am not persuaded that the extant text of the *Persians* displays enough of a play. The *Persians* seems incomplete. There is no resolution of Xerxes' hybris, no promise for the future that makes remaining in Asia a fine thing rather than a choice to be made on the basis of unfortunate experience. After all, defeat can be a challenge. No, Aeschylus would wish to reassure the Athenians, and other Hellenes, that the Persians will not have to be repulsed yet again. This is the reason that I shall attempt to suggest that the *Persians* and the *Glaucus* might have made up a duo. But this is an argument that should be delayed until we have had time to reflect on the possibility of combining transgression and punishment in the same play.

With some disregard for teaching a history lesson in favor of teaching a moral one, Aeschylus has Darius condemn Xerxes for not trusting oracles. (*Pers.* 801-3) Darius could have talked about Phineus' foresight of Persian disaster. But we do not have a clue. Aside from a possible moral lesson,

[5] "The scant notice given to Persian charges is attributable not to ignorance or to blind patriotism but to dramatic design. Being a man of profound religious conviction, Aeschylus saw the Persian defeat on land and sea as the punishment for acts of *UBPIS* which they had committed in both spheres, acts which no provocation could justify; Salamis is conceived to be punishment for the bridging of the Hellespont (705 ff.) and Plataea the punishment for the plunder and destruction of Greek temples (805-22)." (Quincey. "Notes," p. 183.)

the *Persians* was an uncomplicated play. The tragedy unfolded in front of and later at the tomb of Darius the Great. A tomb, along with a typical doorway or entrance of palace or temple, was a favorite Greek stage property signifying the scene. The ghost of Darius will appear at this tomb and Aeschylus' skill with stage machinery will have been exercised to the delight of the audience!

The chorus of the *Persians* consisted of the venerable councillors of Xerxes, presumably not those who urged the young king to undertake his expedition against the Greeks. These old men are wise. The main figures were mature adults, "those who have learnt what suffering is" (*Pers.* 597), and, therefore, the way to wisdom.

The plot of the play is the simple one of the destruction of Persian might on land and sea. The play opens at the royal palace of Xerxes in Susa, specifically before the royal tomb of Xerxes' father, Darius. The naval battle of Salamis, with its great victory for the Athenians, has been fought a few months before. It is now the end of the year 480 B.C. The Chorus of Persian Elders enters and recounts the Persian might that sallied forth under the command of Xerxes. "Such was the flower of manhood, // The pride of Persian valour, // That we saw march away ..." (*Pers.* 59-60) Aeschylus had the Chorus tell how Xerxes threw a bridge of boats over the Hellespont so that the Persian armies might invade the Greek mainland. These armies have always triumphed but never before had they been led overwater. The Elders tremble at the thought of this daring.

Queen Atossa, Xerxes' mother enters, she does not allay the anxiety but rather adds to it by recounting a dream in which two women, one representing Asia, the other Greece, are harnessed to one chariot. But one struggles and breaks free. Is there any doubt that the rebel is Greece and that the gods had made the allotment of Asia—and Asia alone—to Persia? As for the Greeks, when Atossa asks the Chorus which master they obey, the answer that is given is that: "They are not called servants to any man." (*Pers.* 242)

The way has been prepared for the entry of a Messenger bringing the news of disastrous defeats which have stripped Persia of so many of her prize youth, her army and navy. "The flower of Persian chivalry and gentle blood. // The youth and valour of our choice nobility ... Are sunk into the mire of ignominious death // ... This depth of horror Xerxes saw ..." (*Pers.* 441-2, 444, 465) The Messenger spins out a horrendous tale in line after line until Queen Atossa cries: "Our army is destroyed and gone. O bitter grief." (*Pers.* 517) When next we hear from the Queen she asks that the ghost of Darius be raised to give counsel. This is done and Darius

provides the moral lesson that should be learned from Xerxes' hybris.

The introduction of the ghost of Darius was the introduction of a person who could guide, who could speak wisely at a time of crisis, and it was moral wisdom that the shade spoke. Presumably Darius had not known of events; he asked what had happened and was told that Xerxes had campaigned far afield, "Xerxes, whose rashness emptied Asia of its men." (*Pers.* 718) The account of Queen Atossa went on with an account of Xerxes' safely bridging the Hellespont and the shade recalled the prophecies come true. But the prophecies were not compelling. "Heaven takes part, for good or ill, with man's own zeal." (*Pers.* 741) There was no difference in this view of man's complicity in his own fate than the Homeric Council of the Gods, addressed by Zeus who regretted that mortals blamed the gods for the punishment and suffering brought on by their own excesses and transgressions. (*Od.* I, 36-50) Now Xerxes, "in youthful recklessness ... has been the cause of all." (*Pers.* 743-4) The death of Persia's youth was "the just reward of pride and godless insolence." (*Pers.* 809) "Zeus, throned on high, // Sternly chastises arrogant and boastful men." (*Pers.* 827-8) "That man (Xerxes) is mortal, and must learn to curb his pride. // For pride will blossom; soon its ripening kernel is // Infatuation; and its bitter harvest, tears." (*Pers.* 820-2) The lesson was standard. Xerxes—as all young men—had to learn what his forebearers learned, as the son of Medus "whose wisdom ruled his will." (*Pers.* 765) "Xerxes my son is young," said the ghost, "and has a young man's mind ..." (*Pers.* 782) But Xerxes learned "the blows of Heaven's savage hate!" (*Pers.* 912), as he described the punishment of anyone who transgressed the moral code. And Aeschylus had the play draw to its close with the sad lament of the young King returned to his decimated kingdom: "Behold me, theme for sorrow, // A loathed and piteous outcast. // Born to destroy my race." (*Pers.* 932-4) *Pathei mathos*!

The close of the play is all Xerxes. Xerxes enters distraught, his clothes in tatters. Who can forget the entrance of the king whom his father had said invited nemesis with his pride and godless insolence? (*Pers.* 809) Poor, pitiable Xerxes came on the stage, in tatters, his huge army lost, his navy shattered. Even the ghost of his father, Darius, was made to end his denouncement of his son's hybris with the gentle words that must have aroused the fathers in the audience to pity for Xerxes. "You, my dear wife, his mother, go into the house. // Fetch seemly clothes, and go to meet him; those he has // Hang around him, tattered to shreds of royal finery, // Torn in his anguish—all that grief has left to him. // Speak to him words of kindness; for your choice, I know, // Alone will claim and calm him." (*Pers.* 832-38)

And would not the mothers have joined their pity with the sorrow of

Queen Atossa, whose exit lines at the end of the play were a mother's cry: "O hand of God! My heart is sick with many griefs; // Yet none more sharp than this, to hear how wretchedly // My son is clothed, to his dishonour. I will go // And fetch clothes from the palace, and prepare my heart // To meet him, and not fail him in his hour of need." (*Pers.* 845-51) This is good theatre. The audience is a bit at sixes and sevens in knowing how to feel about Xerxes.

PUNISHMENT: MORAL LESSONS OF THE PERSIANS. By far the largest portion of the *Persians* was taken up with details of the punishment of Xerxes for his hybris in bridging the Hellespont and the sacking of Greek temples. (*Pers.* 745-50; 810-12) As the tragedy opens the Persian councillors recount how Xerxes, clad in gold, with "the flower of Asian youth" had set out. "Seamen in ships by thousands, // And horsemen, footmen ... Captains of Persian valour ... The Great King's kingly servants, // Amistres, Artaphernes, // Megabazes, and Astaspes ..." (*Pers.* 18-34), names the readers of Herodotus would find familiar. It was "the flower of manhood, // The pride of Persian valour" and the Athenians, who call no man master. When the queen asked the councillors: "Who shepherds them? What master do their ranks obey?" We have become familiar with the Churchillian response of the Chorus: "Master! They are not called servants to any man." (*Pers.* 241-3) How the Greeks detested slavery! Memorializing those who died at Marathon, Simonides, contemporary of Aeschylus, was said to have written an epitaph that heralded the dead as men who fought "that all Hellas might not see the day of slavery!"

GLAUCUS. Aeschylus had a ready-made tie between the *Persians* and the *Glaucus*. The playwright could have opened the last play with a scene before the palace where someone reminds the Chorus of the oracular warnings, disregard of which was a most impious act, inviting nemesis and leading to the atê of Persia being defeated by Athens and her allies. A distraught Xerxes then might have made his dramatic appearance. The very distraction of the king would have been sufficient evidence of his illness. Continuing to think of theatrics, the stage would have been set for judgment. I do not know who rendered judgment, perhaps these were the royal councillors. Nor can we know if any deities appeared, but I think they probably did. Poseidon might have been played, for it was Poseidon, or the Sea, whom Xerxes had attempted to shackle. It was Poseidon too, who would have to approve any future voyage on the sea. Apollo might have come as patron god of oracles and someone who might have healed Xerxes by persuading

the young king to be guided by oracular interpretation. And at that point Xerxes might have said that at last he realized that Persian destiny lay in Asia. But could not the sea be crossed by friendly seamen now that it was no longer bridled? If Glaucus was present, but as yet not heard from, Xerxes could have turned to him and charged Glaucus with making a godly and friendly expedition. A reconciliation of Persia and Hellas, notably Athens as leader of Hellas, would have been provided by Xerxes saying that Athenian sailors indeed had proven their skill as mariners. The Athenian audience could not but have been enthusiastic in its approval. The actor playing Xerxes could have promised to outfit a ship to be manned by seamen of Athens, and allies of Athens, if they consented. This would have been a righteous decision freely arrived at.

We will not speculate further beyond agreeing with Ahrens that the god, Glaucus, unfolded the fortunes and long voyage of the Argonauts "whose departure was mentioned towards the close of the *Phineus*."[6] This last does remind us of the type of loose association that could have held for the four plays.

The Argonaut expedition would fit a scene of *homonoia*, reconciliation, and *harmonia*, but not what we think was the judgment that opened the *Glaucus*. There was a tradition that Glaucus had built the ship, Argo, and had sailed with the Argonauts and was of service to them "after he became a marine deity."[7] Story has it that the Argonauts founded Sicilian cities which would have been a typical Aeschylean ploy pleasing such a city as Syracuse. It should not have been difficult to have imagined Athens as part of the Argonaut story and this, too, would have fitted the Aeschylean mold.

PROMETHEUS. If the satyr play *Prometheus* was added, I do not believe that it inaugurated the *lampadêdromia*[8] in which youths ran from the altar of Prometheus or the twin altars of Prometheus and Hephaestus to Athens with torches in their hands. Thinking of the *Prometheus Unbound*, my opinion is that the *lampadêdromia* were logically related to bringing fire, and the technologies of the crafts of potters and smiths, into mortal lives. But the name of Prometheus was attached to the satyr play and there had to be some connection with fire. It may be that Murray was correct as Broadhead stated Murray's thesis. "When the Greeks returned to their cities after the battle of Plataea, they had to purify the sacred places which had been

[6] Broadhead. *The* Persae *of Aeschylus*, p. lvii.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*, p. lix.

polluted by the Persians, and to do this they put out all the fires in the country and had them relit from the sacred hearth at Delphi. That great ceremonial of fire-kindling would be a good subject for the final play of a tetralogy."[9]

While there is no slightest shred of evidence that Murray's explanation or some other is the most likely, my feeling is that the *Prometheus* did not act the inauguration of some ceremony or perennial event but rather took the opportunity of showing a bond between Athens and the Greek colonies. I think that this bond was the carrying of ceremonial fire to each of the Sicilian cities. Once again a bit of geography could have been told along with Aeschylus' celebration of the upright ship (symbolizing the upright, righteous ship of state, Persia) with its cargo of fiery embers—similar to the spark that Prometheus hid in the giant fennel stalk—for hearths which would burn sacrifices to the immortals as they ministered to the whole gamut of mortal needs.

II. Seven Against Thebes and the Theban Trilogy: Synopsis of Seven Against Thebes and Speculation on the Trilogy

Dramatis Personae, Seven Against Thebes

Eteocles, King of Thebes, son of Oedipus and brother of Polyneices
A soldier
Chorus of Theban women
Antigone
Sisters of Eteocles and Polyneices
Ismene
A herald
Six armed champions of Thebes, attendants and others ...

The Theban Trilogy[10]

Story has it that the House of Labdacus furnished a succession of sorrows, only a little less fearsome than those plaguing the House of Atreus. King Labdacus died, presumably as Pentheus had died—that is for denying Bacchus. Labdacus' son was Laius and the tetralogy, with which Aeschylus won first prize in 467 B.C., included *Laius, Oedipus, Seven Against Thebes*

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] In using the title *The Theban Trilogy*, I am following the usage of Gilbert Murray in *Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy*, p. 112.

with the *Sphinx* the satyr-play. By opening the trilogy with the *Laius*, Aeschylus avoided mixing the transgression of Labdacus with the transgressions and miseries of Laius, Oedipus and the sons of Oedipus. We can presume that the only use made of the fate of Labdacus was to hint that transgression and punishment of a mortal by immortal was in Laius' background.

The story continues with saying that at Labdacus' death Thebes was ruled by Amphion, who banished Labdacus' son, Laius, who was described as married to Jocasta and childless. This description of childlessness would have spotted the role of a son, or sons, in the very first play of the trilogy. During his exile Laius kidnapped the son of Pelops, Chrysippus, and returned to Thebes after Amphion's death under the curse of Pelops, a curse that warned Laius to remain childless lest he be killed by his own son. The *Seven Against Thebes* does not make mention of Pelops, but repeatedly refers to the oracle of Apollo that warned Laius of his fate should he have a child. It is likely that Aeschylus had Laius transgress twice, once against Pelops and once in disobeying Apollo by rejecting the counsel of the Apollonian oracle, which would have told of the kidnapping of Pelops' son by the childless Laius. True to my thought on the rhythm of the trilogies, the first play would have ended with the seduction of Laius by his wife, Jocasta, and the birth of Oedipus ("Swollen Foot") and the attempt of Laius and Jocasta to thwart the oracle by giving little Oedipus, his ankles pierced, to a shepherd with order to expose the infant on Mt. Cithaeron.

Oedipus, I think, is the second play of the trilogy. As a second play its major theme is punishment. It would be a good guess to think the drama focused on the life of Oedipus beginning with a narrative recalling how Oedipus was spared by the shepherd, how he was adopted by the childless Polybus, King of Corinth, whom Oedipus thought his father. The piety of Polybus could have been contrasted with the impiety of Laius. The play might have continued with the audience told how Oedipus consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphi where he was told that he would kill his father and marry his mother. Oedipus heeded the oracle and turned away from Corinth. The audience would have been prepared for the inadvertent slaying of Laius by Oedipus and the action might have begun with Oedipus arriving in Thebes and successfully confronting the Sphinx. The transgression of patricide would have weighed heavily in Aeschylus and conventional Greek morality, but would have been balanced by the unfatherly treatment Laius had shown the infant Oedipus and the remorse Oedipus later showed (and which the audience knew from the Oedipus legend that he would). The episode of Oedipus triumphing over the Sphinx would have given Aeschylus a fine opportunity to display his skill with mechanical devices—

perhaps 'flying' the winged part-lion, part-woman to a perch on a rock. It was from the rock that the Oedipus legend had the Sphinx ask unfortunate Theban passers-by a riddle: "What is which, having one voice, is first four-footed, then two-footed, and is at the last three-footed?" One after the other the Thebans, failing to solve the riddle, were killed by the monster. But Oedipus, challenged, solved the riddle. "The creature is man," he said. "For in infancy he crawls on all fours, in mature years he walks upright on two feet, and in old age goes as it were on three by aid of a cane." Some of Aeschylus' audience would have been delighted if the playwright had the Sphinx throw itself to the ground—the story being that the monster killed itself by jumping into the valley.

Although I have not tried to identify who it was that might have offered this account of Oedipus' travels, a fair guess would give the story to the leader of the Chorus. It would have been convenient to have this recitation come at a point in the play rather parallel to the Io episode in the *Prometheus Bound.* As that episode allowed Aeschylus chance to entertain with a geography lesson, a like opportunity can be charged against the recitation of the wanderings of Oedipus and his arrival at Thebes. Might not Oedipus himself have spoken? He certainly could have but the defeat of the Sphinx invites hybris and it is doubtful that Aeschylus wished to divert attention to possible boasting by the king. This is purely conjectural at best and it is more promising to move on to events that legend has transpired after Oedipus is named king of Thebes.

All of this probably took half of the *Oedipus.* Justice had been done and the way was clear for establishing what was to be judged in the first of the *Seven Against Thebes.* But we have only guessed at the long first part of the *Oedipus.* Surely Aeschylus found a way to say that years had passed since Oedipus killed his father and married his mother. We know from the *Seven* that the children of Oedipus must have been young adults. Aeschylus could have followed the well-known story in which the daughters of Oedipus, Antigone and Ismene, were conventionally righteous, though Antigone might have appeared somewhat headstrong, as she is in the *Seven.* Still, it is not the daughters who matter; neither the fate of the House of Oedipus, nor the well-being of Thebes in its leadership will depend on *them.*

It is the brothers whose conduct is essential. Two aspects of their behavior must be weighed. In the first place, the fate of the House of Oedipus is harmed by their behavior towards their father; they commit the grave transgression of *gêrotrophia.* When the blind Oedipus expects care and respect, Eteocles and Polyneices treat him harshly, they grudge "him his place at home." (*Seven.* 785) The other aspect of the behavior of the brothers has

to do with their inheritance and the rule of Thebes. In the story that Aeschylus used Eteocles and Polyneices cannot agree on one or the other inheriting the rule of Thebes. They are "in mad jealousy." The compromise that they arrive at is that they will rule in alternate years, Eteocles having the first year.

In the meantime, Oedipus has cursed his sons for their *gêrotrophia.* In the *Seven* we are told of this curse over and over again. "And when his sons grudged him his place at home, then in fury and with a bitter tongue, alas! He hurled his curses upon them, that in time they should apportion their inheritance with violence and a dividing sword." (*Seven.* 785-89) These are lines given the Chorus late in the *Seven.* In the *Oedipus* the "violence and a dividing sword" would have been hidden in oracular language matching the riddle-language of the Sphinx. We know what it was because Aeschylus has the language repeated in the *Seven.* When Eteocles exits to fight Polyneices the Chorus recalls the curse (of Oedipus): "... the stranger apportioning their inheritance, // That Chalybus who comes from distant Scythia, // To be a harsh divider of their possessions, // Is cruel-hearted steel; // It is steel that has cast the die and assigned them land ..." (*Seven.* 727-31)

More light is shed with the lines given the Chorus even later in the *Seven.* The brothers have fallen at each other's hands. "Now their enmity is over; and their lives mingle // where a pool of gore soaks into the earth; // Now they are truly one blood. // He was a harsh settler of quarrels, // The stranger from the sea who leaps out of fire // —iron ground to an edge; // And a harsh and cruel divider of possessions, // Is Ares, who makes a father's curse come true." (*Seven.* 937-46) The stranger from the sea who leaps out of fire, the Scythian stranger, Chalybus, is the iron of the swords Eteocles and Polyneices will use. And the arbitration of Ares is nothing but a way of speaking of the fight that will end so fatally. So it was that the Messenger who brought the news of Thebes' salvation but the death of the brothers could say: "Our city thrives; but her two heads and generals // have thus divided with forged Scythian steel the sum // of their inheritance. The land they possess // shall be what each gets for his grave ..." (*Seven.* 815-18)

The *Oedipus* ends with the fate of the cursed brothers still wrapped in mystery. The audience is in suspense and will come with keen anticipation to the *Seven Against Thebes.*

The *Seven* opens with a judgment scene, which, after the fashion of Aeschylus, will occupy three-quarters of the play. Polyneices never appears. There is no need to judge him; Polyneices is clearly unrighteous. While

Polyneices had been wronged by Eteocles, who would not turn over the rule of Thebes when it was time for Polyneices to be king, Polyneices had attacked Thebes and that was unpardonable. Eteocles, in contrast, appears the able commander and King, made to seem highly circumspect in his rejection of the hybris of the Argive champions sent against the gates of Thebes. Indeed by far the longest passage of the *Seven*—and one I will remark on later—is taken up with moral contrasts between the hybristic devices on the shields of the Argives—that of Polyneices included—and the modesty of the Thebans who are the defending champions assigned by Eteocles. Of course, this was intended to persuade the audience that they should add weight to the pan of righteousness on the moral beam-balance that Aeschylus applied to all his leading characters.

The clinching item of Eteocles' characterization is his "manly endurance." He does not resist the doom sounded by his father's curse. While Aeschylus does specifically express regret—perhaps the Greeks would have thought that unmanly—he accepts his doom and links the death of his brother and himself with the extirpation not only of the House of Oedipus, but of that of Laius as well. In the words of the Messenger who reports the brothers' fatal fight: "... the seventh gate, The Lord Apollo ... Took for himself, and so brought Laius' ancient sin, // To due fulfillment for the race of Oedipus." (*Seven.* 798-802)

With Eteocles exiting to battle his brother, the play had really done with its 'scene of judgment.' There will be several more restatements of the Apollonian oracular warning of Laius and Oedipus and of Oedipus' curse, but the end of the drama has begun. Unlike the end of the *Eumenides*, a happy ending, *in our terms*, is absent. But it would be an error to overlook the fact that Eteocles and his men have saved Thebes. For a Greek audience *that* would be a happy ending indeed. They would attach a good deal less importance than do we to what follows: the famous Ismene-Antigone scene. The daughters of Oedipus come on the stage. At first Ismene and Antigone have a two-part dialogue. It may have been that each girl led half of the chorus, the parts of which supplement each other. Heard as a whole, the Ismene-Antigone stichomythia retells the main points of the trilogy. This done, a Herald enters (*Seven.* 1005) and tells that the regents of Thebes have decreed burial with honors for Eteocles but exposure to the elements and preying animals for the body of Polyneices. Antigone disputes the decision saying that she will bury her brother, Polyneices.

To some the end of the play, beginning with the Herald's announcement of the proclamation from the Theban regents was added by someone(s) and replaced the ending that had been prepared by Aeschylus. To these

critics, what we have is too unlike Aeschylus. But I sponsor the view that the ending was typical of Aeschylus, typical of a man whose ethical views were tough, not tender. Heretofore, the argument has rested on the use of language. I do not feel that enough can be said on that score to make a convincing case. My opinion is rooted in the moral view to which I think Aeschylus subscribed.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES. If the *Prometheus Bound* is the most difficult of Aeschylean tragedies to understand, the *Seven* runs a close second, with the *Persians*, a poor third. I say this last because the difficulties posed by the *Persians* are pretty much those of placement. For example, it is a matter of argument whether the *Persians* is part of a larger unit. I have argued that it is. By comparison with the snares set by the *Seven*, proceeding through the *Persians* is as an easy walk contrasted with as treacherous a one as Pilgrim's. To pick a single illustration, how shall Grube be answered when he writes: "The *Seven Against Thebes* is the last play in its trilogy, but here there seems to be no reconciliation, and the curse of Laius works itself out in bloody death to the end."[11] And is Eteocles morally sound? Even more troubling is a decision on whether the end of the *Seven* is spurious. There is much to suggest that it is—quite apart from whether the words and phrases persuade experts that they either are, or are not, those of Aeschylus. What is so devilishly perplexing (in the lines that begin with 1005) is that the debate between the Herald and Antigone seems to prepare the way for an act of judgment! If my formula for the trilogies is correct, the climactic scene of judgment should come in the first part of the third play. And that would push the *Seven* back from the third position in the trilogy to second. But the didascalic record leaves no grounds for a reasonable doubt on whether the *Seven* was a third play.

The note of the victory of Aeschylus in 467 B.C. may prove our salvation. We only have to hold to it. If we hold fast to the formula, the *Seven* can be understood with even the ending of the play becoming plain. The matrix in which the formula has its being is a tough moral philosophy. I begin with that. If a trilogy can have a happy ending in a conventional sense of a 'happy ending,' fine—if the moral philosophy that appealed to Aeschylus is not violated. Of course, the *harmonia-homonoia* of the finale to the *Oresteia* is a prime example of a milk-and-honey end.

The last of the *Seven* has nothing like the euphoric atmosphere created

[11] G. M. A. Grube. "Zeus in Aeschylus." *AJPh*, 91:49 (1970).

by the judgment in favor of Orestes and the transformation of the Erinyes into Eumenides. I suppose that is just why we stumble at the close of the *Seven*. We are looking for that type of ending. I propose that we give up trying to find it, because it need never have existed. But I will have more to say about that at the close of this chapter. Presently my suggestion is that not only was the ending of the *Seven* consistent with Aeschylean morality, but that Aeschylus had a bulldog grip on the idea that strict obedience to the moral code—however high and demanding its standards—was the best protection of a city-state. In terms of Thebes, the seemingly unhappy ending of the *Seven* in fact represents the salvation of the polis. Thebes will be ruled by the sacred-secular law of the moral code. It is this that Aeschylus has been showing his audience. The playwright demonstrates by having Eteocles champion the cause of Homeric values in his endless rebuke (some two hundred lines are allotted the moralizing) to the hybris of the heraldic devices on the shields of the Argive challengers in contrast to the unassuming posture of those Eteocles sends to guard the gates of Thebes.[12] Again,

[12] H. Patzer. "Die dramatische Handlung der *Sieben gegen Theben*."

Although the content of this extended moral lesson would lead us away from our attention to the dramatic points of the manner in which Aeschylus handled the punishment of Eteocles and Polyneices, the lines are instructive of the conventional moral code held by Aeschylus. For that reason the more illustrative passages should be noted. The first gate was attacked by the "great Tydeus," whom the prophet Amphiaraus called "murderer, public trouble-maker" (*Seven.* 751) who "more than all (the others)" (presumably meant to include Polyneices) "taught Argos evil ways, // High priest of bloodshed, wakener of avenging spirits, // Adrastus' counselor in this infatuate war." (*Seven.* 572-75) Aeschylus' condemnation of unrighteous war, with its stasis, was as roundly denounced here as in the *Agamemnon* where the image was of Ares dealing with bodies as merchants deal with coin. Tydeus, fighting at the Gate of Proteus, was, as Amphiaraus' words would have one expect, "mad with lust for battle," carrying a shield (the "shield of Achilles" doubtless was precedent for the artful embossing Aeschylus intended his audience to appreciate) with the "insolent device" of a night sky. Eteocles described his device of Tydeus' as prophetic folly, foretelling the "night of death ... His pride becomes a prophecy against himself." (*Seven.* 403-6) To fight with Tydeus, Eteocles sent the "brave" son of Astacus, Melanippus. "His birth // Is noble; he reveres the throne of Modesty, // And hates proud speech ..." (*Seven.* 408-10)

Against Thebes' Electran Gate came the Argive soldier Capaneus: "A giantlike boaster worse than him already named. // His bragging shows pride more than human ..." (*Seven.* 424-5) Polyphontes will oppose Capaneus. Polyphontes is "grudging of speech, fiery in courage." (*Seven.* 448)

The third Neistan Gate was assaulted by Eteoclus. "On his shield is a device-// No humble one: a man in armour climbing up // By a ladder to the enemy's wall to sack their town ..." (*Seven.* 464-6) Against Eteoclus, Eteocles sent Margareus, soldier "whose hands // Will do his boasting for him." Is there any doubt of Aeschylus admiring brief,

Eteocles proves that he has internalized the moral code by his 'manly endurance' of the death, which, of course, is the 'proper' retribution for the lack of *gêrotrophia* (care for the elderly) Polyneices and he were guilty of vis-à-vis Oedipus.

Such is the man to whom Thebes can properly be trusted. And so it

trenchant speech as King Pelasgus treasured it!

Hippomedon drew "the gate next to Athena Onca." On Hippomedon's shield was an image of smoking Typhon and Ares "has entered into him; // A Bacchant, drunk with lust of war ..." (*Seven.* 497-8) Hyperbius will fight with the Argive champion, Hippomedon. On Hyperbius' shield is the image of "Father Zeus ... Hyperbius; // Will know the saving hand of Zeus, whose shield he bears." (*Seven.* 513-20)

Only five of the seven Argive champions have been named. There are two more to go. Aeschylus cleverly broke his moral lesson at this point and did so in a way that has not been appreciated. Five of the Argives had been examples of vice; the sixth was virtue incarnate! The audience might have expected all the Argives to be bad, all the Thebans good. Aeschylus avoided complete stereotyping, had the sixth Argive name and condemn the seventh. This seventh was Polyneices and the audience heard him condemned, not by Eteocles or one of Eteocles' soldiers but by an Argive, "a soldier who refrains from boasts, // A prophet who fights bravely." The good man was the "strong Amphiaraus" who was to storm the Homoloean Gate.

The villains had been named, all but Polyneices, and Eteocles damned them for all "their blasphemies, their boastful emblems, all // Meet at Heaven's hand the violence of their own rage! // Ruinous and evil, like themselves, would be their end." (*Seven.* 550-2) Some in the audience must have thought of the suitors in Odysseus' court and their "ruinous and evil" end. Among the suitors there was one who, as Amphiaraus among the men of Argos, was good Amphinomus. To Amphinomus, Odysseus, disguised as a beggar but about to kill the suitors—as the Argive champions were to die—taught the moral law. Remembering the *Seven* as a morality play, those words bear repeating: "Amphinomos, your head is clear ... And you seem gently bred. // In view of that, // I have a word to say to you, so listen. // Of moral creatures, all that breathe and move, // earth bears none frailer than mankind. What man // believes in woe to come, so long as valor // and tough knees are supplied him by the gods? // But when the gods in bliss bring miseries on // then willynilly, blindly, he endures. // Our minds are as the days are, dark or bright, // blown over by the father of gods and men ... No man should flout the law, // but keep in peace what gifts the gods may give." (*Od.* XVIII, 125-143)

But Athena bound Amphinomus to his place; he died even as Amphiaraus foresaw that he must die: "For me, it is this country's earth I shall enrich; // my tomb and oracle shall stand on foreign ground. // Then let us fight. I foresee death, but not dishonour." Amphiaraus' shield had no device; "for he cares not to seem the bravest, but to be ..." (*Seven.* 592) Listening to the soldier's advice to match Amphiaraus with a Theban warrior "both wise and brave," Aeschylus had Eteocles send "strong Lasthenes" who had "an old man's wisdom, a young man's muscle" but the playwright had Eteocles add: "Yet—among mortals victory is the gift of heaven." (*Seven.* 625)

In addition to the hybris, which is the obvious common quality of the devices on the shields of those who attacked Thebes, there is the perfectly reasonable and very interesting interpretation of Seth Benardete: "Two Notes on Aeschylus' *Septem*," (2nd Part), *WS*, (1968), pp. 5-17.

was that Aeschylus could have Eteocles played as one who was calm when the Theban women were hysterical, yet accepting of his own mad impiety in going to a fraternal fight Eteocles knows will be fatal. When I think of why it is so difficult to accept this interpretation, I remember the stichomythia of Prometheus and Hermes. That debate comes at just about the same place in the play as the lines containing the defiance Antigone shows the Herald, who has announced the decision of the regents on the disposition of the brothers' corpses. A liberal temper leads us to side with Prometheus, to cheer his defiance. I say that is no more justified than our siding with Antigone. The exchanges I have in mind are summed in a couple of lines from both the *Prometheus Bound* and the *Seven*. In the one instance the authority is that of Zeus—representing the whole of the moral code—and the messenger of the authority, Hermes. In the *Seven*, Antigone defies the authority of the city-state. HERMES: "Come, bring yourself, perverse fool, while there is still time, // to weigh your situation, and so turn to sense." (*PB.* 1001) PROMETHEUS: "You waste your breath." (*PB.* 1001) Hermes is the voice of unheeded reason.

The *Seven* has its parallel: HERALD: "I warn you, do not think you can defy the State." ANTIGONE: "I warn you not to herald me—you waste your time." (*Seven.* 1042-3) The Herald's is the voice of unheeded reason.

It is my belief that just as Aeschylus intended to have Prometheus thought ill and guilty in defiance of the authority of immortal order, he intended Antigone to seem to plead the wrong case in defying the order of mortal authority. One cannot forget how seriously Greeks took the polis. The victory of Thebes is the equivalent to a modern country victorious in war. That was even more important than the insured future of a family. And the authority of those who rule a city was of moment. The authority of some modern city council, mayor or other bit of urban bureaucracy is not at all comparable.

I may be taxed with forgetting the disobedience of Danaus by his daughter, Hypermestra, who did not kill her husband, Lynceus. The parallel does not obtain. Polyneices had transgressed the moral code, not only in the lack of *gêrotrophia* and lusting after power, wealth, and status, which he shared with Eteocles—and for which he must die—but in waging war against his native *city*. Aeschylus, through the words of the Herald, grants that Polyneices was wronged by his brother, who would not give him a turn at ruling Thebes, but the Herald answers Antigone: "Because one man had wronged him, he attacked us all." (*Seven.* 1050) No, Aeschylus did not uphold the cause of Antigone—as Sophocles did. In matters of morality Aeschylus did not subscribe to the Protagorean thesis, that man is the

measure of all things. It is because the playwright would have been as outraged with Sophistic thought as Plato was to be that he could not be thought to agree that "... what a State upholds as just // Changes with the change of time." (*Seven.* 1070-71) What is authority, what is themis, what is righteous never changes in the moral philosophy of Aeschylus.

In looking about for objections to the idea that Eteocles could be buried with honors when he had transgressed the moral code, it should be remembered that Eteocles had willingly paid his debt, even as had Cassandra. He had accepted his death, a voluntary act no less free for being dressed up as the fulfillment of a curse. Yes, proprieties had been done and the *Seven* could close with the lines of the demi-Chorus chanting: "... we will go with Eteocles; // Since here the State and Justice speak with one voice. // For it was he above all // Who after the blessed gods and almighty Zeus // as pilot of our Cadmean city // saved us from overturning and from being engulfed in the wave of foreign invaders." (*Seven.* 1072-78) *Pari passu* Aeschylus intended the audience to reject the lines of the other half of the Chorus: "Let the State do, or not do, as it will. // We here will follow Polyneices to his grave, // and take part in his burial. // This sorrow belongs to the whole race of Cadmus; // And what a State upholds as just // Changes with the changing of time." (*Seven.* 1066-71)

Can so grim an ending be harmonious? What has been composed, what wound bound up and fruitful future promised? Here is a play whose hero dies so ignominiously. But a Greek audience would not have thought a grim ending inappropriate. As Aeschylus himself, they must have thought that they had been taught the Homeric lesson that justice is retributive and cannot be escaped. The fate of Polyneices could have been avoided. Even if he had to pay his debt by dying, Eteocles showed Greeks that even in death a patriot could be given a most honorable burial. For the Greeks this last was no small matter. They had seen a life made whole in death. *Homonoia* had been acted and the way to *Harmonia* had been pointed in the moral of the trilogy.

CONTRASTING MORALITIES. The propriety of having the body of Polyneices "thrown out // Unburied for dogs to tear ..." (*Seven.* 1012-14) had been established not only in the *Seven* but in the *Oedipus.* While I can only guess at what happened in the *Oedipus* it would have been poor theatre to leave the quality of Polyneices' character truly ambiguous. *Some* ambiguity was good theatre. Clytemnestra was more interesting because real in her grievance against Agamemnon on account of Iphigenia's death. Even Aegisthus was more real because of a well-known and accepted grudge

against Agamemnon's side of the family. Aeschylus did not make Homer's mistake of drawing a character all good or all evil. Polyneices was not all evil but sufficiently evil to make his end acceptable and his role minor. It was enough that, although his brother had wronged him, he wronged Thebes, marching in the army of Adrastus, king of Argos, and himself one of the seven Argive champions each assaulting one of Thebes' seven gates.

As Patzer assures us[13] the Greeks thought of a city as a mother. For Polyneices to war on Thebes was matricide. In addition, Polyneices was guilty of hybris. Before 'madness had taken his wits away,' Eteocles labeled him without libeling. The point is small but Aeschylus allows Polyneices to be condemned out of his own mouth and in terms of the device on his own shield. It is only after both are reported by a neutral, an anonymous soldier, that Eteocles speaks of Polyneices. It is the soldier who tells Eteocles that: "Upon Thebes and you // he calls down curses and destruction; prays that he, // Standing upon our walls, proclaimed as conqueror, // Chanting over our land wild shouts of victory ..." (*Seven.* 632-35) The shield of Polyneices proclaims him guided by Justice. It is this that Eteocles finds repulsive. "Now, surely, least of all, // When his own city suffers violence at his hand, // Does Justice stand beside him. She join with one // So infatuate, Justice would herself be named a lie." (*Seven.* 644-68)

Aeschylus had tried to be explicit in his condemnation of Polyneices. The impious war against Thebes that the Herald was to charge to Polyneices, had been the subject of an earlier accusation made by one of Polyneices' fellow Argives, the goodly man, a prophet, Amphiaraus. "Seeker of Strike," is what Polyneices' name meant and Amphiaraus "twice dwelling on that ominous name" denounced Polyneices for matricidal war. "Surely," Aeschylus had the prophet say with scorn, "such a deed pleases the gods, // Is glorious both to hear and hand on to the young— // To bring an alien army to assault and ravage // Your father's city, lay in dust your country's gods. // Can it be right to quench the spring that nursed your life? // When your own soil is made the prisoner of your sword // Because you are jealous, how can that assist your cause?" (*Seven.* 579-86)

All Argive and Theban champions have been named; Eteocles has shown himself completely attuned to the moral code. The audience has been assured that the king is a good man. Having made this abundantly clear, Aeschylus does a very clever thing. He has Eteocles pronounce his own madness, not in so many words but the message is not lost by its indirection. "O house

[13] H. Patzer. "Die Dramatische Handlung der *Sieben gegen Theben.*" *HSCP*, 63 (1958), pp. 97-119.

that gods drive mad," Aeschylus has the king cry out. "O house of endless tears, our house of Oedipus!" Eteocles goes on. "It is his curse that now bears fruit in us his sons." (*Seven.* 653-5)

I will return to the force of that curse but the power of Aeschylus' technique would be missed were we not to notice how neatly he divides the same man, who has piled up such a weight of virtuous word and deed, from the man who, mad with "bursting passion" (*thymoplêthês*) (*Seven.* 687) and a "lust for battle" (*Seven.* 688) is "goaded on by a wild craving // For ritual blood ..." (*Seven.* 692-3) Eteocles now is like Polyneices. Alike in folly the brothers "were like men possessed," (*Seven.* 1001-2) "enforced by their inexpressible rage." (*Seven.* 897)

As he had with Prometheus representing one in the possession of an overmastering rage, Aeschylus showed his audience what Homer had taught with the aid of Phoenix, the old teacher of Achilles. It was Phoenix (*Il.* IX) who bade his former pupil remember the sad fate of Meleager, who, as Achilles, had been mastered by the passion of extreme anger.

Aeschylus was careful to show that Eteocles had become a different man from the calm general who rebuked the hysterical women of Thebes. Now they were the cool ones who soberly remembered the moral code and urged forebearance and moral obedience on their king. It was they who told Eteocles that the urge he felt was evil. (*Seven.* 689) Repeatedly it is the Chorus of women who preach the immorality of the course on which Eteocles is set in his mad fixation on fighting with Polyneices—who was equally mad in his intention to kill Eteocles and, "killing you," the soldier reports, "die at your side." (*Seven.* 636)

I have acknowledged admiration for Aeschylus' skill in appealing to the female contingent in the audience. The last portion on the *Seven* is such a fine example of the appeal that I cannot miss out on drawing attention to it. Nor is the plot irrelevant to the theme of morality. It is women who warn Eteocles that the "urge you feel is evil." The male segment of the audience already had their self-esteem reinforced by having Eteocles calm upset women and lead his city to victory. Now the turn is the woman's. The same man serves the playwright! Now it is Eteocles who is mastered by passion. Now it is women who tell a man what is impious. "Let a woman's word persuade you even against your will." (*Seven.* 712)

But Eteocles will not listen. The voice of morality has lost. We do not know what crucial scene of persuasion was the turning point of the *Oedipus.* Perhaps it came with Oedipus trying to persuade his sons to be righteous in restraining their desires for inheritance—submerging personal ambition in the best interest of Thebes. All we can hazard is the guess that the brothers

chose impiously. They had begun incurring a debt that only could be discharged with their death. And so it was in the *Seven* for Eteocles. The patriotism and free-will of Eteocles have been remarked but I will write of both again; each is essential for our remembrance. The king had done enough for Thebes to 'buy' honorable burial with his patriotism but nothing could keep him from death. And at this point in the trilogy the audience knew that it was to be understood that Eteocles went to his death voluntarily. The Greeks were not misled by the man playing Eteocles pronouncing the conventional words attributing his doom to a fate ordained by the gods. "When the gods send destruction there is no escape." (*Seven.* 719) Had not Eteocles' lines delivered just a few seconds earlier rejected the persuasion of the Theban women? "My will is set; not all your words can blunt it now." The Greeks knew that it was only the poet's convention to say that doom came from the gods. Had not Homer let his people in on that when his Zeus sighed at the Council of the Gods: "... how mortals take the gods to task! // All their afflictions come from us, we hear. // And what of their own failings?" (*Od.* I, 36-38)

FORCE OF A CURSE. It was in reflecting on the *Oresteia* that I came to the conclusion that curses were handy things for a moralist who used tragedies as the instruments of ethical teaching. The curses lost nothing in the process of storytelling. And the tales gained by the chilling prediction that curses gave the audience. Those who viewed the Theban trilogy knew the mythology[14] that the three generations of the House of Laius were under a cloud, with many of the household doomed for their transgressions.

Even Antigone transgresses in the ending of the *Seven.* Sophocles, not Aeschylus, could make her a heroine. Antigone's transgression in rejecting the authority of the Theban regents is no less predictive than an action that begets a curse. It is just a bit more difficult to 'see' that transgression leads to nemesis and atê. A curse helps point up the delinquency. I think helping is the *only* function of curses in the plays of Aeschylus. Aside from that they have no force; and without a transgression having been committed earlier there is no curse. Not that a transgression need bring down a curse. Laius did not harken[15] to the Delphic prediction. Laius was

[14] Graves. *Greek Myths*, Vol. II, pp. 9-15; Apollodorus. *The Library*, Vol. 2, Bk. III, pp. v-vi.

[15] It would be well to think that not heeding a warning of an oracle, certainly of Apollo's principal oracle, need not be disobedience but a transgression nonetheless. Laius did not wilfully disobey; he drank excessively. It was not well that one carried anything to excess but being overpowered by wine was not a major transgression. Disregarding

not cursed, but he suffered because he had transgressed. Oedipus was not punished. Aeschylus had Oedipus blind himself out of a sense of remorse, which the Greeks would have thought fine. But Eteocles and Polyneices were cursed because of their transgression. Against Oedipus they had shown a lack of *gêrotrophia*, the exact nature of which we do not know, but legend tells that the king cursed his sons "when they insolently sent him the inferior portion of the sacrificial beast, namely haunch instead of shoulder."[16] It only requires remembering Zeus' anger with Prometheus for trying to deceive him with the sacrificial offering to know that Hesiod has reminded us of how seriously the Greeks took such affronts to their position, i.e., their authority.

We shall say no more of the force of a curse in the plays of Aeschylus. No playwright's sorcery must keep one from understanding that Aeschylus' central motive always is persuasion of Greeks to true obedience of the moral code, to the law of retributive justice and whatever else shall be included in the phrase 'the moral law.' This is the same reasoning we would use for response to the thought that possession of wealth, status and power is what drives Eteocles—and *pari passu*, Polyneices.[17]

IS THE CONCLUSION OF THE SEVEN ATHETIZED?[18] Of modern research on

a message from the gods, again specially one from Apollo, was to fly in the face of a certain prehension of future events. I suppose Aeschylus felt that failure to act as though one acknowledged that Apollo's prophecy was actually a sight into the future, or a vision of things to come, was the equivalent of transgression against the allotted power of Apollo.

[16] Graves. *Greek Myths*, Vol. II, 105k.

[17] For the most convincing argument that Eteocles was inspired by a desire for possession one should read Leon Golden. *In Praise of Prometheus Humanism and Rationalism in Aeschylean Thought*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962, p. 42ff. The same thesis, and even more strenuously advanced, is in H. D. Cameron. "'Epigoni' and the Law of Inheritance in Aeschylus' *Septem*." *GRBS*, 9 (Autumn, 1968), pp. 247, 256. For Cameron, Eteocles symbolized the old custom of primogeniture while Polyneices stands for the innovation of equal division. Challenging speculation is, it seems, less persuasive than the one which understands Aeschylus to be a staunch defendant of the old morality.

[18] D. L. Page. *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934, p. 30 ff.; Hugh Lloyd-Jones. "The End of the Seven Against Thebes," *CQ*, 9 (May 1959), No. 1, pp. 80-115. Pages 112 ff. are cited. Lloyd-Jones' essay is the most thoroughgoing of modern reflections on the ending of the *Seven*; I shall borrow from it freely.

References for and against the spurious end are given by Cameron. ("'Epigoni'," p. 249 including fn.) Cameron's review contains an instructive paragraph of summary: "After Theodor Bergk (1884) and Wilamowitz (1903, 1914) had argued that the ending was spurious, the first really powerful attempt to defend the passages was made in 1959 by Professor Hugh Lloyd-Jones. He was answered in turn by Eduard Fraenkel (1964)

the *Seven* nothing has been more animated than study and discussion on the Antigone-Ismene episode ending the play. Those who believe that this ending was added after the death of Aeschylus believe that it was the rehash of one or more actors. This is the question posed us: was the ending of the *Seven* an actor's interpolation? Surviving editions of the *Seven* have an ending (from line 902) which included the lament of Antigone and Ismene for their brothers. The regents of Thebes have ruled that while Polyneices is not to be buried, Eteocles, "in recognition // Of his devotion to this city, shall be interred // In his own native soil; for in her cause he chose // To defy his enemies at cost of his own life; // Thus, guiltless towards the temples of his father's gods, // He died with honour where it befits young men to die." (*Seven.* 1007-11) Nothing in the plays we have of Aeschylus was intended to be a lie.

One small note should be added. The burial granted Eteocles and denied Polyneices had special significance for the Greeks.[19] Aeschylus used the burial as one more way to emphasize that Eteocles from that point forward was to be thought of as morally sound. Agamemnon was a somewhat analogous case. Once Agamemnon had discharged his moral debts and was buried, he could be cast as a hero and splendid father. Polyneices was wicked, therefore he could not be buried; Polyneices was not buried, therefore he must have been wicked.

We now can move backwards in the play, looking at the whole of the Antigone-Ismene episode. Wilamowitz rejected lines 861-874 as false.[20] I have not been able to assess the stylistic grounds of the judgment; beyond the matter of style the lines seem inoffensive. Chanting the triumph of the Erinyes, that is of atê, recognized the doctrine of retributive justice which certainly was Aeschylean.[21] No part of the reflection on the judgment that

primarily on linguistic grounds and in 1967 by D. D. Dawe, who addressed himself to the literary arguments. Recent writers agree that the essential question is whether a new theme is likely to have been introduced at the end of a trilogy." (249.)

[19] Lloyd-Jones emphasized the role of the burial in Greek thought. (Lloyd-Jones. "The End," p. 92 ff.)

[20] Beginning with the Chorus announcing the presence of Antigone and Ismene: "Look! Antigone and Ismene are here; // They have a bitter duty, to mourn for their brothers. // I know that with all sincerity // The sorrows of their sweet breasts // Will be uttered in full and worthy lamentation. // But before they speak it is our duty // To cry aloud the hymn of the Fiend of Doom // And to chant the hated triumph-song of Death. // Ah, you who are more unhappy in your brothers // Than all who bind their gowns across the breast! // I weep and groan; not from pretence // But truly from the heart my shrill cry comes." (*Seven.* 861-74.)

[21] Lloyd-Jones. "The End," p. 81 ff. and 100 ff.

ended with the brothers getting their atê, that is, at line 719 when Eteocles insisted on fighting, was antithetical to Aeschylus' moral teaching. That the reflection was lengthy and repeated its lesson on retributive justice cannot be gainsaid. But that was not grounds for rejecting the lines as those of Aeschylus. Will there be more adequate grounds for thinking that Aeschylus did not write the Antigone-Ismene scene?

Lloyd-Jones will be our guide to other linguistic and stylistic arguments against authenticity. Lloyd-Jones' own summary statement of the commanding questions is this: "the last section of the play contains a number of awkwardnesses and singularities. We have to ask ourselves whether these are of such a nature as to disprove, or to throw serious doubt upon, its Aeschylean authorship. We have also to ask whether the awkwardnesses and singularities would themselves have supplied a case for athetesis even without the arguments based upon the content of this part of the text ..."[22] Lloyd-Jones adds that it is improbable that an "actor's rehash" was substituted for the last part of the play.[23]

Lloyd-Jones, who has given the matter such careful study, brands as "subjective" the arguments for athetizing. There seems to him little doubt that certain passages toward the end of the *Seven* "contain many awkwardnesses and several singularities. But I am not convinced that they contain more of either than may be found in many passages of equal length whose authenticity has not been challenged. Aeschylus is not always a polished writer; if it were permitted to acknowledge this fact, his characteristic excellencies would be better appreciated and the characteristic difficulties his text presents would seem slightly less formidable."[24] Lloyd-Jones draws

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 112 ff., where Lloyd-Jones spells out his negative answer to the question: "How likely is it that an actor's copy which had undergone such drastic changes should have displaced the authentic text in the Alexandrian edition? We know that Lycurgus carried a proposal that official copies of the plays of the three great tragedians should be preserved ... We may well agree with Page (*Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*, p. 2) that 'it is unfortunately improbable that this law had any permanent effect.' But we know that about the year 330 official copies were made, presumably by intelligent persons; and even if we prefer not to believe Plutarch's story of how the original master-copy prepared by Lycurgus and deposited in the Athenian archives came to Alexandria, it seems likely that these official texts were among the copies of the plays on which the Alexandrian scholars based their editions ... Sporadic actors' interpolations are one thing, the replacement of a famous play by an actors' rehash of it is another ... Certainly the thing is not impossible; but it would be a good deal more singular than any of those who have asserted it have paused to remark."

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

his argument against athetization to an end by granting that "a convincing forgery is always possible ... but unless the athetizers are able to adduce objective evidence a good deal more convincing than has yet been brought forward, I shall continue to think, as I do now, that to talk as if it were certain, or anything like certain, that the final scenes were an actor's rehash is to vary considerably beyond the conclusion that is warranted by the known evidence."[25] Lloyd-Jones seems to be correct.

Although neither the adequacy of the history of ancient Western educational thought nor the interpretation of Aeschylean tragedies is touched deeply by understanding the Epigoni, that does help understand the manner in which Aeschylus ended the *Seven*. Aeschylus did not have to be concerned with the fact that the House of Oedipus had been ended. The Greeks had one legend which said that the sons of the Argive champions (Epigoni translates "those born after") would return to the assault ten years later.[26] In a way this ten-year period may be thought the equivalent of the ten-year siege of Troy. As Troy, Thebes would pass under the rule of the Epigoni. This myth allowed Aeschylus to concentrate his attention on moral lessons he could artfully make the Laius-Oedipus stories fit. He did not have to think of the future of Thebes—perhaps leaving the possibilities of another trilogy with the destiny of the Epigoni. This being the way I see it, there is no reason to write more than a few lines about the sons of the Argive champions.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[26] One tradition held the Epigoni were sons of all the Argive champions while another had them only two, Thersander, son of Polyneices, and Laodamas, son of Eteocles.

REFERENCES

Adcock, F. E. *Thucydides and His History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Adkins, Arthur W. H. *Merit and Responsibility.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.

— *Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greece.* London: Chatto & Windus, 1972.

Aeschylus. *Agamemnon.* Edited by John D. Denniston & Denys Page. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.

— *Agamemnon.* 3 Vols. Edited with a commentary by Eduard Fraenkel. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.

— *Agamemnon, Libation Bearers, Eumenides, Fragments.* 2 Vols. Translated by Herbert W. Smyth. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1926, 1929. 2nd ed. edited by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

— *The House of Atreus.* Adapted from the *Oresteia* by John Lewin. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

— *Oresteia.* Translated and with an Introduction by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

— *Prometheus Bound and Other Plays.* Translated with an Introduction by Philip Vellacott. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1961.

— *Prometheus Bound.* Translated by Rex Warner. Percy Bysshe Shelley. *Prometheus Unbound.* New York: Heritage Press, 1966.

Alexanderson, Bengt. "Forebodings in the Agamemnon." *Eranos,* 67 (1969), 1-23.

Anderson, Michael. "The Imagery of the *Persians.*" *G & R* (second series), (October 1972), 166-174.

Andrewes, A. *The Greek Tyrants.* New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

Apollodorus. *The Library.* 2 Vols. Translated by Sir James G. Frazer. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1921.

Aristophanes. *Five Comedies of Aristophanes.* Edited by Andrew Chiappe, translated by Benjamin B. Rogers. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955.

— *The Frogs.* Translated by Dudley Fitts. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955.

Aristotle. *The Works of Aristotle.* Translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-52. Vols. II, IV, VIII, X, XI.

Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp. New York: Hafner, 1950.

Arnott, Peter. *Greek Scenic Conventions.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

Atkinson, John W. (ed.) *Motives in Fantasy, Action and Society.* Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1958.
— "The Point of View," in John W. Atkinson (ed.) *Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society.* Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1958, 1-6.

Babbitt, Irving. *The Dhammapada.* (Translated from the Pali). New York: Oxford University Press, 1936.
Bacchylides: Complete Poems. Translated by Robert Fagles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
Bachofen, Johann J. *Mutterrecht und Urreligion.* Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1954.
Bacon, Helen W. "The Shield of Eteocles." *Arion,* 3 (1964), No. 3, 27-38.
Banks, J. *The Works of Hesiod, Callimachus, and Theognis.* London: Henry G. Bohn, 1856.
Beaujon, Edmond. *Némésis ou la Limite: essai d'humanisme dialectique.* Paris: Gallimard, 1965.
Beck, Frederick A. G. *Greek Education 450-350 B.C.* London: Methuen, 1964.
Benardete, S. "The Crimes and Arts of Prometheus." *RhM,* 107 (1964), 126-139.
— "Two Notes on Aeschylus' *Septem.*" (1st Part), *WS* (1967), 22-30; (2nd Part), *WS* (1968), 5-17.
Boardman, John, Jose Dörig, Werner Fuchs, Max Himer. *Greek Art and Architecture.* New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1967.
Bonner, Robert J. *Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.
Bonner, Robert J., & Gertrude Smith. *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle.* 2 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.
Borthwick, E. K. "Two Notes on Athena as Protectoress." *Hermes,* 97 (December 1969), 385-91.
Bowra, C. M. *Homer and His Forerunners.* Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1955.
— *Pindar.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.
— *Tradition and Design in the Iliad.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930.
Breve, Helmut. *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen.* I. Darstellung. II. Anmerkungen. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1967.
Bridges, Robert. *Prometheus the Firegiver.* London: George Bell, 1883.
Broadhead, H. D. *The* Persae *of Aeschylus.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Browning, Elizabeth B. *The Greek Christian Poets and the English Poets.* London: Chapman & Hall, 1863.
— *Prometheus Bound and Other Poems.* London: Ward, Lock & Nowden, 1896.
— *Prometheus Bound and Other Poems including Sonnets from the Portuguese.* New York: C. S. Francis, 1852.
Burn, Andrew Robert. *The Lyric Age of Greece.* London: Edward Arnold, 1960.
— *The World of Hesiod: A Study of the Greek Middle Ages.* c. 900-700 B.C. London: Kegan Paul, 1936.
Burns, Alfred. "The Meaning of the *Prometheus Vinctus.*" *G & M,* 27 (1966), 65-78.
Bury, J. B. *A History of Greece.* London: Macmillan, 1927.
Bush, Douglas. *Mythology and the Romantic Tradition in English Poetry.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937.

Butcher, S. H. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art.* New York: Dover Publications, 1951. (Containing a critical text and translation on the Poetics. A prefatory essay on Aristotelian Literary Criticism has been written by John Gassner.)

Butts, H. R. *The Glorification of Athens in Greek Drama.* A doctoral dissertation lithographed by Edwards Brothers, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1947.

Byron. *The Complete Poetical Works of Lord Byron.* Edited by Paul E. More. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1905.

— *The Works of Lord Byron.* Edited by Ernest H. Coleridge. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905.

Calder, William M. III. "Aeschylus' *Philoctetes*," *GRBS* II (Autumn 1970), 171-179.

Cameron, H. D. " 'Epigoni' and the Law of Inheritance in Aeschylus' *Septem.*" *GRBS*, 9 (Autumn, 1968), 247-257.

Campbell, Lewis. *Religion in Greek Literature.* London: Longmans Green, 1898.

Cantarella, R. *I nuovi frammenti eschilei di Ossirinco.* Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice. n.d.

Cantor, Norman F. *The English.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967. Vol. 1. "A History of Politics and Society to 1760," p. 32 ff.

Cataudella, Q. "Eschilo in Sicilia." *Dioniso*, 37 (1963), 5-24.

Cicero. *Tusculan Disputations.* Translated by J. E. King. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1927.

Claudel, Paul. *Correspondance, Paul Claudel et André Gide*, 1899-1926. Edited by Robert Mallet. Paris: Gallimard, 1949.

— *Oeuvres Complètes*, 22 Vols. Paris: NRF, Gallimard, 1950-67.

Clay, Diskin. " 'Aeschylus' Trigeron Mythos." *Hermes*, 97 (April 1969), 1-9.

Clough, A. H. *Plutarch's Lives of Illustrious Men.* Boston. Little, Brown, 1928.

Collings, N. E. "Medical Terms and Clinical Attitudes in Tragedians." *BICS*, 9 (1962), 43-55.

Cook, Arthur B. *Zeus.* 3 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925.

Cornford, F. M. *From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation.* New York: Harper & Row, 1957. Originally published in 1912.

— *Greek Religious Thought.* London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1923.

Cunningham, M. L. "A Fragment of Aeschylus' Aigyptioi?" *Rh. Mus.* 96 (1953), 223-31.

— "Second Thoughts on Oxyrhynchus Papyri, 2251." *Rh. Mus.* 105 (1962), 189-90.

Davreux, Juliette. *La Légende de la Prophétesse Cassandre.* Liège: Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège. Fascicule XCIV, 1942.

Dawe, R. D. *The Collation and Investigation of Manuscripts of Aeschylus.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.

— "The Place of the Hymn to Zeus in Aeschylus' Agamemnon." *Eranos*, 64 (1966), 1-21.

— *Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965.

— "Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia." *HSCP*, 72 (1967), 89-123.

Day, James & Mortimer Chambers. *Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.

De Romilly, Jacqueline. *La Crainte et l'Angoisse dans le Théâtre d'Eschyle.* Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1959.

— *Time in Greek Tragedy.* Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968.

Diamantopoulos, A. "The Danaid Tetralogy of Aeschylus." *JHS*, 77 (Part 2), (1957), 220-229.

Dietrich, B. C. *Death, Fate and the Gods.* London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1965.

Dodds, E. R. *The Ancient Concept of Progress.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

— *The Greeks and the Irrational.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951.

— "Morals and Politics in the 'Oresteia'." *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.*, No. 186 (n.s., No. 6), (1960), 19-31.

Drinkwater, John. *The Pilgrim of Eternity: Byron—A Conflict.* New York: George H. Doran, 1925.

Duchemin (de Romilly), Jacqueline. *L'ΑΓΩΝ dans la Tragédie Grecque.* Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1945.

Dumortier, Jean. *Le Vocabulaire Médical d'Eschyle et les Ecrits Hippocratiques.* Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1935.

Dyer, R. R. "The Evidence for Apolline Purification Rituals at Delphi and Athens." *JHS*, 89 (9, 1969), 38-56.

Earp, F. R. *The Style of Aeschylus.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

— *The Way of the Greeks.* London: Oxford University Press, 1929.

Else, Gerald F. *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.

— *The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy.* Cambridge. Published for Oberlin College by Harvard University Press, 1965.

— "The Origin of *ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΙΑ*," *Hermes*, 1 (1957), 17-46.

Fine, John V. A. *Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security, and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens.* Baltimore: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951. (*Hesperia*: supplement 9).

Finley, John H., Jr. *Pindar and Aeschylus.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955.

Finley, Moses I. *Slavery in Classical Antiquity.* Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1960.

— *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B.C.: The Horos-Inscriptions.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951.

Fitton-Brown, A. D. "Promethia." *JHS*, 79 (1959), 52-60.

Fontenrose, Joseph. "Gods and Man in the *Oresteia*," *TAPhA*, 102 (1971), 71-109.

Fowler, Barbara Hughes. "Aeschylus' Imagery." *C & M* 28 (1970), 1-74.

— "The Dramatic Use of Imagery in Aeschylus." Doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr College, 1954.

— "The Imagery of the *Prometheus Bound.*" *AJPh*, 78 (1957), 173-84.

— "The Imagery of the *Seven Against Thebes.*" (1970), 24-37.

Fraenkel, Eduard. "Aeschylus: New Texts and Old Problems." *Proceedings of the British Academy.* London: Oxford University Press, 1942, 236-247.

Freeman, Kathleen. *The Works and Life of Solon.* London: Humphrey Milford, 1926.
Freeman, Kenneth J. *Schools of Hellas.* London: Macmillan, 1922.
French, A. "The Economic Background to Solon's Reforms." *CQ*, 6 (n.s., January 1956), 11-25.
— "The Party of Peisistratos." *G & R*, 6 (2nd series, 1959), 46-57.
— "Solon and the Megerian Question." *JHS*, 77 (9, 1957), 238-46.
Frenzel, Elisabeth. *Stoffe der Weltliteratur: ein Lexikon dichtungsgeschichtlicher Längsschnitte. 2., überarbeitete Aufl.* Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 1963.
Frisch, Hartvig. *The Constitution of the Athenians.* København: Gyldendalske, 1942.

Garvie, A. F. *Aeschylus'* Supplices: *Play and Trilogy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Gassner, John & Ralph G. Allen. *Theatre and Drama in the Making.* Vol. 1. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964.
Gide, André. *Le Prométhée Mal Enchaîné.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1925. (Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française.)
Goethe, J. W. von. *Briefe.* 3 Vols. Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1962.
— *The Works of J. W. von Goethe.* Edited by Nathan H. Dole, 14 Vols. London: Francis A. Niccolls, n.d., IX.
Golden, Leon. *In Praise of Prometheus: Humanism and Rationalism in Aeschylean Thought.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962.
— "Zeus, Whoever He Is ..." *TAPhA*, 92 (1961), 156-67.
Grabo, Carl. *A Newton Among Poets: Shelley's Use of Sciences in Prometheus Unbound.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930.
Graves, Robert. *The Greek Myths.* 2 Vols. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1964.
Greene, William Chase. *Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963.
Grene, David & Richmond Lattimore (eds.). *The Complete Greek Tragedies.* 3 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
Grube, G. M. A. "Zeus in Aeschylus." *AJPh*, 91 (1970), 43-51.
Guthrie, W. K. C. *The Greeks and Their Gods.* London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1950.
— *Orpheus and Greek Religion.* London: Methuen, 1935.

Hammond, G. L. "Personal Freedom and Its Limitations in the *Oresteia.*" *JHS*, 85 (1965), 42-55.
Hands, A. R. "Ostraka and the Laws of Ostracism—Some Possibilities and Assumptions." *JHS*, 79 (1959), 69-79.
Harrison, Jane E. *Epilogemena to the Study of Greek Religion and Themis.* New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1962.
— *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion.* New York: Meridian Books, 1955.
— *Themis: A Study in the Social Origins of Greek Religion.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912.
Harry, Joseph E. *Greek Tragedy.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1933. Vol. 1: *Aeschylus and Sophocles.*

Havelock, Eric A. *The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1951.
— *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
Heichelheim, Fritz M. *An Ancient Economic History.* 2 Vols. Translated by Joyce Stevens. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij N. V., 1958, 1964.
Heinemann, Karl. *Die Tragischen Gestalten der Griechen in der Weltliteratur.* Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920. Vol. 1.
Heitsch, Ernest. "Das Prometheus-Gedicht bei Hesiod." *RhM*, 106 (1963), 1-15.
Herington, C. J. "Aeschylus in Sicily." *JHS*, 87 (1967), 74-85.
— "Aeschylus: The Last Phase." *Arion*, 4 (1965), 387-403.
— *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias: A Study in the Religion of Periclean Athens.* Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1955.
— *The Author of the* Prometheus Bound. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970.
— "Some Evidence for a Late Dating of the *Prometheus Vinctus.*" *CR*, 14 (1964), 239-40.
— "A Study in the *Prometheia.*" Pt. I, *Phoenix*, 17 (1963), 180-97; and Pt. II, *Ibid.*, 236-243.
Herodotus. *The Histories of Herodotus.* 2 Vols. Translated by Harry Carter. New York: Heritage Press, 1958.
Hesiod. *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica.* Translated by Hugh G. Evelyn-White. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964.
— *The Works and Days. Theogony. The Shield of Herakles.* Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959.
Hignett, C. *A History of the Athenian Constitution.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952.
Homer. *The Iliad.* Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
— *The Odyssey of Homer.* Translated by Robert Fitzgerald. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963.
Hooker, J. T. "The Sacrifice of Iphigenia in the *Agamemnon.*" *Agon*, 2 (1968), 59-65.

Ingram, Winnington R. P. "The Danaid Trilogy of Aeschylus." *JHS*, 81 (1961), 141-152.
Italie, Gabriel. *Index Aeschylus.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954-55.

Jacoby, Felix. *Atthis.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.
Jaeger, Werner. "The Greeks and the Education of Man." *Bard College Papers.* Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Bard College, 1953.
— *Paideia: (3 Vols.) The Ideals of Greek Culture.* Translated by Gilbert Highet. Oxford: Blackwell, 1939-1944.
Jebb, R. C. *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos.* 2 Vols. New York: Russel & Russell, 1962.
Jepsen, Laura. *Ethical Aspects of Tragedy.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953.
Johansen, Friis H. "Codex Scurialensis T. I. 15 and the Transmission of Aeschylus' *Suppliants.*" *GRBS*, 9 (Winter, 1968), 359-383.
Jones, A. H. M. *Athenian Democracy.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957.
Jones, Walter J. *The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.

Kakridis, Johannes T. 1958. "Classical Tragedy in the Light of New Texts," 141-153. In *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Classical Studies.* International Federation of Associations for Classical Studies. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard.

Kels, J. H. "Aeschylus, Eumenides 213-224, and Athenian Marriage." *CP*, 56 (1961), 169-73.

Kerényi, C. *Prometheus: Archetypal Image of Human Existence.* Translated by Ralph Manheim. Bollingen Series 65. I. New York: Bollingen Foundation, Pantheon Books, 1963.

Kirk, G. A. & J. E. Raven. *The Presocratic Philosophers.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.

Kitto, H. D. F. *Form and Meaning in Drama.* London: Methuen, 1956.

— *Greek Tragedy.* New York: Barnes & Nobel, 1961.

Knox, Bernard M. W. "Aeschylus and the Third Actor." *AJPh*, 93 (January 1972), 104-24.

Kramer, Frank R. "The Altar of Right: Reality and Power in Aeschylus." *CJ*, 56 (October 1960), 33-38.

Kreutz, Christian. *Das Prometheussymbol in der Dichtung der englischen Romantik.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963.

Kuhns, Richard. *The House, the City, and the Judge.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962.

Lattimore, Richmond. "The First Elegy of Solon." *AJPh*, 68 (1947), 2.

— *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.

Lesky, Albin. "Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus." *JHS*, 86 (1966), 78-85.

— "Die Datierung der Hiketiden und Der Tragiker Mesatos." *Hermes*, 82 (1954), 1-13.

— *Die Tragische Dichtung der Hellenen.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956.

— "Eteokles in den Sieben gegen Theben." *WS*, 73 (1960), 5-17.

— *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur.* Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1963.

— *Greek Tragedy.* Translated by H. A. Frankfort. With a Foreword by E. G. Turner. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965.

Lessing, Gotthold E. *Laöcoön.* Translated by Ellen Frothingham. Boston: Little Brown, 1904.

Levin, Donald N. "Ethical Implications of the πέρας-ἄπειρον Dichotomy as Seen Particularly in the Works of Aeschylus." Doctoral Dissertation. Harvard University, 1956.

Liddell, Henry G. & Robert Scott. *Greek-English Lexicon.* London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Little, Alan M. G. *Myth and Society in Attic Drama.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1942.

Lloyd-Jones, Hugh. "Agamemnonea." *HSCP*, 73 (1969), 97-104.

— "The End of the Seven Against Thebes," *CQ*, 9 (May 1959), No. 1, 80-115.

— "The Guilt of Agamemnon." *CQ*, 12 (1962), 187-199.

— *The Justice of Zeus.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971.

— "The Robes of Iphigeneia." *CR*, 66 (1952), 132-35.
— "Three Notes on Aeschylus' Agamemnon." *Rh. Mus.*, 103 (1960), 76-80.
— "Zeus in Aeschylus." *JHS*, 76 (1956), 55-67.
Lobel, E., C. H. Robert, & E. P. Wegener (trans. & eds.). *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri.* Part XVIII. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1941.
— *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri.* Part XX. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1952, p. 167.
Long, Herbert S. "Notes on Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound." *Proceedings, American Philosophic Society*, 102 (1958), 229-280.
Lovell, Ernest J., Jr. (ed.). *His Very Self and Voice: Collected Conversations of Lord Byron.* New York: Macmillan, 1954.
Lowell, Robert. *Prometheus Bound.* New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1969.
Lucian. "Dialogues of the Gods." In *Lucian*, Vol. 7. Translated by A. M. Harmon. New York: G. P. Putnam, 7 (1919), 257-261.

Macurdy, Grace H. *The Quality of Mercy.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940.
Marrou, Henri I. *A History of Education in Antiquity.* Translated by George Lamb. New York: New American Library, 1964.
Matheson, William H. *Claudel and Aeschylus: A Study of Claudel's Translation of the Oresteia.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, n.d.
McDonald, William A. *Progress into the Past: the Rediscovery of Mycenaean Civilization.* New York: Macmillan, 1967.
McKay, A. G. "Aeschylean Studies 1955-1964, I, II." *CW*, 59 (1965), 40-48; 65-73.
— "A Survey of Recent Works on Aeschylus." *CW*, 48 (1955), 145-50; 153-59.
Molitor, Michael. "The Life of Aischylos: A Preliminary Sketch." (Unpublished manuscript.)
Murray, Gilbert. *Aeschyli: Septem Quae Supersunt Tragoediae.* Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano. MDCCCCLV.
— *Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy.* Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940.

Nietzsche, Frederick. *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals.* Translated by Francis Golffing. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956.
Nilsson, Martin P. *Cults, Myths, Oracles and Politics in Ancient Greece.* Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1951.
— *Geschichte der griechischen Religion.* I. *Bis zur griechischen Weltherrschaft.* München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1941.
— *Greek Folk Religion.* New York: Harper, 1961.
— *Greek Piety.* Translated by Herbert J. Rose. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.
— *Greek Popular Religion.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.
— *A History of Greek Religion.* Translated by F. J. Fielden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.
— *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and Its Survival in Greek Religion.* Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1927.
— *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932.
North, Helen. *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature.* Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966.

Oliver, James H. *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950.
— *Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960.
Onians, Richard B. *The Origins of European Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.
Otto, Walter F. *The Homeric Gods.* (Translated by Moses Hadas.) New York: Pantheon, 1954.
Owen, E. T. *The Harmony of Aeschylus.* Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1952.

Page, D. L. *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.
Patzer, Harold. "Die dramatische Handlung der *Sieben gegen Theben.*" *HSCP*, 63 (1958), 97-119.
Pearson, Lionel. *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962.
Peradotto, John J., Jr. "Cledonomancy in the *Oresteia.*" *AJPh*, 90 (1969), 1-21.
— "Time and the Pattern of Change in Aeschylus' *Oresteia.*" Doctoral Dissertation. Northwestern University, 1963.
Pickard-Cambridge, Arthur. *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy.* 2nd ed. Revised by T. B. L. Webster. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
— *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
— *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
Pindar. *The Odes of Pindar.* Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.
Plato. *The Dialogues of Plato.* 2 Vols. Translated by B. Jowett, with an introduction by Raphael Demos. New York: Random House, 1937.
— *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus.* Translated by H. N. Fowler. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1926.
— *Gorgias.* A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by E. R. Dodds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.
— *Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus.* New York: G. P. Putnam, 1924.
— *Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias.* Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1925.
— *The Republic.* 2 Vols. Translated by Paul Shorey. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1930.
— *Sophist.* Translated by Harold N. Fowler. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1928.
Plutarch. *Plutarch's Lives of Illustrious Men.* Corrected from the Greek and revised by A. H. Clough. Boston: Little Brown, 1928.
Podlecki, Anthony J. "The Character of Eteocles in Aeschylus' *Septem.*" *TAPhA*, 95 (1964), 283-299.
— *The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966.
— "Politics in Aeschylus' Supplices." *CF*, 26 (1972), 67-71.
— "Reciprocity in *Prometheus Bound.*" *GRBS*, 10 (Winter, 1969), 287-292.
Pohlenz, Max. *Die griechische Tragödie.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954.
Pollard, J. R. T. "Birds in Aeschylus." *G & R*, 17 (1948), 116-127.

Pope, M. W. M. "Athena's Development in Homeric Epic." *AJPh*, 81 (April 1960), 113-135.

Quincey, J. H. "Notes on the *Persae*." *CQ*, 12 (November 1962), No. 2, 182-186.

Reeves, Charles H. "The Parodos of the Agamemnon." *CJ*, 53 (1960), 165-71.
Reinhardt, Karl. *Aischylos als Regisseur und Theologe*. Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1949.
— "Vorschläge zum neuen Aischylos." *Hermes*, 85 (1957), 1-17.
Rivier, André. "Eschyle et le Tragique." *Etudes de lettres*, Lausanne, 6 (1963), 73-112.
Robertson, H. G. "The *Hybristês* in Aeschylus." *TAPhA*, 98 (1967), 373-382.
Rose, H. J. *A Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus*. 2 Vols. Amsterdam: N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1957.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Les Mouches*. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1943.
Schadewaldt, Wolfgang. *Die Niobe des Aischylos*. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1934.
Schmid, Wilhelm. *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*. In the series of Wilhelm von Christs and Otto Stahlin. I. *Klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur*. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1940.
Séchan, Louis. *Le Mythe de Prométhée*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951.
Seltman, Charles. "The Status of Women in Athens." *G & R*, 2 (2nd series, October 1955), No. 3, 119-124.
Shelley, Percy B. *Complete Works*. 10 Vols. Edited by Robert Ingpen & Walter E. Peck. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926-30. Vol. 2.
— *Prometheus Unbound*. London: Henry Frowde, 1910.
— *Shelley's Prometheus Unbound*. Variorum edition by Lawrence J. Zillman. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959.
Shepherd, William R. *Historical Atlas*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1956.
Siegmann, Ernst. *Literarische griechische Texte der Heidelberger Papyrussammlung*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag, 1956.
Singer, Charles et al. (eds.). *A History of Technology*. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.
Smyth, Herbert Weir. (trans.) *Aeschylus, Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, Eumenides, Fragments*. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1926. Vol. II.
— *Aeschylean Tragedy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924.
Solmsen, Friedrich. "The Erinyes in Aischylos' *Septem*." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 68 (1937), 197-211.
— *Hesiod and Aeschylus*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959.
Sommerstein, A. H. "Aeschylus, Agamemnon 126-30." *CR*, 31 (New Series), (1971), 1-3.
Srebrny, Stefan. *Wort und Gedanke bei Aischylos*. Warsaw: Zaklad Narodowy Imienia Ossolinskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1964.
Stevens, E. B. "Some Attic Commonplaces of Pity." *AJPh*, 64 (1944), 1-25.
Stoessl, F. "Aeschylus as a Political Thinker." *AJPh*, 63 (1952), 113-131.
Strauss, Leo. *On Tyranny*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

Tardieu, Jean. "Tonnerre sans orage." *Poèmes A Jouer.* Théâtre, II. Paris: Gallimard, 1960.
Thomson, George. *Aeschylus and Athens.* London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1941.
Thomson, J. A. K. "The Religious Background of the *Prometheus Vinctus.*" *HSCP*, 31 (1920), 1-37.
Thucydides. *Thucydides.* 2 Vols. Translated into English by B. Jowett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881.
Toplin, Oliver. "Aeschylean Silences and Silences in Aeschylus." *HSPh* (1972), 57-97.
Trousson, Raymond. *Le Thème de Prométhée dans la Littérature Européenne.* 2 Vols. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964.

Untersteiner, Mario. *Guida bibliografica ad Eschilo.* Arona, Italy: Paideia, 1947.
— *The Sophists.* Translated by Kathleen Freeman. Oxford: Blackwell, 1954.

Vandvik, Eirik. "The Prometheus of Hesiod and Aeschylus," *Norske Videnskaps-Akademi.* Oslo II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse, 1942, No. 2. (Oslo, 1943).
Verdenius, W. J. "Homer, the Educator of the Greeks." *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd.* Letterkunde Nieuwe Reeks. Vol. 33, No. 5, 207-27.

Wade-Gery, H. T. "Eupatridai, Archons, and Areopagus." *CQ*, 25 (1931), 1-11; 77-89.
— "Studies in the Structure of Attic Society: II. The Law of Kleisthenes." *CQ*, 27 (1933), 17-29.
Walzel, Oskar. *Das Prometheussymbol von Shaftesbury zu Goethe.* München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1932.
Wartelle, André. *German Romanticism.* Translated by Alma E. Lussky. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1932.
— *Histoire du Texte d'Eschyle dans l'Antiquité.* Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1971.
Wasserman, Earl R. *Shelley's Prometheus Unbound: A Critical Reading.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.
Waters, K. H. "Solon's 'Price-Equalisation'." *JHS*, 80 (1960), 181-190.
Webster, T. B. L. *From Mycenae to Homer.* London: Methuen, 1964.
Whallon, W. "Why Is Artemis Angry?" *AJPh*, 82 (1961), 78-88.
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. *Aischylos: Interpretationen.* 2 Vols. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandelung, 1914.
Wilcox, Stanley. "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction." *HSCP*, 53 (1942).
Will, Frederic. "Prometheus and the Question of Self-Awareness in Greek Literature." *AJPh*, 83 (1962), 72-85.
Wills, Garry. "Aeschylus' Victory in 'The Frogs.' " *AJPh*, 90 (January 1969), 48-57.
Winnington-Ingram, R. P. "Clytemnestra and the Vote of Athena." *JHS*, 68 (1948), 130-147.
— "The Danaid Trilogy of Aeschylus," *JHS*, 81 (1961), 141-52.
— "The *Glaukos Pontios* of Aeschylus." *BICS*, 6 (1959), 58-59.
— "The Role of Apollo in the Oresteia." *CR*, 47 (1933), 97-104.

Wolf, Erik. *Griechisches Rechtsdenken*: *Vorsokratiker und frühe Dichter*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950.

Wolff, Emily A. "The Date of Aeschylus' Danaid Tetralogy." *Eranos*, 56 (1958), Nos. 3-4; 57 (1959), Nos. 1-2.

Wolff, Erwin. "Die Entscheidung des Eteokles in den *Sieben gegen Theben*." *HSCP*, 63 (1958), 89-95.

Wolff, Hans. "Marriage Law and Family Organization in Ancient Athens." *Traditio*, 2 (1944), 43-95.

Woodhouse, W. J. *Solon the Liberator*. London: Oxford University Press, 1958.

— "Studies in the Structure of Attic Society: I. Demontiondai." *CQ*, 25 (1931), 139-143.